

Pucinski Asserts 'Spy' Used CIA Grain Data

By DON KENDALL
Associated Press

A Midwest congressman says Central Intelligence Agency reports may have been used by a so-called international grain spy who fed inside tips to a Kansas City trade magazine about huge U.S. wheat sales to the Russians.

Rep. Roman C. Pucinski, D-Ill., told The Associated Press that the CIA earlier this year furnished the Agriculture Department with a detailed account of Soviet crop failures which led to the \$1 billion sale of U.S. wheat and other grain to Moscow.

Further, Pucinski said telephone calls purportedly made from London in July and August to Milling & Baking News, Kansas City, probably were placed by a USDA employee who had access to the CIA information.

The grain sales, including more than 400 million bushels of wheat, or one-fourth of the U.S. crop, have prompted allegations by Sen. George McGovern and others that private American grain companies were able to reap windfall profits because of inside information fed to them by Nixon administration farm officials.

A detailed account of a month-long series of phone calls to Kansas City by the mysterious tipster was published Oct. 3 by the magazine's editor, Morton Sosland.

The caller, at first identifying himself as "Mr. Smith" of the London Financial Times, provided Sosland with details—later proved to be accurate—on the timing and volume of the Soviet wheat purchases.

The calls began July 17, weeks before the public or the

grain industry was fully aware of the size of the Russian sales.

Sosland said his magazine delayed reports based on the calls because the informant's story seemed fantastic, but carried the stories later.

Pucinski, who is campaigning for the Senate seat held by Charles Percy, R-Ill., said he is certain the CIA gave the Agriculture Department a full report on the Russian crop situation, information which Pucinski said the department suppressed.

Discussing the telephone calls described by Sosland, the Illinois congressman said that of the conceivable possibilities it seemed most likely that the information was passed by a USDA employee.

"One of the insiders who had access to this CIA report might have been calling this editor (Sosland) in order to jack up grain prices," Pucinski said. "Obviously, the fact that this information was correct would indicate it could have come only from this CIA report."

There are other possible explanations, Pucinski said.

The caller might have been, as he eventually told Sosland, an international grain spy working out of London; an American grain trader who wanted to leak information to the public; or an agent of the CIA itself.

But the possible motivation for such calls remains a mystery.

Pucinski, however, said he sticks to his theory that the calls were made by an Agriculture Department employee with access to CIA reports.

That theory was disputed by Nathaniel F. Kossack, inspector general of USDA. Kossack told a reporter he had read Sosland's article and thought "it sounded like somebody looking into a crystal ball."

He said he doesn't know whether the FBI or Justice Department is investigating the grain-spy calls to Kansas City.

He said his own agency has "no jurisdiction" to investi-

Meanwhile, the Agriculture Department admits it uses CIA reports — along with other information — in developing analyses of the farm situation in the Soviet Union. Officials deny, however, that reports have been suppressed except where information involves security.

Fletcher Pope Jr., a specialist on Soviet agriculture in the Economic Research Service of USDA, told a reporter he routinely sees CIA reports in formulating estimates about the Soviet Union.

Informed of Sosland's report about the grain-spy telephone calls, Pope at first suggested the initial call — made to Sosland on July 17 — may have involved an educated guess based on information made public about then, indicating Soviet crop output was going to be down sharply this year.

Also, Pope said, President Nixon announced July 8 that a \$750 million credit deal to sell grain to the Soviets had been signed. That called for mostly feed grain, according to the interpretation at the time,

with wheat considered secondary.

As it turned out, the Russians by July 8 already had purchased massive quantities of U.S. wheat from private American firms, including Continental Grain Co. of New York City.

It also became apparent later that the Soviets had purchased far more grain than specified in the July 8 agreement announced by Nixon.

After questions over the Soviet-U.S. grain deal began in August, the White House ordered the FBI to investigate whether some private grain companies may have made large windfall profits.

Charges that job-shuttling between USDA and the private grain trade has produced a "cozy" relationship between federal farm officials and the grain industry have been labeled "bald-faced lies" by Agriculture Secretary Earl L. Butz.

Some congressmen say they will press for further hearings next year. Pucinski will insist the CIA question be raised then.

Chronology of U.S.-Hanoi Negotiations

Following is a chronology of the recent private negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam:

Sept. 26 and 27—For the 18th time since August, 1969, Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national security, meets privately in Paris with Le Duc Tho, a Hanoi Politburo member, and Xuan Thuy, North Vietnam's chief delegate to the Paris peace talks.

Oct. 8—Mr. Kissinger begins five days of talks in Paris with the North Vietnamese. According to Hanoi, Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy present "a new, extremely important initiative" in the form of a draft agreement. According to Mr. Kissinger, North Vietnam drops its demand for a coalition government prior to a military settlement.

Oct. 9—According to Hanoi, the United States proposes the following schedule: on Oct. 18 American bombing and mining of North Vietnam would be halted; on Oct. 19 both the United States and North

Vietnam would initial the text of the cease-fire agreement, and on Oct. 26 the foreign ministers of both countries would formally sign the agreement in Paris.

Oct. 10—Ellsworth Bunker, United States Ambassador in Saigon, meets with the South Vietnamese President, Nguyen Van Thieu, for the third time within a week. Mr. Kissinger's luggage is taken off a jet at the last minute, and he remains in Paris to continue talks with North Vietnamese-Hanoi says that President Nixon sends a message to Premier Pham Van Dong confirming the completion of the agreement but also raising "a number of complex points."

Oct. 11—Mr. Kissinger meets again with the North Vietnamese. According to Hanoi, the United States proposes a change in the schedule: bombing and mining would be stopped Oct. 21, the agreement initiated Oct. 22 and formally signed Oct. 30. Hanoi says it agrees to the change.

Oct. 12—Mr. Kissinger returns to Washington to brief President Nixon. In Saigon, President Thieu tells a youth rally of his opposition to a coalition with the Communists.

Oct. 17—Mr. Kissinger, in Paris again, is said by Hanoi to have "reached agreement on almost all problems." North Vietnam says only two unspecified points of disagreement remain. Mr. Kissinger flies to Saigon.

Oct. 18—Mr. Kissinger begins discussions with President Thieu. In Paris, a spokesman for the North Vietnamese delegation, Nguyen Thanh Le, denounces the United States position as "erroneous and intransigent."

Oct. 20—Mr. Kissinger confers with President Thieu again. Hanoi says the United States asks again for a change in the schedule, to which North Vietnam agrees:

a bombing and mining halt Oct. 23, an initialing of the agreement Oct. 24 and formal signing Oct. 31. According to Hanoi, this schedule was never officially altered.

Oct. 21—Mr. Kissinger again confers with President Thieu, then flies to Phnompenh to brief Cambodia's President, Lon Nol.

Oct. 22—Mr. Kissinger meets with President Thieu. Hanoi says that both the United States and North Vietnam have agreed to the text of the agreement and the schedule.

Oct. 23—After another Kissinger-Thieu meeting, the South Vietnamese President calls in his commanders of the four military regions, the 44 province chiefs and many of the 559 provincial councilors. Mr. Kissinger returns to Washington. According to Hanoi, the United States cites "difficulties in Saigon" and demands continued negotiations, but "did not say anything about the implementation of its commitments under the agreed schedule," Hanoi contends.

Oct. 24—President Thieu, in a speech, declares the proposals discussed by Mr. Kissinger in Paris unacceptable.

Two Germanys in market for spies

From JOHN GOSHKO, Bonn, October 3

The two women spies exchanged by West Germany for more than 100 prisoners from the East has focused attention on a little known aspect of commerce between the two Germanys — a lively traffic in human beings.

Such exchanges have been going on for nine years. Officials here say privately that since 1969 they have arranged the release to the West of about 1,000 people held in East German jails.

Until now the Federal Government was loth even to admit its role in these "buying out" deals for fear of endangering these operations, and the West German public has been generally unaware of the size of this system of exchanges.

The practice received renewed notice a few days ago when Government officials here confirmed press reports that two spies, Liane Lindner, and Irene Schultz, had been handed over to East Germany in exchange for more than 100 political prisoners. Both women had been in prison 30 months, awaiting trial on charges of espionage against West Germany.

Mrs Schultz had been the personal secretary to the then Federal Minister of Science and Research, and she allegedly had passed to Mrs Lindner papers describing the private meetings of Chancellor Brandt's Cabinet.

The case was unusual because the Minister for Inter-German Affairs, Herr Franke, took pains to issue a statement confirming the Government's part in the exchange. Evidently he deviated from the usually discreet diplomatic tactics because first reports of the women's release were "highly inaccurate" and handled by the opposition press "in a way that constituted a partisan attack on the Government."

Privately Government officials say that the system of "buying out" began in 1963 during the chancellorship of Dr Erhard and was initiated by Dr Barzel, now the leader of the Christian Democrat Opposition, and an aspiring Chancellor next

month. In 1963, Dr Barzel was Minister for Inter-German Affairs.

Since then the exchanges have been a regular part of the uneasy relations between the two Germanys. Usually prisoners held by the two sides are exchanged or West Germany "buys" East German prisoners for goods or cash.

One of the more sensational instances was the release in February 1969 of Heinz Felfe, a Soviet agent who had infiltrated West German intelligence for 10 years. He was released in exchange for three Heidelberg University students detained in the Soviet Union on charges of spying for the Central Intelligence Agency. Bonn's view is that the East Germans deliberately stockpile hostages as a bargaining counter to secure the release of specific agents imprisoned in the West.

For this reason senior members of West Germany's security services generally frown on the system on the grounds that the East Germans are better able to recruit spies by promising them a speedy "buy out" if they are caught.

In spite of such objections, the Federal Government has continued to exchange imprisoned spies because, as one official says, "the advantages generally outweigh the disadvantages."

"Most of those exchanged are little fish to begin with. Once they have been caught and identified, their usefulness to East Germany as agents is ended."

Most of those held in East Germany have been released by "direct purchase." On occasion, this has involved shipping such commodities as citrus fruit or medicines. But for the most part German Marks are paid out to satisfy East German hard currency demands.

Publicity surrounding the Lindner-Schultz affair might depress the chances of further exchanges for a time. But East Germany's need for hard currency and concern for its agents should allow business to resume soon. — Washington Post.

Indira tells Rogers : Proof of CIA guilt not needed

New Delhi, Oct. 9.

PRIME MINISTER Indira Gandhi refused today to give Secretary of State William P. Rogers the proof he is reported to have requested to substantiate her charges that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency is active in India.

«Everyone knows that CIA has been active in India and there is no question of proving it,» the Prime Minister told a national convention of her Congress Party in central Ahmadabad city, according to Indian news agencies.

«When any foreign intelligence agency comes here, what does it do ? This does not need any proof.

Mr. Rogers was understood to have asked Foreign Minister Swaran Singh during a meeting in New York last Thursday for proof of charges that the CIA was interfering in India's internal affairs — a charge denied by the State Department.

Opposition politicians and leading Indian newspapers also have urged the government to back up the charges, which were first made three weeks ago by the Congress Party President Shankar Al Sharma. Mrs. Gandhi personally entered the controversy last Tuesday warning partymen in Eastern Bihar state to be vigilant against the CIA.

Welcomed assurance

She repeated the warning at the national convention.

At the same time, she welcomed Mr. Rogers assurance to Swaran Singh that the United States did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

«If this signifies a change in policy, we welcome it,» she said, «but we must always be vigilant.»

The Prime Minister said that even foreign scholars had been used for CIA purposes. She did not elaborate but claimed her government had information that scholars had been given «other tasks» beside research.

The Indian Government, with rare exceptions, has stopped issuing visas to American scholars in the past several months. — AP.

16 OCT 1972

CIA Activity Becomes Issue in Indian Politics

By Lewis Simons

Washington Post Foreign Service

NEW DELHI, Oct. 15 —

Not a day seems to go by lately in which every newspaper front page in town isn't shouting about the dire effect the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency is having, isn't having or may be having on India's internal security.

"CIA activities on the rise, warns Mrs. Gandhi," the sober and respected daily Hindu proclaimed yesterday across four columns in the middle of page one.

There would be "no inquiry into CIA activities," countered the equally prestigious Statesman on the same day, explaining further in the sub headline that "Mrs. Gandhi rejects opposition demand."

"CIA hand in gramophones" was the eye-catcher on a small but widely used item distributed by the Press Trust of India earlier in the week.

In the tribal areas of Arunachal Pradesh, readers were told, CIA agents were suspected of passing out cardboard record players and plastic discs which, although they had not yet been translated, "Perhaps carried messages preaching Christianity."

The propaganda outbursts against the CIA were started by leaders of the ruling Congress Party for as yet undisclosed reasons. But then, as the government sought to cool off the issue, opposition forces sensed an opportunity to embarrass the Congress Party and are not letting the matter die.

And, as though conceding the obvious confusion among government leaders, politicians, newspaper editors and just folks, the rightwing Motherland entitled its latest offering on CIA: "It's here, it's not here, it's growing."

That "it's here" is beyond doubt. Not even officials of the U.S. Embassy or the most ardently pro-capitalist members of the Jan Sangh or Swatantra parties would deny that the CIA is as

much a fact of American life in India as is the steamy duck pond in the center of the embassy building.

But beyond that there is doubt. No one really knows the extent of CIA operations in India except the CIA, and they're not talking.

Much of the doubt can be attributed to the on-again, off-again approach Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her senior ministers have taken and their refusal to come forward with any evidence more solid than a cardboard gramophone to prove that CIA activities were detrimental to India.

"Everyone knows that the CIA has been active in India and there is no question of proving it," Mrs. Gandhi huffed last week. But her political opponents are not willing to let it go at that.

During a meeting last Friday of the parliamentary consultative committee, a sort of mini Parliament in the off-season, three opposition leaders demanded that the government publish a white paper on CIA activities.

The prime minister reportedly refused. According to opposition members who attended the session, she first claimed that CIA activities were under control but later said they "are on the increase and we must continue our vigil."

Thus the confusion. It all began two weeks ago when the president of Mrs. Gandhi's ruling Congress Party, Dr. Shankar Dayal Sharma, proclaimed that the shadowy hand of the CIA was behind a spreading rash of student rioting, communal unrest and other violence in diverse areas of the country.

Initial reaction was divided among those who believed that Sharma, who took over the party just five months ago, was trying to make a name for himself and others who were convinced he was acting on orders from Mrs. Gandhi.

Sharma continued to make charges. There was specific evidence, he said, that the disruptive elements, particularly right-wing, anti-social-

ist political parties. But he refused to divulge any evidence.

Then, during a visit to the Bihar town of Ranchi, Mrs. Gandhi was quoted very briefly as confirming Sharma's accusation and saying it was for the CIA to prove it was not operating in India rather than for India to prove it was.

The president of the Swatantra Party which, in contrast to the Congress Party's socialistic approach strongly favors private enterprise, accused the Congress a few days ago of raising a CIA bogey to divert attention from Soviet secret service (KGB) activities in India.

The claim that India is becoming a political and economic appendage of the Soviet Union is growing rapidly among rightwing opposition parties. These organizations lost considerable strength in this year's state elections and some government analysts claim they are now following a pattern of fomenting violence in their former strongholds —with CIA help.

The most accepted general explanation for the outbursts of violence of the last month or so is that people are irate over high food prices, which have climbed as a result of this past summer's inadequate monsoon rains. In this view, the government needs the CIA for a scapegoat.

But sophisticated Indian specialists dismiss this view —although appealing in its neatness—as simplistic. For example, they note that the so-called language riots now going on in Assam, in the far northeastern corner of the country, are apparently nothing more than a revival of the periodic dispute between Bengali-speaking Muslims and Assamese-speaking tribal people.

Similarly, violence in New Delhi last month had apparently unrelated origins and participants were almost entirely young men who were probably just looking for some excitement. In fact, the

Home Ministry, which is headed by Mrs. Gandhi and which controls India's major intelligence organization, said it found no evidence of "outside inspiration" in the New Delhi violence.

However, expert observers agree, none of this is meant to suggest that the CIA—or the KGB as well as dozens of other foreign intelligence organizations, both Eastern and Western—is not constantly at work in India. But the activities of these organizations are believed to be more subtle than the Congress Party and government allege.

"It's intelligence-gathering, it's a search for 'friends,' it's a contest for influence," commented one senior Indian journalist during a recent private conversation.

Journalists, in fact, find themselves regular targets of this "search for friends." According to several top reporters on leading New Delhi and out-of-town journals, those foreign missions most lavish in their treatment of Indian journalists are, on the "Western" side, the Americans, the West Germans and the South Koreans. In the Communist camp, it's the Soviet Union, the Poles, Czechs and North Koreans who extend the greatest "hospitality."

Concerned over the effect such influence may have on newsmen, bureaucrats, scholars and others, the government is planning to pass a bill in the coming Parliament session which will severely limit the foreign "hospitality" Indians may accept. The bill would sharply curtail press junkets, foreign scholarships and other travel at the invitation of all foreign countries.

Similarly, the government is phasing out foreign voluntary agencies, including the U.S. Peace Corps. By 1974, voluntary agencies from the United States, Japan, West Germany, Britain, Canada, Sweden and Australia will no longer be allowed to operate in India.

The government contends that activity of certain American scholars are even more menacing than those of some Peace Corps volunteers, who until the beginning

continued

of this year had their studies in India paid for by U.S. government holdings of rupees under Public Law 480, have also been gathering intelligence for the CIA, the government maintains.

There is a certain irony in the current outburst taking place during a period of unprecedented Congress Party power and government stability. The last time the CIA came in for extensive attack in India was immediately after the 1967 general elections, in which the Congress suffered a major setback.

Some observers see the present outburst as an expression of India's concern with the Nixon administration's efforts at friendship with China; the resulting feeling that India should maintain its relations with the Soviet Union; and a belief here that no improvement is in sight in Indian-American relations.

Should CIA tell all?

By CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR.
Third District Congressman

Legislation with important consequences both for the Congress and for our foreign policy presently is being considered by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The bill, sponsored by Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, proposes the Central Intelligence Agency submit regular reports to the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees and to the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees.

This measure would require the CIA to keep the Committees fully and currently informed "regarding intelligence information collected by the Agency concerning the relations of the United States to foreign countries and matters of national security."

The bill's provisions were patterned after the Joint Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which specified that the Atomic Energy Commission and the Defense Department keep the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy fully informed.

Proponents of the legislation argue that it is necessary to be kept well-informed in order to deal effectively with foreign policy decisions. The Foreign Relations Committee, in its report on the measure, said a "right to full information and analysis...would strengthen and improve the operation of our government."

"The bill is needed to enable Congress properly to carry out its Constitutional responsibilities for the making of foreign policy and national security."

The State Department opposes the plan. It contends such legislation would be dangerous to national security and would allow Congress to overstep its Constitutional bounds.

In my view, complete and accurate information is necessary for Congress to reassert its Constitutional role as a participant in the making of foreign policy, and this measure is needed to provide that information. In order for Congress to be coequal with the executive branch, it must have the same right to information that the executive has.

Much of what has happened in Southeast Asia is directly traceable to information in Congress. This bill would be invaluable in avoiding such uninformed judgments in the future.

To prevent the disclosure of secret information, the measure would permit only Members of the relevant Committees, and their staffs, to receive the reports. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has already demonstrated the success of this practice.

The National Security Act of 1947, which created the CIA, provided that information gathered by the agency was to be used only by the executive branch. Until now, Congress has received the information only at the discretion of the President.

Senator Cooper's bill was first studied by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and approved on July 17. The bill then was referred to the Senate Armed Services for further consideration.

I will strongly support this measure when it comes before the House. With a legal right to CIA information, Congress will be able to make more informed judgments.

Had this bill been passed twelve years ago, our recent history might have been completely different.

Author's Query

I am interested in obtaining written reports of personal experiences of civilians involving the Central Intelligence Agency. These will be published, with permission of the contributors, as part of an anthology concerned with the extent to which the C.I.A. is involved with civilian life.

L. G. PEDERSEN
U. of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, N. C. 27514.

HS/HC-950

4 OCT 1972

General

Mrs. Gandhi Alleges CIA Activities

NEW DELHI, Oct. 3 (UPI)—Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's attack on the activities of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in India raised fears in U.S. embassy circles here today of further damage to Indian-American relations.

Mrs. Gandhi told a local Congress Party meeting yesterday that she had information that the CIA had become active in India.

She asked the party workers to be vigilant and to counteract the CIA's activities.

Mrs. Gandhi did not say precisely what the CIA was doing in India. "It is not for us to prove that this agency is working in our country," she said. "It is for the CIA to prove that it is not active in India."

Sniping at the CIA has become traditional in India. Shankar Dayal Sharma, president of the Congress Party, resurrected the issue on Sept. 21 at a news conference. He accused the CIA of involvement in recent civil disturbances here.

At the time, a U.S. embassy spokesman said "Such accusations are outrageous and have no basis in fact." But the embassy declined to comment on Mrs. Gandhi's remarks.

In Washington, State Department officials denied her charges. Department spokesman Charles W. Bray was asked: "Are you privy to what the CIA is doing?"

"We are quite satisfied," he replied.

HS/HC-950

India Swipe at CIA Could Hurt Ties

NEW DELHI (UPI)—Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's attack on the activities of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in India has raised fears in U.S. Embassy circles of further damage to American-Indian relations, already at an all-time low.

Mrs. Gandhi yesterday told a meeting in Ranchi for workers in her ruling Congress party that she had information the CIA had become active in India.

She asked the party loyalists at Ranchi, which is in the northeastern state of Bihar, to be vigilant of the CIA and to counteract its activities.

Mrs. Gandhi did not say what the CIA was doing in India.

"It is not for us to prove that this agency is working in our country," she told the party workers. "It is for the CIA to prove that it is not active in India."

In Washington, State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray III said that "any implication that the United States government is involved in the internal affairs of India is quite without foundation."

He said the United States would withhold specific comment until the exact allegations of Mrs. Gandhi are received here from the embassy in New Delhi.

'Old Hat' Issue

Sniping at the CIA is old hat in India. Dr. Shankar Dayal Sharma, president of the Congress party, resurrected the issue Sept. 21 at a Calcutta news conference in which he accused the CIA of involvement in recent civil disturbances in this country.

At the time, a U.S. Embassy spokesman said "such accusations are outrageous and have no basis in fact." The embassy this time declined to comment on Mrs. Gandhi's remarks.

It was considered likely that Secretary of State Wil-

liam P. Rogers will raise the issue when he meets in Washington on Thursday with Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh.

It was learned here that Washington already has told Indian diplomats privately in the United States that such criticism is "not constructive."

The Indian diplomats were reported to have responded that India, like the United States, is "a free country" and its officials could say what they pleased.

Watch Russians

It is generally believed here that the primary mission of the CIA in India is to watch the activities of the Russians. Those in a position to know say the CIA has little or no interest in the domestic political situation in India.

The agents are known to have Indian contacts, who presumably are paid and could infiltrate political organizations for reporting purposes.

Relations between the United States and India plunged to an all-time low when the United States "tilted" in favor of Pakistan during December's India-Pakistan war.

(Kuldip Nayar, the Star-News special correspondent in India, reports from New Delhi that after the general elections in 1967, the Indian Intelligence Bureau submitted a report alleging that "financial assistance" during the elections had come from American sources. It claimed that the ultimate source of funds was the CIA.)

Two Steps Seen

(Two courses of action were then considered appropriate: One, not to permit the working of those U.S. foundations and organizations which were suspected to have originated intelligence agencies such as the CIA. Two, the receipt of donations and other forms of financial assistance from American sources would be subject to more rigorous control and scrutiny.)

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Tuesday, October 3, 1972

(The government of India has already begun implementing both steps. Most U.S. organizations have wound up their activities in India and one of the recent ones phasing out its activities is CARE. Similarly, legislation is being brought forth to enable the government to approve of invitations received by individuals and organizations from America before they are accepted.)

2 OCT 1972

U.S. major held by Syria

Is envoy Barrett a hostage, an agent, a defector?

*Special to The Christian Science Monitor***Beirut, Lebanon**

The case of Maj. Richard Barrett, the United States diplomat who has been held by the Syrian Government since Sept. 9, shows signs of slowly building into a cause celebre.

The major, who is from Wyoming, is the assistant military attache in the United States Embassy in Amman, Jordan. He was traveling by road from Amman to Beirut, to visit his wife and child, when he was taken into custody at the intervening Syrian frontier post of Deraa.

Nothing was said about the incident till Sept. 19 when the news broke in an Arabic language newspaper in Beirut. The United States State Department then said it had maintained silence because it had been using quiet diplomacy to obtain Major Barrett's release. It also then became known that both Italy, which has been looking after United States interests in Syria since 1967, and Lebanon had tried, and failed, to get more out of Syria than a bare acknowledgement of the arrest.

Syria now has been put off limits for United States officials. And the State Department has twice expressed its concern at Major Barrett's imprisonment.

There are three theories concerning the arrest. The first and least likely is that the major defected to Syria taking important documents with him. This seems very improbable to say the least.

The second theory is that he is being held on espionage charges, and one Beirut publication predicts he will be put on trial as Gary

Powers of the U-2 incident was in the Soviet Union.

The arguments favoring the espionage theory are that the major is said to be fluent in Arabic, a dubious accomplishment that is always likely to arouse suspicion here; that he made unusually frequent trips by road across Syria, and showed particular interest in the frontier area where Palestinian commando units are stationed; that, according to one story, he had two passports on him — diplomatic and ordinary; and that, above all, there was that strange gap of silence of 10 days, which suggests embarrassment in Washington.

The third and perhaps most probable theory is that Major Barrett is being held as a hostage by Syria to force the United States to pressure Israel into releasing five senior

Syrian officers who were kidnapped by Israel from Lebanese territory on July 21.

When Lebanon and Syria took the matter to the UN Security Council the United States abstained on a resolution that was passed ordering Israel to return its prisoners. Israel has ignored the resolution, saying that it would liberate its hostages only in return for all Israeli prisoners held by all Arab countries, especially including Egypt.

The argument here is that if the United States thus condones the situation where country "A" can kidnap hostages from country "B" on the territory of country "C" to obtain the release of prisoners in country "D," then it is surely permissible for country "B" to take a hostage on its own territory from country "E" (America) to get back its prisoners from country "A."

The Middle East policy of the United States has been profoundly pro-Israel and anti-Arab for the past 25 years, it is said here, yet United States interests and individual United States citizens have seldom suffered harm from the Arabs. The case of Major Barrett shows that Arab tolerance may be changing.

If the major were innocent, the argument goes, would not Washington have been the first to announce the news and to raise a hue and cry instead of leaking the information belatedly to a Lebanese newspaper?

1 OCT 1972

'Spy' story is delayed in Moscow

Moscow (Reuter) — The memoirs of Gordon A. Lonsdale, a Soviet master spy, have run into a mysterious delay after beginning publication here almost a year ago.

Lonsdale, alias Konon Molody, alias Georgi Lonov, died in October, 1970, while picking mushrooms in the woods near Moscow.

A professionally edited version of his memoirs began appearing a year later in the monthly magazine *Molodaya Gvardiya* (Young Guard). Three installments appeared at intervals, but there have been none since last March.

Lonov — this was his real name according to the magazine—was sentenced to 25

years in prison by a British court in 1961 for his part in a spy ring seeking British naval secrets.

He was known in Britain as Gordon Arnold Lonsdale, and he even published what purported to be his autobiography there after being released in a swap for Greville M. Wynne, a British businessman convicted of spying against Russia in 1963.

"Not our fault"

But Lonsdale's story has not done too well in the country which honors him as one of its most distinguished agents.

A member of *Molodaya Gvardiya's* staff said the journal hoped to continue publishing the memoirs, but it would not be until the new year.

Asked why they had been held up, she explained that

"the reasons are complicated . . . But one thing is clear, the delay in continuing publication is not our fault."

So far the memoirs have described how Lonov went to Canada to establish his cover as a Canadian citizen, then moved to Britain where he set himself up in the vending machine business.

The last installment, which ended on Chapter 18, told how Lonov met his British contact,

Harry F. Houghton, in London

It suggested that Houghton's friend, Ethel E. Gee, who obtained secret papers for Lonsdale, was under the impression the spy was an American naval officer named Alec Johnson.

Describing Lonsdale's first meeting with her, the account said that to judge by all appearances she had no doubt she was helping an American naval officer.

The installment concluded by saying that Houghton was generously rewarded for his services "as Assistant Naval Attache Alec Johnson had promised him when they first met."

Houghton and Miss Gee later served 10 years in English prisons for espionage.

The reason for the delay in continuing the memoirs is not likely to become known, but the following installments

could be expected to cover Lonov's arrest, interrogation, trial and imprisonment.

Possibly the man who has been putting the memoirs into publishable form, Trofim Podolin, has simply failed to turn out the sequel yet, but it is more probable that it has been held back for other, less easily explained reasons, by Lonov's old employers, the Soviet security forces.

VIENTIANE, Laos — Still savoring his cigar after a three-course luncheon washed down with French wines, G. McMurtrie Godley answered the telephone, postponed his tennis game, dashed to his sedan and was driven off at top speed.

"Wheatburner 50 to Wheatburner Base," he intoned into the car's radio-telephone, "heading for airport — ten-four." The rush mission of American Ambassador Godley on an otherwise sleepy recent afternoon in the Laotian capital turned out to be a false alarm of sorts. There was just a chance that three captured American pilots North Vietnam had agreed to release might be on board the regular weekly Aeroflot flight which was arriving from Hanoi ahead of schedule. And "Mac" Godley wanted to be on hand just in case the men accepted his personal suggestion they disembark and accept U.S. government transportation home rather than continue in the company of their antiwar chaperones.

While Russians in sports shirts and North Vietnamese in pith helmets and business suits streamed off the Ilyushin 18, Godley saw that the pilots were not among the passengers, got back into the car and headed home to change for tennis. "Forty-five minutes is about all the tennis I can take in this age anyway."

At 55, Godley has been going at this pace for more than three years in Laos and, for that matter, ever since he graduated from Yale, class of '39. Part consul, part traditional striped-pants diplomat and part general, Godley personally directs the no longer quite so secret American war in Laos — and loves every minute of it.

He has no doubts about his job or how to carry it out even though his critics suspect he is more Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's man in Vientiane than Secretary of State William Rogers. "Call me field marshal if it makes you feel better," he is inclined to say. "I don't care. But please note I've got no troops."

"Uncle Sugar"

INVOLVED in undercover work since World War II when he dealt with American prisoner of war problems while based in Switzerland, one of the first U.S. diplomats to work closely with the military, activist ambassador to the Congo during the "Simba" revolt in 1964, Godley believes in the American world mission in uncomplicated terms uncomfortable to more doubting Americans.

So big and burly that Congolese called him "The Bear that Walks Like a Man" when he was ambassador in Leopoldville, Godley maintains, "I think I've had the very best of the Foreign Service" and "if I end up being the fall guy I couldn't care less."

"They weren't ten deep for the Laos assignment, but I just pinch myself daily when I think I'm being paid for doing this."

—G. McMurtrie Godley

Our Man In Vientiane

By Jonathan C. Randal

Washington Post Foreign Service

Godley is given to pithy, direct language of a nature which an earlier age would not have found repeatable in mixed company. Pure product of the Cold War in warm climates, he invariably refers to the United States as "Uncle Sugar," a sobriquet reflecting the persuasiveness of American power in underdeveloped countries.

Even with a staff of 1,200 diplomatic, military and CIA men, as ambassador to this Oregon-sized country Godley has his hands full:

- Requesting and approving all American air strikes against North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops—who numbered over 100,000 just before the Easter invasion of South Vietnam—in northern Laos and along the Ho Chi Minh supply trails leading south to Cambodia and South Vietnam.
- Directing CIA military operations and the activities of some 230 military attaches whose tasks include supplying arms and ammunition to the Royal Lao army, Miao tribesmen and Thai volunteers in the Plain of Jars north of Vientiane and in the southern Laos panhandle.
- Keeping able neutralist Premier Souvanna Phouma in office despite repeated right-wing efforts to dislodge him, to ensure that the tatty facade on the 1962 accords remains intact for another effort to neutralize Laos in the event of an Indochina-wide peace settlement, a task even the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao representatives here privately concede he performed brilliantly in the past month.
- Maintaining the precarious and artificial Laotian economy within the limits of a congressional aid ceiling of

\$350 million annually, a far from easy task since most of the money goes for military spending. Indeed, the annual threat of the fall of the CIA's base at Long Cheng on the Plain of Jars is feared less than the economic crisis reflected by the fall in value of the Laotian kip from 500 to 800 to the dollar in the past year.

Dropping the Veils

FOR MOST of Godley's first year as ambassador, and indeed since the 1962 Geneva accords were broken first by North Vietnam and then by the United States, American military involvement was kept as secret as possible. But in the past year or so, Washington has progressively dropped the principal fiction imposed by the Geneva accords which set up the tripartite right-wing, neutralist and left-wing government under big power auspices: a promise to avoid any foreign military establishment in Laos except for a small French training mission.

As early as 1964, the United States was deeply committed to the Souvanna Phouma government, providing aid, a stabilization fund for the kip and military help. In return, Souvanna Phouma allowed the United States to bomb North Vietnamese positions on the strength of a verbal understanding which even now remains the only basis for American military operations here.

In March, 1970, President Nixon started lifting the secrecy after a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee headed by Stuart Symington held hearings on Laos as part of its investigation of U.S. commitments abroad. Whatever major mystery was left disappeared last December when U.S. officials put on a guided tour of Long Cheng, headquarters of Gen. Vang

Pao's CIA-paid mercenaries on the rim of the Plain of Jars. The base was in danger of falling to the North Vietnamese and it was apparently deemed wiser to let the press see the base rather than learning about it from triumphant enemy propaganda.

The "Congo Mafia"

PERHAPS UNDERSTANDABLY, Godley's staff has drawn heavily on men who served in the Congo in the early and middle Sixties. Indeed at one point the deputy chief of mission, CIA station chief and several important deputies, a U.S. Information Service staffer and several young diplomats all were part of what is known as Godley's "Congo Mafia."

Although ambassadors are allowed wide latitude in choosing their staffs, Godley swears he hand-picked only one of his former Congo associates: Monteagle Stearns, until recently the deputy chief of mission, who left a soft berth in the London embassy when Godley offered him a chance to "rejoin the real Foreign Service." The others, Godley feels, logically ended up here because of the similarity of the skills and experience which stood them in good stead in the Congo.

"You look at the State Department's personnel structure and of 1,500 officers there may be 250 with facility in French," Godley explained, "then 75 without family problems of one sort or another, perhaps 50 who are gun-ho, dedicated and not yellow, and then you choose the best. It's only normal that two out of three have been in the other, similar area."

In the Congo, one of the most successful — some would say just plain lucky — exercises of American military and political power, the United States was instrumental in holding the country together. From 1960 to January 1963, the United States provided the muscle behind the United Nations effort to repress rebellions in the center, northeast and southeast of the country.

But less than 18 months after the United States helped the U.N. troops scatter mercenary soldiers, and the secession of copper-producing Katanga province and send its leader, Moise Tshombe, off to European exile, he was back again as prime minister of the entire country in July 1964. Faced with a Chinese-backed uprising which spread across the country, Godley backed Tshombe, brought in CIA-paid Cuban pilots to fly T-28 fighters, World War II B-26 bombers and U.S. Air Force C-130 transports which flew Belgian-financed white mercenaries around the country.

Within a year of its inception the rebellion collapsed. **Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0**
U.S.-Belgian paratroop drop on Stanleyville which rescued hundreds of European refugees. "It was a shoestring

operation," recalled one of Godley's Congo Mafia. "Our military aid started at \$3 million and ended up costing \$9 million for the entire year 1964."

"A Frustrated Soldier"

LIKE MANY OTHERS who served there, Godley is nostalgic about the Congo and likes to wear a brightly colored print shirt depicting President Joseph Desire Mobutu. Such sentiment is all the more touching since Godley had to have himself withdrawn as ambassador in October 1966, after he

grounded the Congolese air force to keep Mobutu from napalming rebellious white mercenaries in Stanleyville.

Godley rates his Congolese experience as "invaluable" in teaching the practical application of limited military and diplomatic operations. He figures he spent 20 per cent of his time on military problems in the Congo but now devotes as much as 70 per cent of his efforts to them here. Only part of his long days is spent with large war maps on the walls of his windowless ground-floor embassy office.

"I'm a frustrated soldier," Godley concedes in noting his active military service is limited to two years' naval duty from 1939 to 1941, when he went into government work. But for Godley, who admits to being intrigued by such weaponry as M-79 grenade launchers, doing his job is "getting the hell out into the field. You cannot do anything sitting behind a desk and reacting."

Flying in helicopters and light planes of the U.S. government-chartered Air America or Continental Air Service, Godley likes to put down on dirt strips and see for himself. "I try to get out as much as possible, partly for morale purposes to see my field hands who risk their lives—and to encourage Laotian officials to do likewise," he said, "but also because I never go out without learning something from the military attaches and CIA teams, some of whom have been here 8, 10, 12 years."

Godley's appreciation of the military dates back to a tour as first secretary in the Paris embassy in the early Fifties, where he worked on NATO infrastructure and on securing French agreement for American bases to be built for the alliance in the then French Morocco. Back in Washington in 1958 after a tour in Cambodia, he was involved in planning the U.S. landing during the Lebanese civil war.

"I was horrified by the vacuum between both sides of the Potomac," he recalled. He later was instrumental in

setting up an exchange program for State and Defense Department officers.

An Earlier Breed

BOTH IN THE CONGO and Laos, he believes the United States has been successful in "careful orchestration of U.S. military might under tight political controls."

"With a minimum of equipment and zero commitment we are killing 30 North Vietnamese a day," he added, as well as tying up large enemy units which otherwise could be used against South Vietnam. Yet with much of the air support coming from nearby bases in Thailand, Laos remains a sideshow to the South Vietnamese theater and there is no really independent American policy for Laos.

Even critics among the Laotians and his fellow diplomats credit Godley with smooth crisis management although they decry U.S. policy here and throughout Indochina.

"A classic diplomat couldn't and wouldn't do this kind of job," said a diplomat in a backhanded compliment. He described Godley's role as falling somewhere short of the total powers of a Marshal Louis Lyautey who built French Morocco with a free hand, or a Lt. Gen. Sir Sidney Clive, who expanded British power in India unfettered by the restraints of modern instant communications.

But there is something of an earlier breed about Godley and the men who work for him here.

A Congo veteran who also served in Vietnam took a perverse pride in the Nixon administration's attitude towards Laos. "Here we've done more with less," he said. "Maybe some places have had too many assets for their own good."

Godley works with Congress looking over one shoulder. "We cannot afford to jettison a single rocket pod here without accounting for it under the Symington restrictions," one American said.

Moreover, the Laos war is conducted with strange ground rules under which the North Vietnamese hold much of the country—if not the population—but do not seek to take over the rich plain around Vientiane or other cities further to the south along the Mekong River. Hanoi's forbearance is apparently based on fears that Thailand would intervene were its borders along the Mekong threatened.

"I Pinch Myself Daily"

OBSERVERS BELIEVE Godley's main problem is less defending the Long Cheng base—which once again is under threat of enemy capture in the upcoming dry season—than in stabilizing the increasingly critical economic situation. His critics complain that more than a decade of American largesse has produced a thin crust of Mercedes owners but overall pauperization, corruption and no sign of efficient administration. But even an ambassador who opposes Godley conceded that "given American policy here I don't think he has had much choice."

The critics worry that Godley's close relations with Souvanna Phouma have caught the Laotian leader in a vise: "Souvanna Phouma uses American support to bolster his own bargaining power, but that means his government is dependent on the United States—quite a tightrope act."

Yet on a recent Sunday, in between playing with his wife, Betty, and their two adopted young Greek children, Godley managed to confer twice with the premier, read four hours of reports and discuss the military situation with an aide.

Godley is not one to reflect on the justifications of United States policy—at least not in public. But a man who worked with him in the Congo put it in one-dimensional terms that so many Americans have come to reject in the past decade. "It sounds corny," the man said, "but those of us here believe in our country and believe what we are doing is right for the world."

For Godley, there are more nuances. "They weren't ten deep for the Laos assignment," he said in characteristically admitting he bucked for the job, "but I just pinch myself daily when I think I'm being paid for doing this."

Tribesmen's Drive in Laos Slows and Fears for Base Rise

By FOX BUTTERFIELD

Special to The New York Times

LONGTIENG, Laos, Sept. 27

—Maj. Gen. Vang Pao's irregular army of hill tribesmen has opened its annual rainy-season offensive against the Communists around the Plaine des Jarres.

But despite some successful thrusts behind the enemy's lines, American officials here are concerned that the irregular's campaign has stalled, bedeviled by exhaustion after many years of war and unusually stiff North Vietnamese resistance.

As a result, these Americans fear that when the rains stop in another month, the North Vietnamese will still be in a good position to threaten the important base at Longtieng and the 132,000 refugees who live in valleys just to the south.

"Militarily the loss of Long Tieng wouldn't mean the end of the war," said one high-ranking American officer at this once-secret center for the irregular army, "but it would be a major catastrophe for the hill people who have been retreating for four or five years and would have to move on again."

Farther south lies only the hot, humid and already crowded Vientiane plain, which the hill people, mostly members of the Meo tribe, consider uninhabitable.

The chief hope of the Laotians and Americans is that when the roads become passable again in November, the North Vietnamese, preoccupied by their offensive in South Vietnam, will not substantially reinforce the estimated 6,000 troops they have scattered around the Plaine des Jarres and just north of Long Tieng.

Last spring the Communists withdrew one of their two divisions—the 312th—from the fight for Long Tieng, transferring it across the border to Quangtri Province.

"If the North Vietnamese don't bring in a lot more

troops we can hold Long Tieng," said another American who has watched the Communists gradually push General Vang Pao's forces south over the past five years. "It all depends on Hanoi."

Long Tieng itself, nestled in a narrow mountain valley 83 miles northeast of Vientiane, has been largely rebuilt since the devastating three-month North Vietnamese siege last spring. General Vang Pao once again has his headquarters here and many dependants of the tribal soldiers have returned after being evacuated.

Planes belonging to Air America and Continental Air Services bring "supplies for the irregulars. A squadron of tiny T-28 fighter planes manned by Royal Lao Air Force pilots also use the paved airstrip, which ends abruptly in a series of jagged limestone cliffs that look like the scenery in a Chinese landscape painting.

Because of the Communists' offensive in South Vietnam, American air support for the fighting here in northern Laos has been drastically reduced, authoritative American sources say. It is down from an average of 200 sorties a day last year to only about 20 sorties a day.

There are still a number of Americans here, agents of the Central Intelligence Agency, which finances and helps train and direct General Vang Pao's forces. Several could be seen today during a visit sponsored by the American Embassy, some of them in jungle camouflage uniforms carrying M-16 rifles and boarding helicopters with the irregular troops.

Although much of the secrecy that once surrounded

Long Tieng has ended, Americans here still use only facitious names and newsmen were not allowed to photograph them. Foreign military aid to Laos and the presence of foreign troops or advisers is banned by the 1962 Geneva accord on Laos.

The irregulars' offensive began in mid-August with four separate task forces totaling about 5,000 men being lifted by helicopter onto the heights around the plain des jarres, which lies 20 miles north of Long Tieng. Their objective was to cut in behind the entrenched North Vietnamese facing Long Tieng and force them to retreat.

But General Vang Pao's troops, reportedly exhausted by last spring's fighting and afraid of the Communists' newly introduced 130-mm. long-range guns, moved slowly.

In one of the columns, American officers say, almost 500 men had to be evacuated with trench foot after they had failed to dry their feet during the monsoon rains. Another column lost its commanding officer on the first day.

Even more disastrous, the North Vietnamese did not pull back this year as they have in the past to shorten their supply lines during the torrential rains. Instead they have clung to heavily fortified positions in the mountains and blasted the irregulars with their artillery.

General Vang Pao appears as energetic and determined as in the past. Despite years of bitter fighting and defeat, the

sturdily built 43-year-old Meo leader spends almost all his time these days at Long Tieng and gives his officers a tongue-lashing over lunch in his quarters, Americans who work with him report.

But the number of Meos among his 30,000 soldiers has steadily decreased as they have been killed or became disillusioned. They have been replaced by other hill tribesmen, particularly upland Laos, and by so-called volunteers from Thailand, who are also paid and equipped by the United States.

The number of Thais is a closely guarded secret, but one well-informed source estimates that there are "well over" the 4,800 figure used in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report last year.

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17 SEP 1972

The Montagnards: Losing Two Wars

By Thomas W. Lippman

Washington Post Foreign Service

SAI GON—South Vietnam's mountain tribesmen—the primitive and gentle folk known collectively as the Montagnards—are losing two wars.

One is the war against the North Vietnamese, who have occupied or destroyed hundreds of Montagnard villages, seized their lands, used them as hostages to American bombs, forced them into service as laborers and killed them in combat.

The other is the war against the South Vietnamese, themselves victims of war and privation, who are steadily encroaching on the Montagnards' traditional lands and forcing them to confront a harsh 20th-Century reality for which they are ill prepared.

Throughout the Montagnard homeland in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam, there are people fighting a rear-guard action trying to help the tribes keep their families, villages and way of life intact. The U.S. Special Forces soldiers, who developed a close relationship with the Montagnards and for whom the Montagnards retain an affection they do not feel for the Vietnamese, have all gone home. But there remain medical missionaries, volunteer nurses, U.S. Agency for International Development field workers, a few trained Montagnard civil servants and a handful of Vietnamese who have dedicated themselves to the interests of the tribes.

The Montagnards, however, are a dark-skinned ethnic minority, they are primitive and unsophisticated, and they control a disproportionate amount of land in a country where there should be more than enough to go around but the dislocations of the war have created a shortage.

As a result, any contest between the tribes and the Vietnamese—whether over policy matters in Saigon or over the ownership of a few acres in the Highlands—is unequal. These conclusions which confirm the findings of many other journalists, anthropologists and sociologists who have looked into the problem, are the result of a four-day tour of the Highlands and interviews with U.S., Vietnamese and Montagnard officials there and in Saigon, as well as talks with unofficial sources familiar with the Montagnard situation.

Montagnards was the French term for the group of more than two dozen linguistically distinct tribes and groups who lived in an area running from Quangtri Province south through the sparsely populated Central Highlands to within about 50 miles of Saigon.

Many of the men still wear breechcloths and many of the women still go bare-breasted, as they have for centuries. That is part of the reason for the low esteem in which they are held by the Vietnamese, who regard them as almost prehistoric. They are smiling, pipe-smoking and friendly, and the Americans who know them well praise them for their honesty and forthrightness, in pointed contrast to the Vietnamese.

A government decree signed five years ago was intended to ease the dissatisfaction of the Montagnards and give them both a special semi-autono-

mous status and representation in the central government. But improvements on paper have done little to alter the basic situation. Even if the Saigon government genuinely desired to protect the Montagnards and their land, to let them live in their ancestral homes and farm in their traditional ways and attend their own schools, this is a nation of Vietnamese at war, not mountain tribesmen at peace, and the Vietnamese interest comes first.

By government statistics, 100,000 Montagnards, or more than one of every eight in the country, were driven from their villages by this year's North Vietnamese offensive and the massive bombing raids that came with it. For some, it was the third or fourth dislocation of the war. Thousands more, according to government officials in the Highlands, were killed or captured.

Most of the refugees are barely subsiding on government allotments and private donations in stark, barren, muddy, disease-infested camps where the mental suffering is worse than the physical. Officially, they are waiting to go home, but in fact most of them are to be permanently resettled far from their native villages, which are in areas the Saigon government does not control.

In the Highlands, as elsewhere in the country, there have been complaints that even the meager allotments of rice and fish to which the refugees are entitled were not being delivered in full because of corruption along the supply line.


In Darlac Province, for example, a senior U.S. adviser who said that "in general the government here has done a pretty good job of giving them the benefits they are entitled to, and then some," went on to say that there had been "no systematic shortchanging" of the refugees, just random incidents.

Y Jut Buon To, a Montagnard who is the ethnic minorities service chief for the province, said he instructed the people at one large camp to refuse one shipment of rice because all the 1,000-kilogram sacks weighed in at 700 kilograms each. He also said that there were four camps in the area and only one—where a Montagnard was in charge—was giving its refugees their full allotment. From the others, he said, people were forced to go into the streets of Bannethout, the province capital, to beg.

Losing Men and Land

BESIDES the new wave of refugees, about 40,000 more Montagnards are living unhappily in bleak resettlement villages to which the government must their will a year and a half ago for security reasons.

continued



By Joseph Mastrangelo—The Washington Post

Historically, the Montagnards have occupied the shaded region. The government plans to resettle them in three provinces.

Montagnard militiamen, who were supposedly exempt from service in the regular South Vietnamese army because they are in the military and because they are members of an ethnic minority, are being grabbed up to fill the depleted ranks of some South Vietnamese divisions.

The request of Montagnard leaders that they be allowed to form their own regiments, instead of being dispersed among the Vietnamese, has been turned down, a fact attributed by some authorities to a lingering suspicion in the Saigon government that the tribes, who rose in armed revolt in the mid-1960s, remain less than fervent in their ideological commitments to South Vietnam.

A land reform law enacted five years ago to give highland villagers title to their traditional lands—in other words, to give them on paper what they always had in fact until President Ngo Dinh Diem allowed ethnic Vietnamese to begin moving to the Highlands 20 years ago—has had only scattered success.

Many of the lands involved are no longer controlled by South Vietnam, and in the more secure areas, close to cities and along principal highways, ethnic Vietnamese moving up from the crowded, refugee-swollen coast have begun to take over.

The result of all this, according the gloomier sources among those interviewed, is that the Montagnard way of life is doomed to extinction.

Three Montagnards have earned

U.S. college degrees, and a handful were trained for the French civil service. Almost 200 are enrolled at the Montagnard Training Center in Pleiku, a kind of community college for the hill tribes.

But most still spend their lives in the inefficient, land-consuming slash-and-burn agriculture that is part of the problem they face in their struggle to keep their traditional territories.

In the fertile Mekong Delta, the government estimates that a peasant can produce enough food for his family on 7½ acres, which is his maximum allotment under the land reform program. But a Montagnard family needs up to 50 acres because of the semi-nomadic farming system that leaves parts of each family's land fallow all the time.

That is why the Montagnards, who seem to have so much land, are so apprehensive about encroachments on it and about plans to concentrate them in smaller areas than they now consider theirs.

In the words of a Montagnard civil servant in Darlac, "there will be bloodshed over land before the issue is settled."

Frequent Relocations

NAY LUETT, a Montagnard who is the government's minister for ethnic minorities development, said in an interview that "all that you saw, all you tell me about what you heard in the Highlands, is true."

President Nguyen Van Thieu, he

said, "has instructed me to push very hard" to meet the demands of the Montagnards and carry out programs designed to help them, but "the percentage of Vietnamese who really want to assist the Montagnards is very small."

Furthermore, in Luett's view, "It will be very hard for the people ever to go back into the hills" as they desire to do. "They must be where they can escape bombs, escape death."

Luett said he hopes to move all Montagnards out of the country's four northern provinces and resettle them, along with refugees from Communist-held parts of Kontum province, in three provinces of the Highlands: Pleiku, Darlac and Quangduc. That is an area the size of Vermont with a current permanent population of less than half a million. Bananas, coffee, rubber, vegetables and upland rice grow there in abundance.

But as maps on display in government offices in those provinces show, there are already Vietnamese who have begun to farm large tracts in the secure areas—"Vietnamese with their tractors," as one official said—while the Montagnard refugees remain huddled in their camps waiting for their allotments of land.

"Without land the Montagnards cannot live," Nay Luett said. But he did not deny that the dwindling amount of land still available is being taken over by the Vietnamese while the Montagnards wait helplessly for the flood to recede.

16 SEP 1972

Soviet Embassy employe defects

By DONALD R. MORRIS
Post News Analyst

Evgeniy Sorokine, 24, an employe of the GRU Rezidentura in the Soviet Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, has defected to the United States.

According to AP and UPI reports, Sorokine and his wife Tatiana were posted to Laos in 1971, where he was assigned duties as driver and French interpreter for Col. Vladimir P. Gretchanine.

Gretchanine was listed as a Soviet military attache. In the early 1960s, Gretchanine was posted to Washington, and was expelled in the course of a quid pro quo reprisal for several U.S. diplomats expelled from Moscow at the time.

ON SEPT. 10 Sorokine's car was found crashed into a tree halfway between the Soviet Embassy and Vientiane Airport. That evening he requested political asylum at

the U.S. Embassy, and the following day he was flown out of Laos, probably on a chartered Air America flight.

Sorokine is now reported to be in the United States. Tatiana Sorokine remains in Vientiane.

These are the bare outlines of a story that will not be expanded on by official U.S. sources, at least for some time to come. Several conclusions, however, may be drawn.

Sorokine was an employe of the Soviet military intelligence service, the GRU; he was not attached to the KGB. All personnel attached to the Soviet military attache office are employes or officers of the GRU, and never of the KGB. Gretchanine is, and always was, a GRU officer.

SOROKINE WAS, most likely, not an officer, but an employe whose duties were exactly as given: driver-interpreter to Col. Gretchanine, whose rank indicates he was

probably the GRU Resident — the officer in command of the GRU Rezidentura.

Although not an agent handler, Sorokine will be nonetheless valuable. He will be able to provide a complete breakdown of the GRU Rezidentura, including those offi-

Post analysis

cers under other covers outside of the Military Attache Office. He will undoubtedly be able to identify a goodly proportion of the KGB Rezidentura as well. His duties would also have enabled him to identify a number of GRU agents, developmental cases and spotting leads as well.

Several aspects of the story hint that Sorokine may be something of a handling problem. More than twenty officers of the Soviet intelligence services have defected to Western countries. It is the act of a deeply maladjusted man, a misfit in his own society who is, by cutting off his entire past life with no

hope of return, in effect, taking what may be the only alternative to suicide open to him. For complex psychological reasons, defection almost never occurs before middle age, and Sorokine, at 24, is quite possibly the youngest GRU defector to reach the West.

THE CRASHED car indicates further agitation and a spur-of-the-moment decision. Under no circumstances would this be some form of window-dressing to mislead the Soviets; the CIA eschews such James Bondish dramas.

Sorokine's desertion of his wife may be still further evidence of disturbance; had the defection been planned in advance with CIA assistance she could easily have been evacuated as well. (But several defections have been triggered by the urge to escape an impossible marital situation.)

The Soviets reported that

Laotian Foreign Ministry the same day he was flown out of the country. They dropped their standard gambit in such cases, which was to charge that the defector had absconded with the embassy petty cash fund and should be treated as a common criminal. Either they placed little reliance in the Laotian police, or they knew he was out of the country when they reported his absence.

THE CIA is to be commended for the speed with which Sorokine was evacuated; even in Laos such operations pose administrative problems, especially with a sudden walk-in. Over the years, they have been able to count on such a defection every 18 months or so, to implement the knowledge gained from their independent penetrations of the Soviet services.

Sorokine, in fact, may be astonished to find that his hosts know more about the GRU than he does. It has happened before.

20 SEP 1972



International

CIA major 'publisher' of anti-Soviet literature

By ERIK BERT

In the last few years "dissident" Soviet authors have found a good market in the United States. Their books are assured uniformly of favorable reviews, and these conduce to larger sales.

Sales are helped along by a good press which is provided by the U.S. corps in Moscow. The bureau reporters for the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, as well as visiting firemen, make sure that every squeak, or snarl, of a "dissident," every onion-skin manifesto, is reported at length. In the absence of a squeak or snarl or manifesto, some enterprising reporter can be counted on to suggest one.

This leads to other things, among them to Radio Liberty headquarters in Munich, West Germany, whence the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency broadcasts anti-Soviet propaganda to the Soviet Union.

The story of this broadcasting is told in the Library of Congress study of Radio Liberty, made public earlier this year by Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The study was prepared by Joseph G. Whalen, a CIA agent in 1951 and since then an employee

of the Library of Congress. He has made anti-Communism his life's work.

"Dissident" books and their authors offer important possibilities for exploitation by the CIA. But books are, in the nature of things, long in respect to broadcasting technique. Nevertheless the CIA has used them.

Since May 1969 Radio Liberty has broadcast, in "unpublished Works of Soviet Authors," works by Marchenko, Bulgakov, Platonov, Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn, and N. Ya-Mandelstam, according to the Library of Congress study.

During February 19-24, 1971, Radio Liberty broadcast Andrei Amalrik's "Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?" in six parts; from March to July 1970, Boris Pasternak's "Doctor Zhivago," in 16 parts; from July to Decem-

ber, 1970. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's "The First Circle," and in late 1971, Solzhenitsyn's "August 1914," in 62 parts.

Solzhenitsyn's "First Circle" was read over Radio Liberty three days a week over a five-month period.

One of the brightest lights in the "dissident" firmament is Andrei Sakharov, Soviet physicist, who burst on the U.S. and international scene with publication

of his "Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom."

Between August 5 and 13, 1971, "Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom" was broadcast by Radio Liberty's North Caucasian Service in the Russian, Karachai, Ossetian and Avar languages, according to the Library of Congress study.

The CIA and its broadcasting technicians are not convinced that broadcasting "dissident" books in their entirety is the most effective use that can be made of them.

This was discussed last year at a meeting of Radio Liberty's "Russian Service" in the Munich headquarters.

Robert Tuck, director of RL's Program Operations Division, "suggested that books of this nature should be analyzed, discussed and reviewed extensively in broadcasts, rather than being read in toto."

In the "dissident" market, literary standards are secondary to political criteria, of course. Most notorious in this area was the award of the Nobel prize for literature last year to Solzhenitsyn. His literary quality was not the reason he was chosen. The subsequent anti-Soviet brush fire set by the U.S. press about Solzhenitsyn's receiving the award show-

ed that literature was low on the list of its concerns.

Literary judgment has become a matter of controversy on occasion even within the CIA broadcasting fraternity.

The Library of Congress study of the CIA's Radio Liberty operations reports that an "incipient issue began to emerge in October (1971) over the handling of Solzhenitsyn's novel 'August 1914'."

"Some staff (in Munich—EB) did not share the enthusiasm of some Western observers over the high literary quality of this work. At an informal discussion the issue arose in the form of a question as to how RL should report these mixed views.

"Our group felt that negative observations should be reported; another group . . . felt this would be unfair to Solzhenitsyn."

"Moreover, it was pointed out that it would be counterproductive to RL's purposes to report sharp criticism of Solzhenitsyn's stature in the eyes of the Soviet people. . . ."

With the publication of Sakharov's book in the summer of 1968, "the parameters of dissent expanded" and the "movement entered a new phase," the Library of Congress declares.

The reasons for the CIA's interest in Sakharov's "freedom"

cry are simple:

"The publication of criticisms by Sakharov . . . was the first programmatic document that brought into question some of the basic tenets of the Soviet system."

The non-literary, anti-Soviet criterion for judging 'dissident' literature has its quirks. Thus, Arthur Miller, playwright, writing in the New York Times, Dec. 10, 1971, complained:

"Solzhenitsyn's works never brought charges against the current regime but only against that of Stalin."

The following day David Sidor-sky, professor of philosophy at Columbia, replied (his letter to the Times wasn't published until Dec. 26) "...how limited is Arthur Miller's interpretation of Solzhenitzyn's writings as 'not against the current regime but only against that of Stalin.'"

The criterion is clearly not literary, on either side, but an argument as to whether Solzhenitzyn is an enemy only of Stalin as Miller complains, or of the whole Soviet system, as Sidorsky insists and Miller demands.

Another problem arises for the CIA in broadcasting "dissidence." What will the Soviet people think of books about the Soviet Union broadcast by the CIA, even if the authors are Soviet citizens?

FRENCH SECRET AGENTS SAID TO BE SPYING FOR CIA

L'EXPRESS Paris in French 11-17 Sep 72 p 49 X

[Text] In addition to drugs, the SDECE now risks becoming involved in an affair concerning the sale of some special photographs. An investigating committee has just arrived in Tahiti, where it has been discovered that French secret agents responsible for keeping an eye on distinguished visitors to the Pacific Nuclear Test Center were also working for the American CIA.

A number of cameras camouflaged in hotel rooms made it possible to photograph certain persons while in the company of female companions as the former profited by their stay in Tahiti to carry out "research" that had nothing to do either with the national defense or nuclear energy.

This kind of operation is not new, but about a month ago, the SDECE correspondent in Washington found out that his American colleagues were also receiving copies of these photos. Some 15 agents belonging to various services are the subject of the newly opened investigation..

CHICAGO, ILL.
NEWS

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SEP 23 1972

Fiction: An ex-CIA man's disputed thriller

COMPANY MAN by Joe Magglo (Putnam, \$6.95).

By George Harmon

THE late Allen Dulles, quarterback of our World War II spies and later chief of the CIA, scoffed at the notion of the American diplomat or spy being a closed-mind blunderer too cynical to play by any rules but his own. He criticized such novels as Graham Greene's "The Quiet American" and Burdick and Lederer's "The Ugly American" for promoting "mischief-creating prejudices."

Dulles wrote that he preferred "taking the raw material which we find in America — naive, home-grown, even homespun — and training such a man to be a good intelligence officer, however long the process lasts." Those homespun

boys, if we are to believe recent news accounts, are traveling much farther afield than Dulles seemed willing to send them.

THE BACKBONE of CIA activity apparently remains the clandestine listening posts and purloined letters which Dulles so loved. But now the charge is often made that the CIA tries to foment change rather than merely report it; in Uganda, for example; in Chile, in Laos.

So much is being written about the CIA, in fact, that its argot is creeping into American slang: a spy is a spook, to kill is to "terminate with extreme prejudice."

Now arrives Joe Magglo, a mercenary-turned-writer, who says he worked off and on for the CIA in places like Africa and Laos.

His novel tells of Nick Mar-

tin, a sort of comic book superhero and former Green Beret. A "home-grown" boy whom Dulles would have liked, he is recruited off a Florida campus by "the Company" (in-group slang for the CIA), and works part time, training Bay of Pigs invaders and shooting up Africa and the Tonkin Gulf. There is enough bad writing to fill three pulp magazines ("steel split the air overhead").

BUT MAGGIO'S book has an aura of authenticity about it, and few readers know enough about the CIA to dispute him — even though the question already has been raised: Is Joe Magglo the Clifford Irving of the barracks set?

W. E. Colby, executive director of the CIA, disputes the publisher's contention that "Company Man" is "a novel of facts," proclaiming it a "law-

dry fabrication" filled with "lurid writing and innate contradictions." He denies that the CIA ever has carried out assassinations or has trafficked in drugs, as Magglo asserts.

Colby also says Magglo was "terminated for cause" during a six-month CIA training program and never went overseas for the CIA or undertook any of the "assignments" Magglo says he performed. But Magglo has obtained a government letter quoting the CIA as saying that he worked for the agency on contract.

In any event, Magglo writes enough like a soldier to convince the reader he has been one. He has produced an unprofessional but good example of thriller fiction.

George Harmon is a Daily News editor and writer.

CIA FUNDING CHALLENGED; PRESS SUPPRESSES STORY

Mass Media Ignore Item

A virtual news blackout has been declared by the nation's press concerning the major legal challenges that have been launched against the Central Intelligence Agency.

The August 10 filing of a suit in Washington against CIA Director Richard Helms and other government officials was a matter of court record and easily accessible to the news media. In addition, a news release containing essential facts about the story was hand delivered to the Washington Post, the Evening Star, the Associated Press and United Press International.

A week later, not one line concerning it had appeared anywhere in the country.

Earlier this year on July 20, an important decision in the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals guaranteed that the CIA would be brought to court on a challenge that had been in process since 1968. America's greatest newspaper "of record" the New York Times, ignored the story, as did the Washington Evening Star and most other papers. The Washington Post carried the story as a small item on page ten.

It was confirmed that editors were well aware of the story and its importance.

A call to one of Washington's two dailies produced this comment from a leading reporter: "You can call it a 'press conspiracy' if you like, but we're not going to print it and I'm sure no one else is either."

Court Moves Hit Secrecy

**Special to the Virginia Weekly*

America's "invisible government," the Central Intelligence (CIA), owes its existence to a piece of legislation that is unconstitutional.

This is the likely import of recent actions in Federal Courts in Washington and Philadelphia.

In a suit filed August 10, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, three Washingtonians challenged the secrecy of the CIA's funding and accounting.

The Washington suit followed closely a trail-blazing decision on July 20 of this year by the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia. In that decision a majority of the court held that there was a serious legal question concerning the constitutionality of the CIA act of 1949 which established a secret procedure for financing the agency.

A VIRTUALLY IGNORED CLAUSE

Both court cases are based on a virtually ignored clause of the United States Constitution specifically requiring that "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipt and Expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time." The CIA act of 1949 just as explicitly states "...Sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to the provisions of Government funds."

The spy agency receives somewhere between four and twenty billion dollars each year in public funds (how much is a closely guarded secret) that are carefully hidden throughout the appropriations figures for the entire federal government.

The new suit also asks for a state-by-state and nation-by-nation breakdown of CIA expenditures, as well as separating the money into categories by functions. CIA Director Richard Helms and Eliot Richardson, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare are brought into the local suit.

Domestic Spying

The National Security Act which created the CIA states that it shall not have "police, subpoena, law-enforcing powers or internal security functions." The CIA has been operating in violation of this law for at least fifteen years and probably longer.

In early 1966 Richard Helms, the Director of the CIA, in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated flatly that the CIA does not operate in the United States.

Yet in 1964 in a court case involving two Estonian emigres the CIA presented to the court a secret document authorizing it to engage in certain domestic activities.

This authorization was in the form of an executive order which seems to be in direct violation of the act creating the CIA.

As a matter of fact the domestic operations of the CIA were so large by 1964 that it set up a Domestic Operations Division with headquarters at 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, about a block and a half from the White House.

Major breaks in CIA secrecy in 1966 and 1967 resulted in disclosures that the CIA was very heavily involved in financing all types of programs at such major universities as Michigan State and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

In addition, it was revealed that the CIA had subsidized many domestic organizations including the major American student organization, The National Student Association. CIA money also found its way into at least twenty foundations, as well as Radio Free Europe, a large publishing house, and various other organizations.

Have the CIA's domestic operations ceased? A simple inspection of telephone books discloses that today the CIA has offices in at least twenty American cities.

by TOM SCHUSTER

THE CIA'S WAR WITH RED CHINA AND OTHER ASIAN LANDS

THE OLD WORLD WAR TWO C-46 bounced and yawed in the violent turbulence as its twin engines strained to maintain 160 knots. Its American pilot gripped the controls with every ounce of strength he could muster, and his eyes ached from the strain of searching the darkness to avoid the towering Himalayan mountains on each side.

They'd taken off from a secret base over three hours ago and were threading their way east of the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, long occupied by the forces of Red China. Their mission: drop agents and supplies to a band of Tibetan guerrillas who were still fighting the Communists.

The copilot, sweating over the air chart in his lap, tried to guide them to the drop zone that a mysterious American "civillian" at their base had earlier described. "Hold your course," he yelled. "Another two minutes should put us right on."

The pilot reached up, flicking on the "get-ready" light to alert the Tibetan agents who'd be jumping, and the plane crew who would kick the supplies out. "Go!" he yelled and switched on the buzzer.

Just as the last chute opened, the old plane was suddenly rocked by deadly Communist 37mm antiaircraft fire and the pilot cursed to himself, "Goddam—

ambush! Sonofabitch bastards were waiting for us."

But he managed to drop down and contour fly the valley floors, below the Red radar, and just after dawn they landed back at their base. They climbed from the plane, their gray uniforms soaked through with sweat, and the pilot muttered for the thousandth time, "There's gotta


be an easier way to make a buck." The C-46 was ancient, but its skin had been polished to shine like a mirror. Back toward the tail were small blue letters that spelled out "Air America." The only other identifying marks were the fresh 37mm holes in the left wing panels.

Throughout Asia, people have come to recognize these strange aircraft and their even stranger American pilots. Especially the pilots. You learn to spot them wherever you are. They're the guys in the gray Air Force-type uniforms, crushed caps, cowboy boots, with pistols hanging at their sides. They can be found raising hell in the Suzy Wong section of Hong Kong or racing motor bikes along Tu Do Street in Saigon or joking with the girls at the Vieng Rattay Club in Vientiane.

They're the pilots of the cloak and dagger Air America, one of the world's least known airlines.

Many are "old China hands" who first began flying for the "outfit" back when mainland China belonged to Chiang Kai-shek. They're the last of that breed known as soldiers of fortune, and these devil-may-care mercenaries will

continued



"It looks like any other plane, but that Air America marking spells one thing: CIA."

CIA'S WAR

continued

literally fly anything, anywhere, anytime—if the price is right. And they earn every penny of their tax-free paychecks.

"Sometimes no one can tell if a site is closed or open," one of them explains. "You get there and circle the place, looking for any suspicious sign. If no one shoots, you take your chance and land and keep the engines running until a friendly face shows up."

The planes are usually unidentified except for the discreet "Air America" markings, but they've been around long enough to earn the nickname "CIA Airlines" because of the type of jobs they take.

Officially, Air America is a private airline operating in Asia under charter to the U.S. government, but the bulk of its operations are, to say the least, closely connected with the CIA's spook operations. Officials say only that the outfit does "government contract flying," and when one of their planes is shot down, the release typically reads, "Names are being withheld by authorities until the next of kin are duly notified. Spokesmen declined to disclose the plane's point of origin or destination."

Behind all this official double-talk is the most colorful, mysterious and romantic airline in the world, complete with enough shady deals, "dragon ladies," and international intrigue to keep their sheet-metal repairmen busy patching bullet holes. Try as they may to remain secret, more is becoming known about these airborne soldiers of fortune. Air America's very size makes it difficult to conceal. It is one of the world's largest airlines, ranking between National and Northeast in number of planes and personnel. All told, it operates some 200 aircraft, employs about 600 pilots and, in an average year, these daredevils will haul 27,000 people and 6,000 tons of cargo, as well as air drop millions of dollars worth of supplies to anti-Communist troops behind enemy lines all over Asia.

"We air drop so much rice in Laos," says one of the pilots, "there's a whole generation of Meos who are going to be surprised when someone tells them rice doesn't grow in the sky."

Another Air America pilot told this author in a Danang bar one night, "Hell, we were doing the dirty work over here before Uncle Sam would even admit there was a Vietnam. Back in the early Sixties, we used to fly search and rescue missions into North Vietnam with only a .45 and nothing but an M16 for protection.

Now that the Air Force is doing it, they think they need all kinds of armor plate and fighter cover. Of course, they were all bonus flights for us. We were paid pretty well."

The pilots average \$25,000 a year, tax free, for their hair-raising work and claim, "So long as we get paid, we don't care what the customer puts in the back of where we have to haul it."

A list of "typical" Air America jobs reads like a page out of Terry and the Pirates—air drops of ammo, artillery spotting, insertion of saboteurs and agents, flying a fresh group of concubines to a lonely Asian warlord, transporting super-secret prisoners, refugee hauling (often plucking them from under Communist noses) and, recently, lifting Thai troops into Laos to reinforce the Meo General, Vang Pao.

If it all sound like an unusual role for a "civilian" airline, remember that Air America's father was the famous Civil Air Transport founded by Flying Tiger General Claire Chennault.

Chennault originally went to China to forge an air force for Chiang Kai-shek and formed the Flying Tigers to fight the Japanese before the United States got involved in World War Two. The deal was simple—join up as a mercenary, get \$600 a month and \$500 for every Jap plane you shot down. After America entered the war, most of the Tigers joined Chennault's 14th Air Force, swapping their Chinese insignia for Uncle Sam's and ran up a kill ratio of about 16 to 1.

After the war, Chennault retired from the service and returned to China as a civilian. There, the real war was just beginning as Chiang and Mao began their massive battle for control of the country. Chennault saw that the Nationalists needed dependable air transportation more than anything else, and he quickly stepped in to fill the gap. With Chiang's blessings, he gathered a small group of his ex-Flying Tigers in his office at Shanghai's Broadway Mansions Hotel, and Civil Air Transport was born.

Quickly dubbed CAT, his planes became a familiar sight throughout China, and even today the stories of his pilots are legendary. To keep beleaguered Nationalist troops supplied, most of the CAT routes were flown over Communist-held territory, and all the CAT men were on the Communists' list of wanted war criminals, with a price on their heads (Bob Buol was captured by ChiCom troops and held prisoner for five years. Six months after his release, he died a broken man).

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than any other company, but under con-

ditions that would shock any ordinary airline. For instance, every time CAT planes flew in the vicinity of Port Arthur, they were buzzed and fired on by Russian planes. Ironically, they were American-made Bell P-63s given to the Russians during World War Two under Lend Lease. In return, the CAT boys would take on a load of 500-pound bombs and "just happen to lose" them over enemy land.

There was no such thing as standard procedure, and the pilots learned to survive any way they could—like the time Captain Bob Roussclot lost an engine on his C-46 over the mountains of central China. He ordered his crew to kick the cargo out to lighten the plane enough to gain altitude on his sive good engine. Out went over 40 bales of Chinese currency, worth \$4,000,000.

Felix Smith used to fly out of Shanghai's Hungjao airport, hauling medicine to Kummung in the interior. He regularly returned with .50 caliber machinegun holes in his wings and fuselage, a tribute to the skill of Mao's gunners.

Stuart Dew was piloting his C-47 to Lanchow in northwest China when it became so cold that his engines simply froze solid on him.

But the favorite story among CAT pilots concerns Sterling Bemis of Melrose, Mass. Running into a blinding sand storm over an unexplored area of the Gobi Desert, he was blown off course and ran out of gas. Forced down, he figured he'd bought the farm until he stumbled across a hut and inside found an Army field phone! "Man, that was the hairy part," he remembers. "I stared at that damned phone for 10 minutes, wondering if it was connected to anything, before I got the nerve to pick it up."

Bemis was lucky and found himself talking to an operator who connected him with CAT in Lanchow. His convenient "phone booth" turned out to be a remnant of Chennault's wartime early-warning net that had never been disconnected.

In spite of the hazards, the pilots wouldn't have worked for anybody except CAT. In many ways, they were misfits, men who couldn't stand military discipline or the spit and polish demanded by state-side airlines. Others were on the run from nagging wives or pregnant girlfriends. Many had served with Chennault during the war and were still drawn by his personal magnetism and the glory and adventure of it all. Whatever the reason, all of them were more than happy when payday rolled around. They earned a base pay of \$800 a month for 60 hours in the air and \$10 for each additional hour. In CAT lingo, a city was "\$20 away."

Certain runs were dangerous even for CAT and became bonus flights. One of these was CAT's famous Taiyuan airlift in which they kept that north China industrial city completely supplied for nine months as the Reds drew a siege line tighter and tighter around it. Old Marshall Yen kept building airfields for the CAT planes and the Communists kept capturing them. By the end, they had run through 15 landing strips, each one closer to the heart of the city, and were making 30 flights a day into the place, all dangerous enough to warrant \$100 bonuses (the operation served as the model for the Berlin airlift).

continued

To add to the hazards, CATs were called on to set down inside walled cities or to make last-minute evacuations. Bill Severt recalls his last days as CAT's station manager in Mukden, Manchuria. "I was on the last plane out, and the lead Chi-Com troops were already in sight on the airport road. Men offered fantastic sums in American money to get their families out." The plane crew had to blind the crowd with a spotlight to get their C-46's hatch shut. Then "they tried to drive a truck in front of us to block our takeoff. We gunned our engines down the runway, leaping Chinese who knelt in our path, still wringing their hands and pleading to be saved."

Anyone who spends time in Asia will hear tales of CAT pilots auctioning off "tickets" on the last plane out of any city and making hundreds of thousands of dollars on a single refugee flight, but these stories have never been proved.

The Communists steadily pushed ahead, and in 1949 the "world's most shot at airline" began evacuating Chiang's forces to Formosa. In Shanghai, pilot Felix Smith salvaged an old Navy LST from the bottom of the Whangpoo River, loaded her with CAT's machine shops, and set sail for Formosa where she still sits today.



"EARTHQUAKE"
flaming and

The last official CAT flight from the Chinese mainland was on January 15, 1950, when they flew the final load of tin from the Mengtze mines in Yunnan to Haiphong. Since that time, CAT and Air America have frequently returned to Yunnan but in a very unofficial manner.

At that point, it looked as though CAT was doomed to go broke. Formosa was primitive, with only five motor vehicles on the whole island, and CAT was an airline without routes or passengers. Then war broke out in Korea and CAT was back in business hauling military cargo for the UN forces. They eventually flew nearly 30% of all the Korean airlift and were back on their feet.

During this period, CAT also went deeper into the spook business for both Uncle Sam and Chiang Kai-shek. It is said that Richard Fecteau, recently released by Red China, was on a CAT plane shot down while attempting to deposit CIA and Nationalist agents on the mainland.

When the Nationalists had evacuated to Formosa, their 93rd Division had been cut off in southwest China and they fled south into Burma. There, they remained intact as a fighting unit, due to Chiang's direction from Formosa and, they say, CAT's clandestine supply flights into abandoned World War Two airstrips. By 1950, CAT had resupplied them to the point that they were able to launch a 12,000-man raid back into China's Yunnan Province.

Chennault continually worried about the Communist advances throughout Asia and, in 1954, tried to form an International Volunteer Group similar to his old Flying Tigers, to wage an air war against the Reds on a strictly cash basis. When he failed to



Film still depicts downed U.S. pilot captured by VC, a fate met by many CIA airmen.

raise the necessary financial and diplomatic support, he took CAT to Indo-China to fly cargo for the French in their war against Ho Chi Minh. The Foreign Legion was bottled up inside of Dien Bien Phu and the French desperately needed CAT's cargo-carrying talents to supply them. Twenty-four CAT pilots landed at Haiphong's Cat Bi Airport to do the "dirty work" for \$3,000 a month plus bonus. Their planes were C-119 Flying Boxcars whose U. S. Air Force insignias still showed through the hastily brushed on gray paint.

It was here that CAT's most famous pilot, James B. McGovern, ran the show. A huge, 300-pound mountain of a man, he was called "Earthquake McGoon" (after the Lil Abner character) by one and all. A booming extrovert openly contemptuous of anyone timid, McGoon was no stranger to the Orient. As a fighter pilot for Chennault, he had been one of the war's last prop aces. Instead of going home to Elizabeth, New Jersey, he went to work for CAT when it was first formed and rented a house in Tsingtao, next door to Admiral Badger, CO of the US 7th Fleet. As reported in the *Saturday Evening Post*, he first stole barrels of the admiral's drinking water to fill the swimming pool he built. Then he won a troupe of White

Russian dancing girls in a poker game and finally tapped the admiral's electricity to light his all-night parties.

The official CAT hangout was Pop Gingle's bar in Hong Kong. Pop had taken his Navy retirement there years ago, got into a poker game, and woke up with the deed to the joint. Anybody who ever met him said that he looked like Sidney Greenstreet—fat, heavy jowls and squinty eyes, Panama hat and cane. He always had steaks, beer, baseball scores and country music for his CAT boys, and Chennault's picture hung in the back room. But McGoon was his favorite; some claimed that Pop was the only man in all of south China who could beat Mac in a belly-bumping contest. McGoon usually parked his enormous bulk in an easy chair in Pop's back room, drinking gallons of beer and threatening, "Someday I'm gonna quit coming here and ruin your business."

Mac almost made good on his threat when he ran out of gas over Communist lines in December, 1949. His feet were always bothering him, as if complaining about the load they were forced to carry, and he would tell Bill Welk that he'd "never bail out because I'd only have to walk." True to his word, he rode his C-46 down onto a dry riverbed and was immediately captured.

As soon as Pop heard about it, he raised \$100,000 and gave it to Chennault with instructions to "Use it all if you have to, but get my boy back."

No one knows if it was Pop's ransom money that did the trick or not, but six months later, Mac walked into Gingle's screaming for a beer. He didn't remember until 24 hours later to notify CAT that he was all right and that "the goddam Commies couldn't afford to feed me." As the news flashed through the Orient, beer glasses were raised from Tokyo to Singapore.

The first to volunteer for Indo-China, Mac and Eric Shilling flew into Haiphong together and calmly wheeled an icebox out of their C-46. "After all," they said, "you got to have cold beer if you're going to fight a war."

So fat that he couldn't pull the yoke all the way back, Mac was known for his tail-high landings, but twice a day he squeezed himself into a C-119 to deliver seven-ton loads of ammo to General DeCastries. It was a 90-minute flight followed by a couple of minutes of sheer terror as they went into "the slot," a gauntlet of Communist anti-aircraft fire, and dropped their loads from only 1500 feet to insure getting them into the ever-shrinking French lines.

At night, the CAT crews hung out at Haiphong's La Marseillaise bar, unwinding from the day's runs and trying not to think about their mounting casualties.

Although they were supposed to stick to flying cargo, they began to feel for the French troops on the ground and on April 2, 1954, they loaded one of their C-119's with napalm and used the lumbering cargo plane for a dive bomber to drop their deadly load on the Communist lines during a particularly crucial battle.

One day toward the end of April, Mac looked over Wallace Buford's flak-riddled plane at Haiphong and joked, "Somebody must have been carrying a magnet." A week later, enemy machine-gun fire severed McGoon's elevator controls as he flew through the slot, and he called over

double flying this thing." After see-sawing all over the sky on his trim tabs, he made it back to Haiphong to tell his ground crew, "Now I know what it's like to ride a kangaroo."

Buford met him with a grin and asked, "You borrow my magnet?"

The afternoon of May 6, one day before Dien Bien Phu fell, Mac took off in Bird 2 of a six-plane flight. His copilot was Buford and Mac couldn't resist telling him, "Now maybe we'll find out which one of us carries the magnet."

Steve Kusak, called "the Polock" by McGoon, was first through the slot. Just as he looked back to check on Earthquake, Mac called out, "I've got a direct hit. Where the hell are the fighters?"

His port engine was out and the leading edge of his wing was torn up. A second shell exploded against his right tail boom and he called to Kusak, "Steve, tell me which way the mountains are lowest."

"Turn right. Can you make it? Bail out." "No sweat," Mac answered. "We'll ride her."

He headed for a valley along the Nam Dinh river, fighting for control of his shot-up plane. Then, slowly and horribly, his C-119 skidded toward the hills, and Kusak heard Mac say, "Looks like this is it, son." His left wingtip dug into the hillside and the plane turned a perfect cartwheel before bursting into a ball of flame. Less than an eighth of a mile ahead was a clearing where he could have safely put down.

When Pop's phone rang just after midnight, he answered and said, "You don't have to tell me. It's Mac, isn't it?"

After Dien Bien Phu fell, most of the planes were shifted to flying anti-Communist refugees south to Saigon, but a young CAT pilot named Richard Pope was packing to leave. War correspondent Richard Tregaskis had ridden the slot several times with Pope and asked him where he was going now.

"I don't know. I guess I'll do a little tiger hunting," he answered. A few months later, it became apparent what kind of "tigers" Pope and a handful of other CAT pilots were hunting. They turned up in an anti-Communist rebellion in Indonesia, flying B-26 bombers for the rebels. Pope

down and spent long months as a pilot of Sukarno.

Most people speculate that it was about this time that the CIA stepped into the picture. Among other things, CAT was reorganized to give birth to the offshoot called Air America. The old CAT stayed legitimate for the most part, flying commercial passenger traffic throughout the Pacific, and Air America took over the undercover part of the operation. The whole operation is such a tangle of phony corporations that it's hard to tell just who controls what, but it appears that both the Nationalists and the CIA were involved for a while and one rumor even has it that Madame Chiang has a personal interest in the deal.

Chennault died of cancer and control passed to a group of ex-Pan Am pilots headed by George Doole in Washington and Hugh Grundy in Taipei. Air America got deeper and deeper into the secret wars being fought in Southeast Asia and, in 1958, North Vietnam began complaining about civilian planes invading their airspace. It is claimed that these were Air America C-47s on CIA missions. At the same time, China complained of U.S.-supplied Nationalist Chinese special forces camps in Yunnan Province. Again, Air America is mentioned as their source of men and munitions.

In 1959, retired Admiral Felix Stump took over as board chairman of Air America and moved the operation into Laos, where a new war was starting to brew. As far as is known, the first Laos casualty for the company occurred in 1960 when one of their planes was shot down over the Plain of Jars. The copilot turned out to be the son of C. Hollington Tong, Nationalist China's ambassador to Washington.

Air America quickly became the unofficial air force of the Laotian government for a few reasons. The Laotians didn't have a prayer of forming an air force of their own, and Americans can't serve in the armed forces of a foreign government without losing their citizenship. Also, if an American military plane is shot down over a hostile country, the enemy has a marvelous "incident" to publicize. If a "civilian" plane goes down, the enemy can't complain to anyone but the company. The easiest solution to the whole mess was to hire the Air America gang, who'd do anything as long as the price was right.

Things really got spooky in Laos and the company had a hard time maintaining their civilian cover. They flew a large fleet of choppers and one of their pilots claims, "Most of my missions were given to me directly by CIA agents in Vientiane." As the scale of operations grew, the original group of former CAT pilots had more business than they could handle and the company began recruiting pilots. Or, as some say, shanghaiing pilots.

"I was a Marine chopper pilot based on Okinawa," explains a blond, 30-year-old Air America man. "CAT came through looking for flyers. I thought I was going to become an airline pilot when they hired me. I resigned my commission, went to Taipei full of dreams about being a civilian jet jockey, and a couple of weeks later, found myself hedge-hopping a Sikorsky through Vientiane. Sure, I could have quit on my three-year contract, but I came out of the service broke. So

here, I stay, flying the mission ordered."

Laos is a strange place, populated by different tribes who all believe they came out of a pumpkin thousands of years ago. The country's major exports are gold and opium, and palace revolts are so common, the pilots often don't know who will be paying them.

One of the old CAT men tells, "Half the time when we heard shooting, it meant combat. The other half was for local festivals. I woke up one morning in Vientiane with all hell breaking loose. I grabbed my 45 thinking the Pathet Lao (PL) had finally taken the city, but it was only the start of the three day Boun Banx festival. Naturally, both sides completely stopped the war to celebrate it. And the Army fired thousands of rounds of star shells to illuminate the festivities. It almost would have been safer flying against PL flak."

The really strange thing is that, at one point, the Russians were also flying transports into the Plain of Jars to supply the PL side, and they'd often pass Air America planes along the way. On one occasion, an Air America pilot was searching for a hole in the monsoon cloud cover to make his drop when he spotted a Russian doing the same thing. The American spoke a little Russian and asked them for an altimeter setting. They willingly gave him a reading and both went on to make their drops so the troops below could kill each other for another day.

Wattay Airport outside of Vientiane began to look like Air America headquarters until part of the operation was shifted to the Long Chiang base of General Vang Pao. An Air Force officer who flew in there once told this author that some of the planes he saw on the strip had sets of insignia and the crews swapped them like license plates on a car so that the plane could claim any of several identities.

The Air America crews have done their best to make themselves at home in this out-of-the-way spot. The Vieng Rattay bar has good booze and the city is full of lithe, young prostitutes. "Even if you had a mission in the morning, you drank because you knew that at least the booze was pure," says one veteran of the scene. "The local drinking water from the muddy Mekong was so lousy, we paid a dollar a quart for imported, tinned drinking water. Everything in town closed up by 10 PM except bars and opium dens."

On duty, even the country itself is an enemy. Mountains are often a thousand feet higher than the charts show and sudden monsoon storms spring up out of nowhere. Pilots regularly have to cope with shot-out engines, emergency evacuations, and making takeoffs while 2,000 pounds overweight with an escaping Lao general, his staff and concubines and PL mortars hammering the strip.

One pilot trying to get out of Ban Nam Boc was horrified to find a PL artillery barrage open up just as he began to taxi. The Lao ground troops panicked and rushed the plane trying to get aboard. "We had to taxi right through them to get out," he says.

The chopper pilots earn their pay the hard way, often flying behind enemy lines to rescue people. In the early days, they used old Sikorsky HO4S. They had already worn out before they got them. The book says that the H-34 can go

5,000 feet with 18 men aboard, but Air America pilots have never been known to pay much attention to the book.

"I've had my bird up as high as 14,000 feet," says a nervous, chain-smoking pilot, "and as many as 20 guys in the cabin. Sometimes, the only way I could get airborne was by bouncing the ship up, like a kid getting higher and higher off a trampoline. I constantly flew with engine RPMs way past the red line."

"It's no wonder we lost so many ships in Laos. Our navigational checkpoints used to be 'this crashed copter here' or 'that one over there.'"

"When we hauled troops in, they'd pile out with rifles, machine guns, sacks of rice, cooking pots, loaves of bread—while the PL fired away at us. It was a helluva job, let me tell you."

Even refueling is ticklish in this part of the world. They use C47s to spot 55-gallon fuel drums at all the isolated strips. If you must put down at one, you have to hand pump the gas into your bird while local tribesmen watch... and you wonder, are they friendly or enemy? Are they civilized or are they some of the head hunters that still roam the region?

Casualties have mounted as the Communists teach the PL to sit on mountain-tops with 20-and 40-mm AA guns and fire down at low flying Air America planes. Their instructions are "to kill the metal birds."

Of the many Air America crews listed among the missing, only one is known to have survived capture to return. In 1961, Ed Shore's plane developed engine trouble and went down near Ban Vieng San. They were quickly captured by the PL and led off to a jungle prison where they were kept tied to posts and displayed to the natives for 15 months.

"We were treated like wild animals, locked in stocks, and held while Meos fired their guns at our cell for amusement," recalls one of Shore's passengers.

Finally released at Wattay Airport during a truce, the Air America men were quickly hustled aboard a plane for the States and have never talked about their ordeal.

Although Air America is highly visible wherever you go in Asia, its pilots' most daring exploits are cloaked in official secrecy. Yet, if you hang around that area long enough, you begin to put the pieces together. An Air Force officer speculates, "North Thailand is dotted with airstrips that are beautifully maintained. I wouldn't be surprised if they were flying right into China from some of them."

Although some 23 years have passed, the shadowy Chinese Nationalist General Li Mi still commands several thousand troops from his old mainland 93rd Division. They operate in the triangular area formed by the junction of Burma, Thailand and Laos and are regularly accused of crossing over into China's Yunnan Province (remember, they are officially still at war with Mao) and raiding ChiCom camps—with Air America support.

Experienced observers go even further in their listing of Air America activity, crediting them with flying agents in and out of North Vietnam, putting U. S. Special Forces teams behind the lines in Cambodia, and supplying a myriad of secret base camps along the North Vietnam—

Laos border that are jumping off points for commando raids into enemy territory.

Joe Maggio, a fiercely aggressive ex-CIA spook and Congo mercenary, claims to have been part of a team that was transported into North Vietnam by Air America in the early Sixties. "We were taken in by one of their choppers, and after we'd completed our mission, they picked us up and took us back out," he says. "Those guys were flying all over North Vietnam in unarmed choppers and old C-46s."

Terry Walkerstorfer, an ex-Special Forces captain with two tours in Vietnam's delta, talks of the CIA-run Special Operations Groups, bands of spooks made up of both U.S. and foreign agents. "They carried Swedish K submachine-guns with silencers and were hauled around behind the lines by Air America. The whole outfit is weird. They say that one of their agents cracked and went over the hill a while back. He completely disappeared. But a few months later, an Air America guy was doing a job in the Congo and spotted this deserter working there as a mercenary. He knew too much to be running around loose; so they quietly kidnapped him and shipped him back to the States."

When Air America began recruiting pilots from the military, they added new skills to the "company" that were put to work in the Laotian fighting as far back as 1964. At that time, the U.S. still wasn't officially involved, and some of the Air America pilots abandoned their cargo planes to fly T-28 fighter-bombers in combat for the Laotian government.

Perhaps the most interesting "work" that Air America has undertaken, however, was their involvement in the rebellion in Tibet. Bob Miller, an old hand in Asia, told this author, "As recently as 1966 the CAT-Air America boys were regularly running to Tibet in C-46s to resupply rebels there that Chiang had stirred up."

The recently published Pentagon Papers confirm this story. General Ed Lansdale, an experienced Asian CIA man, said, "CAT has... more than 200 overflights of mainland China and Tibet..." It appears that the Nationalists grand scheme was to coordinate and lead twin rebellions in Tibet and Yunnan.

The deeper you look, the more you realize that the Air America organization is into almost every aspect of Asian air operations. They provide plane crews for Air Vietnam, and columnist Jack Anderson claims that the planes of another Asian outfit, Southern Air Transport, are actually Air America craft with a new paint job.

Most Air America planes are old C-46s and C-47s built during World War Two, but they're beautifully maintained and prized for their durability. Others are specially built jobs that can land on grass strips only 250 feet long, C-123 cargo planes of the type used by the Air Force, a fleet of Huey helicopters and a recently spotted four-engine Constellation with "strange humps" in the fuselage that looks very much like the electronic spy plane the Navy uses. Unusual aircraft for a civilian airline.

Doolle has just been replaced as head of Air America, but before he left, he hedged his answers when questioned about his company's business. "I don't know all of our customers' private business and re- things—whatever the customer has for us."

continued

Others in the company are less cagy about what they do. Saigon station chief E. J. Theisen says, "I guess we carry about everything except bombs under our wings." Even that is doubted by some, but Theisen does admit that the super-secret SOG groups use Air America for their in-country transportation. These are the guys you see getting out of a plane on some God-forsaken strip, dressed in uniforms without insignia, and carrying gun bags that take a form suspiciously like that of the Swedish K.

Vietnamese station manager Jim Cunningham will only say, "We operate on a you-call, we haul basis. We don't go into details."

Strangely, one of the members of Air America's board of directors is a very prominent Boston lawyer. An ex-Air Force officer, he says that he "got to know some of the CAT operating personnel and was invited to join the board. Air America handles mostly CIA charter work. It's a very well run airline." Evidently, it's a damned well run airline. They supposedly show a \$10,000,000 profit every year.

So America's flying foreign legion flies on. In fact, as the official U.S. presence in Asia shrinks, Air America is stepping in to fill the void in its "unofficial" manner, and they're busier than ever before.

Wherever they go, whatever they do, they earn their keep by doing what nobody else would touch with a ten-foot pole. In Taipei, a statue of the "old man," Claire Chennault, looks out over New Park and he has a satisfied look on his face as though he knows that the outfit he left behind will always live up to its motto: "Anything, anytime, anywhere—professionally." ▲


TAB

Typical of the battles over land was a proposal to create a 230-acre park out of some wooded green hills along the Virginia bank of the Potomac River near Washington, D. C.

The tract was owned by the Federal Highway Administration, which wanted to retain the land for future expansion of its research laboratory. Opposition to the plan also was expressed by the Central Intelligence Agency next door, which preferred to keep the public as far away as possible from its headquarters.

Under the compromise finally reached, some of the land was transferred to the National Park Service for public recreation, while other portions were divided between the Highway Administration and the CIA.

In Virginia, woodlands adjacent to the Central Intelligence Agency recently were turned into a public park. Surplus property in 39 States has been acquired for recreation areas.



FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Eyewitness News

STATION WTOP TV

DATE August 24, 1972 5:30 PM

CITY Washington, D.C.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR CIA EMPLOYEES

MAX ROBINSON: Twenty-two-year-old Joseph Hamm was fired from the FBI in April because his hair is too long. The American Civil Liberties Union fought for his reinstatement with the Civil Service Commission. And Hamm has been ordered back to work.

Eyewitness News correspondent Steve Gendel reports.

STEVE GENDEL: Joseph Hamm was a night fingerprint clerk with the FBI. He rarely came in contact with the public as part of his job. But FBI officials said his image, which does not conform to their standards, could lessen public confidence in the FBI. Hamm was fired when he refused to cut his hair.

In a letter to the Civil Service Commission regarding this case, the FBI defended its hair-grooming requirement, saying the American public compares agents against "Inspector Erskine" of The FBI tv series.

The ACLU said this ruling infringes on basic constitutional rights. They filed a grievance with the Civil Service Commission, who ordered Hamm reinstated.

MAN: What is basically involved here is a right of an individual in the absence of some compelling governmental interest to be let alone, to decide how he will dress, how he will conduct what is essentially his private life.

GENDEL: The FBI is in most circumstances exempt from Civil Service review. Hamm's case was an exception because he's a Vietnam veteran and entitled to protection under the Veterans Preference Act.

But ACLU attorneys say this is the closest thing to a precedent, breaking what they call FBI operations as a separate

enclave insulated from constitutional requirements. The ACLU says if asked to do so they'll try and extend the principle won here to FBI special agents themselves, and possibly the military and the CIA.

This is Steve Gendel, Eyewitness News.

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Not One Trench Coat

Austin CIA Office Has 'Low Profile'

By DAVE MAYES
Staff Writer

You almost have to do a little cloak-and-dagger work yourself to find the Austin office of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Go to the Federal Building on East 8th and you won't find it listed in the office index. Neither will you see its name posted on any office door.

As in most spy thrillers, however, the mystery can be solved if one does the unexpected but obvious thing. In this case look it up in the telephone book.

A woman will answer your

call by repeating the phone number, but don't be uncertain you've found it.

"We try to maintain a low profile," began William B. Wood of the CIA. It's his name that appears in the index at the Federal Building and beside the door of Room 520.

The door, complete with peephole and nightlatch, opens into a green-carpeted two-room office shared by Wood and his secretary.

But here the James Bond scenario ends. The impression quickly registers that neither of these CIA folk has ever clicked

a picture with a camera hidden in a cigarette lighter, or smuggled microfilm anywhere. They probably don't even own trench coats.

Wood, An affable, well-polished man, is one of the dozen CIA representatives in the country who does recruiting for the agency.

The CIA tries not to be obvious in Austin, he continued, because as a recruiting office it has no reason to be otherwise. "We don't really have to advertise ourselves," he said, because the agency has never had to worry about getting enough applications.

It seems the CIA is more concerned with caps and gowns than cloaks and daggers.

Wood said he receives resumes from many people with backgrounds in law enforcement because there is a popular but mistaken notion that the CIA is some kind of law enforcement arm of the government.

He maintains that the CIA has no such duties, in fact has no domestic responsibilities, but works exclusively in gathering foreign intelligence for the National Security Council.

Consequently, the CIA is looking for people with highly-developed intellectual skills in virtually all fields of social and physical science and technology.

The most fertile grounds for recruiters are the university graduate schools, Wood said. For this reason, the agency in 1965 located its recruiting office in Austin where the University of Texas maintains the largest graduate school in the South.

Wood's recruiting territory includes Texas, Louisiana,

Oklahoma and part of New Mexico.

The recruiter said he prefers to work with applicants on a one-to-one basis, in an effort to make a "personalized analysis of an individual."

If the applicant seems promising and does well on a test similar to the graduate record exam, he fills out a lengthy application, goes to Washington, D.C. for further screening, and undergoes a thorough security check.

"The entire process may take between four and six months," Wood said.

The number of people employed by the CIA is classified, but Wood characterized it as one of the "smaller" government agencies.

Most of them work at CIA headquarters in Washington, he added.

Wood points out with pride that the CIA has the lowest turnover rate of any government agency, attributing this to the "esprit de corps" that exists among staff members.

Himself a career CIA man, Wood joined the agency in early 1950's, not long after it was created under the National Security Act of 1947.

The University of Texas graduate said he specialized in Russian studies before becoming a recruiter in 1965.

"The CIA is a unique place in which to work, he said. "For an understanding of the total dimensions of a foreign problem, there is no other place to get it."

STATINTL
DCI:

DAILY WORLD
17 AUG 1972

Attempt to hide role of ex-CIA agent

WASHINGTON—The revelation that an ex-CIA agent is on the payroll of Action, the government agency which includes the Peace Corps, was deleted from a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report after a personal plea by Action director Joseph H. Blatchford, United Press International reported.

DOMINICANS UNDER CIA SURVEILLANCE

SANTO DOMINGO, Dominican Republic — The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which maintains a network of espionage in the Dominican Republic, is centralizing its operations in the postal service and in Las American International Airport, according to news media here.

The CIA, say these sources, uses traffic inspectors in post offices and national guard agents in the airport, commanded by Lt. Jose Ramon Gomez Quezada, who formally appears as a representative of INTERPOL (International Police).

The postal "inspectors" censor correspondence entering and leaving the country, and confiscate books, magazines and newspapers.

The airport team is officially stated to be fighting the drug traffic, but its basic concern is to watch those suspected of opposing the regime of President Joaquin Balaguer, and censor correspondence and literature.

It is estimated that at least 10,000 letters fell into the hands of these agents in the past 14 months in the airport alone.

The Gomez Quezada group began work nearly two years ago.

The Dominican press has reported that most Dominicans living abroad prefer to send their mail through friends.

— Compiled by Jose Perez

TAB

30 July 1972

Denounces AID Link With CIA

By WILLIAM K. WYANT JR.
A Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, July 29—Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, denounced Saturday the Agency for International Development's involvement in Laos with the Central Intelligence Agency.

"The activities and funds of these two agencies in Laos are now so mixed," he said, "that it must be impossible for Lao officials to know whether they are dealing with AID or with the CIA."

Symington, chairman of the Senate foreign relations subcommittee on security agreements and commitments abroad, made the statement in a preface he wrote for a declassified version of hearings over which he presided last April 13.

He criticized the Executive Branch of the government for making extensive deletions in the hearing record, made public Saturday. He said the deletions were made "on alleged grounds of security."

The hearing transcript was scissored so severely, Symington said, that his panel was at first reluctant to make public what remained. However, it was decided that the report would add to information available about Laos.

Roderic L. O'Connor, co-ordinator of AID's bureau for supporting assistance, appeared before the subcommittee in response to a letter Symington wrote March 21 to John A. Hannah, administrator of the Agency for International Development.

Symington's letter had asked Hannah a series of questions about the relationship in Laos between AID, which administers foreign assistance, and the CIA, which finances irregular troops fighting Communists.

In a separate statement issued Saturday with the censored but now declassified hearing record, the Missouri Senator said the facts now coming out "raise serious questions about the legality of some United States expenditures in Laos . . ."

The facts also disclose, Symington said, "a pattern of deviousness, if not actual deception, which has characterized the conduct of our policy in Laos for the last decade."

O'Connor told the subcommittee that AID was not now financing, and never had financed, military or intelligence operations in Laos, as such. He conceded that AID's assistance had helped the royal Lao government carry its defense burden.

In fiscal 1972, the witness said, the CIA is reimbursing AID in the amount of \$2,500,000 for medical services and supplies for paramilitary forces or their dependents in Laos.

O'Connor said AID supplied certain services in the health and humanitarian fields for "anybody in Laos who is ill, sick, or wounded."

HS/HC-9501

Court to Act On Secret CIA Costs

PHILADELPHIA, July 21 (AP)—The Third U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ordered a three-judge court set up to decide the constitutionality of a law exempting the Central Intelligence Agency from revealing its expenditures.

In a 4-to-3 decision, the appeals court told the U.S. District Court in Erie, Pa., to empanel the special court.

The ruling Thursday was made on a request filed by William B. Richardson, 52, of Greensburg. He charged the government's failure to disclose CIA expenditures violates the constitutional requirement for an accounting of all government financial dealings.

Richardson appealed to the Circuit Court after a District Court judge in Erie rejected his plea.

In the appeals court decision written by Judge Max Rosen, the court said a citizen has the right to know how his tax money is being spent.

The CIA Act of 1949 exempts the agency from "the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditures of government funds."

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM CBS Evening News

STATION WTOP TV
 CBS Network

DATE July 28, 1972 7:00 PM

CITY Washington, DC

CIA REPORT

ROGER MUDD: The propaganda war over allegations that American bombs have destroyed North Vietnamese dikes heated up today on two sides of the Atlantic.

In Paris the North Vietnamese charged Mr. Nixon with trying to elude responsibility when he denied yesterday the dikes were being bombed deliberately.

But in Washington the State Department backed up Mr. Nixon's denial when it took the highly unusual step of releasing a report compiled by the super secret CIA.

MARVIN KALB: Senators began to leak details of the report, so late today the State Department under increasing pressure, released it, but without any photographic evidence.

The report claims that only 12 of North Vietnam's major dikes have been struck by American bombs, presumably since the air war intensified last May.

The 12 dikes are all located south and southeast of Hanoi in what is called the Lower Red River Delta, the same area which experienced severe flooding last August when approximately 600 persons died.

The report further claims that damage is minor, no major dike has been breached and there has been no flooding.

Hanoi claims 58 dikes have been hit, part of a systematic American campaign against the entire dike system of North Vietnam.

US officials say that is a total fabrication. There is no systematic campaign of that kind.

The report says in an almost plaintive way that there are so many dikes in North Vietnam, 2700 miles of them, that any major air campaign almost inevitably results in damage to some of the dikes; officials adding that if North Vietnam hopes to avoid major flooding next month it had best repair the dikes now.

This report is based on official photographs taken July 11 and 12. It was shown late yesterday to Senators Fulbright, Aiken and Symington by

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the CIA. Today the leaks began. The report was sprung. And there is little doubt the dike controversy will continue.

Marvin Kalb, CBS News, the State Department.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER

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S - 867,810

JUL 22 1972

Ruling Asked On Secrecy in CIA Spending

The 3rd U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals here has ordered that a three-judge court be set up to decide the constitutionality of a law that exempts the Central Intelligence Agency from revealing its expenditures.

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The CIA Act of 1949 exempts the agency from "the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditures of government funds."

Key Egyptian-Soviet Moves Since '55

By United Press International

Following is a list of major events in relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union:

- Sept. 27, 1955**—Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser announces that the Soviet Union agreed to supply Egypt with weapons in exchange for Egyptian cotton and rice.
- March 14, 1957**—Soviet Union announces agreement to deliver 500,000 tons of oil in exchange for Egyptian goods.
- Nov. 19, 1957**—A communiqué at the conclusion of a visit by Egypt's Defense Minister, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, to Moscow reports agreement on matters of political and economic cooperation as well as on military matters.
- April 29 to May 15, 1958**—Mr. Nasser, then President, visits Moscow for talks on the Middle East situation.
- Oct. 23, 1958**—The Soviet Premier, Nikita S. Khrushchev, announces Soviet economic and technical assistance in the construction of the Aswan Dam.
- Jan. 28, 1961**—Soviet Union agrees to contribute almost \$36.5-million toward construction of steel-rolling mill and other factories.
- Dec. 12, 1961**—The Egyptian press reports shipments of submarines, destroyers and other warships from Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.
- June 18, 1963**—Marshal Amer ends official visit to Moscow, and a communiqué announces Soviet agreements to provide further industrial credits and economic and military aid.
- May 9 to 24, 1964**—Mr. Khrushchev arrives for inauguration of first stage of Aswan High Dam. Mr. Nasser announces that Moscow has agreed to lend Egypt nearly \$280-million for a second five-year plan.
- Aug. 27, 1965**—Mr. Nasser arrives in Moscow on official visit. New trade agreement is initialed.
- May 10, 1966**—The Soviet Premier, Aleksei N. Kosygin, and a high-level Government and party delegation visit Cairo to hold talks on economic and other assistance.
- June 21 to 24, 1967**—The Soviet President, Nikolai V. Podgorny, talks with Mr. Nasser in Cairo, and a joint communiqué pledges both nations to "further collaboration" against Israel.
- Sept. 29, 1970**—Mr. Nasser dies in Cairo and is succeeded as President by Anwar el-Sadat. Mr. Kosygin remains in Cairo after the funeral for talks with Mr. Sadat and the new Egyptian leadership.
- May 27, 1971**—Mr. Sadat and Mr. Podgorny sign a 15-year treaty of friendship and cooperation in Cairo.
- Feb. 3 and 4, 1972**—Mr. Sadat visits Moscow, and Arab reports say that he sought more military aid.
- Feb. 18 to 20, 1972**—A joint communiqué issued after the visit to Egypt by the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, says that Moscow agreed to increase Egypt's combat capabilities.
- July 15, 1972**—The Egyptian Premier, Dr. Aziz Sidky cuts short a scheduled three-day visit to Moscow after one day of talks with leaders.
- July 18, 1972**—Official sources in Cairo report that Mr. Sadat asked the Soviet Union to withdraw all military advisers from Egypt.

Multiple 1964-68 Peace Efforts and Their Code Names

By Tim O'Brien and John Thorner
Washington Post Staff Writers
The Seaborn "Initiative"

Between June, 1964, and June, 1965, J. Blair Seaborn, the Canadian member of the International Control Commission in Southeast Asia, met five times with North Vietnamese officials. He carried, according to the official diplomatic history of the period, "unusually substantive and dramatic" messages.

"... The main subject stressed repeatedly by each (side) was its determination to do and endure whatever might be necessary to see the war to a conclusion satisfactory to it.

"To the extent they believed each other, the two sides were amply forewarned that a painful contest lay ahead. Even so, they were not inclined to compromise their way out."

Accordingly, nothing came of the Seaborn missions.

* * * *

Project Mayflower

In May, 1965, President Johnson ordered a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam in an effort to persuade the North Vietnamese to take some reciprocal action toward deescalation. U.S. Ambassador Foy Kohler in Moscow was instructed to inform the North Vietnamese Ambassador there that the halt would be indefinite and could lead to "a permanent end to ... attacks on North Vietnam."

The Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) refused to transmit the message to Hanoi and suggested it be turned over to the Soviet government. The Soviets refused to act as intermediaries and "lectured Kohler at length upon the U.S. misconception of the conflict in Vietnam."

The failure of this initiative had been anticipated by the CIA and other Administration officials but was regarded within the government as a productive gesture toward world and domestic opinion even if it failed.

* * * *

The XYZ Channel

Mal Van Bo, head of the DRV delegation in Paris, had three contacts with the U.S. government between May, 1965, and February, 1966.

The first contact was through the French government on April 29, 1965. The French notified the U.S. that Bo believed that "favorable condi-

tions for (a) solution" could be created if the U.S. would accept the "Four Points" of North Vietnam's announced position.

There was no reply from the Americans until August, 1965, when Edmund Gullion, a retired foreign service officer who is now at Tufts University, was sent to Paris to talk with Mal Van Bo. They met four times and their discussions, the diplomatic history says, represented "the most serious mutual effort to resolve matters of substance between the U.S. and DRV before and since."

Gullion (known as "X") and Bo ("R") discussed the possibility for reconvening the 1954 Geneva Conference on Southeast Asia and seemed to be heading toward agreements on some of the Hanoi "Four Points." Then suddenly Bo failed to show up for a scheduled meeting (Sept. 7, 1965) and the initiative ended. The diplomatic section of the Pentagon papers called the episode "as mysterious in its ending as it was fruitful and suggestive in its beginnings."

* * * *

Pinta: the Rangoon Contact

On Dec. 24, 1965, the U.S. began a 37-day bombing pause. It came after Soviet Embassy Counsellor Zinchuk in Washington told White House aide McGeorge Bundy that Hanoi was unlikely to respond, although a pause might possibly improve the atmosphere for the long run.

During the pause, the U.S. met with the North Vietnamese counsel general in Rangoon, Burma, and submitted an aide memoire. No reply came until 12 hours after the bombing was resumed. It amounted to a rebuttal of the U. S. position.

* * * *

The Ronning Missions

Retired Canadian diplomat Chester Ronning visited Hanoi in March and June of 1966. Ronning had friendly relations with the Chinese and was known to be critical of U.S. policies toward China and Vietnam, but the U.S. nevertheless gave its formal support.

During his first visit Ronning was unable to sway North Vietnamese leaders from their insistence on the previously announced "Four Points" as the only basis for settling the war. Pham Van Dong did tell him, as Bo believed that "favorable condi-

tion for (a) solution" could be created if the U.S. would accept the "Four Points" of North Vietnam's announced position.

Neither the U.S. nor North Vietnam was enthusiastic about a return trip but Ronning did arrange to visit Hanoi again in June. He was not permitted to see Pham Van Dong this time, and was told by a lesser official that there would be no military reciprocity for a U.S. bombing halt.

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Marigold: The Polish Channel

Marigold was the code name for negotiating efforts that involved Janusz Lewandowski, the Polish member of the International Control Commission in Vietnam. These efforts began in June 1966 in Saigon and also involved the Italian Ambassador there.

Lewandowski made several visits to Hanoi in succeeding months, carrying with him a 10-point formulation of his own interpretation of the American attitude toward a settlement.

North Vietnam agreed to meet a U.S. representative in Warsaw, but canceled all further discussion of the matter after U.S. bombing raids on Hanoi.

The Pentagon history concluded that Marigold gave each side a glimpse of possible areas of negotiation. It added that the Poles "acted as friends of Hanoi, not neutrals" and "applied pressure in good faith by the ever-present threat of disclosing their version of the matter to influential world leaders or the public at large." Nothing came of the Marigold exercise and it did leak out to the world.

* * * *

Packers: The Romanian Channel

From October 1966 through February 1968 the Romanians made efforts to take a part in the negotiating picture. Acting on the suggestion of Ambassador Averell Harriman; Deputy Foreign Minister Gheorghe Macovescu went to Hanoi in December, 1967, and came to Washington early in January, 1968, to convey North Vietnam's position. In an effort to seek clarification, he returned to Hanoi in the third week of January — just before the Communist launched the Tet Offensive. His report reached Washington after Tet.

In hindsight, according to the U.S. history, the Romanians were "very poor reporters; they did not pick up distinct-

continued

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tions such as talks, negotiations, settlement terms. . . It is likely that Hanoi did not take the Romanians seriously." Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0

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Aspen: The Swedish Channel

From November, 1966, through February, 1968, the Swedish government (Aspen) played "a continuing though minor role" in attempting to bring about a settlement of the war. The Pentagon papers said "The Swedes were more active over time than any other intermediary—and produced the least amount of information."

At one point in May of 1967 Aspen went so far as to say it would "take responsibility for a position they felt convinced about" — in other words, to be a broker as well as a message carrier. But the Pentagon historian concluded that the Swedish role was dominated by that nation's domestic politics. Finally on Nov. 4, 1967, the Swedish government publicly denounced U.S. policy in Vietnam.

* * * *

Sunflower: The Wilson-Kosygin Channel

From February 7 to 13, 1967, an intensive round of talks involving British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin took place in London.

Through the British, "the U.S. advanced various de-escalatory proposals, none of which (were) accepted."

The key proposal was a halt in U.S. bombing of North Vietnam in return for a cessation of North Vietnamese infiltration of men and supplies to South Vietnam. A halt in the U.S. military buildup in South Vietnam also was contemplated.

At a critical moment in the proceedings, the United States changed the wording of the final version of the proposal. The effect of the change was to require North Vietnam to stop its infiltration before the bombing halt, rather than merely give assurance that infiltration would stop after the bombing halt took place. The British, as the Pentagon papers note, took "strong exception" to the change.

Hanoi had not replied to the proposal by the time Kosygin left London and a temporary U.S. bombing suspension ran out. After the bombing was resumed, Hanoi rejected the plan and broke off DRV embassy contacts with the U.S. in Moscow.

Ohio: The Norwegian Contacts

Norwegian Ambassador to Peking, Ole Algard, met six times with the North Vietnamese Ambassador to Peking, Ngo Loan, between June, 1967, and February, 1968. In early March, 1968, Algard went to Hanoi and met several times with North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. A final meeting between Algard and Loan took place in early April, 1968.

State Department was especially interested in Algard's initial report that the North Vietnamese were prepared to be "very flexible" in any negotiations and a later report from Loan that reunification of the two Vietnams could be "postponed to an indefinite point of time in the future."

The Pentagon papers say that while the Norwegian role was not treated with great importance by Washington, "in retrospect the exchanges between Algard and Loan were probably the most reliable of all . . . Algard seems to have been a careful note-taker, and his messages look like he was using Hanoi turns of phrase."

* * * *

Pennsylvania: Henry Kissinger and the Frenchmen

The Pennsylvania channel was activated in June, 1967, by Kissinger and two Frenchmen — Herbert Marcovich and Raymond Aubrac. Aubrac had personal ties to the North Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh, which enabled the two Frenchmen to visit Hanoi and set up a channel of communications in Paris.

There was hope on the American side that Hanoi might accept the terms for halting the bombing which were passed to North Vietnam through the Pennsylvania channel in August, 1967. The hope was frustrated and in October the channel was closed.

The Pentagon papers say that the exchanges "seemed to have been handled with great care and accuracy. While the two Frenchmen . . . were clearly committed to getting the U.S. to stop the bombing, there is no evidence that their reporting, or message carrying, was adversely affected. Kissinger for the U.S. handled the play with consummate skill, clarifying points and making interpretations that could lead to a continuing dialogue. Both Hanoi and Washington treated this channel as a major one and yet little was accomplished . . ."

* * * *

Killy: The Italian Channel

Giovanni d'Orlandi, an Italian diplomat, met with the DRV Ambassador to Czechoslovakia in Prague in February and March, 1968.

According to the Pentagon Papers, the North Vietnamese sought out d'Orlandi who had played a major role in "Marigold," a role respected by both sides. The history notes that d'Orlandi believed the two sides should negotiate about the future of South Vietnam—the essential issue — rather than focus solely on cessation of U.S. bombing. "Only when the future of South Vietnam could be foreseen, d'Orlandi argued, would the two sides sit down and genuinely and seriously negotiate."

Important Dates in Vietnam Conflict

March 2, 1965—Sustained U.S. air attacks on North Vietnam, code-name "Rolling Thunder," begin.

March 2, 1965—Two U.S. Marine Corps battalions sent ashore at Danang, South Vietnam, for "limited security duty."

Jan. 31, 1966—President Johnson announces resumption of air strikes after 37-day bombing "pause," saying Hanoi failed to respond to peace campaign.

June 6, 1966—Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon begins secret meetings, code-named "Marigold," with Polish envoy Lewandowski and Italian Ambassador d'Orlandi.

Dec. 2-5, 1966—U.S. bombers begin intensive air attacks in Hanoi region; Poles quickly protest that "Marigold" diplomatic track is endangered.

Dec. 13-14, 1966—American planes pound targets around Hanoi. China and Romania later claim their Hanoi embassies hit.

Feb. 7, 1967—Secret talks code-named "Sunflower" start in London with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, during bombing "pause." Talks collapse on Feb. 13.

July 21, 1967—French scientists Herbert Marcovitch and Raymond Aubrac arrive in Hanoi with U.S. messages transmitted to them through Henry A.

Kissinger—operation "Pennsylvania."

Aug. 3, 1967—President Johnson announces authorized ceiling of 525,000 troops in South Vietnam.

Jan. 30-31, 1968—Communist forces launch Tet offensive in South Vietnam.

March 31, 1968—President Johnson announces cessation of all air and naval bombardment of North Vietnam above 20th Parallel.

April 3, 1968—North Vietnam offers to meet U.S. representatives to discuss "unconditional cessation" of all "acts of war" against its territory.

Oct. 31, 1968—President Johnson announces cessation of all air and naval activity against North Vietnam.

25 JUN 1972

'Batista Blames Ike, Dulles, and Herter for Fall of Cuba

BY GEORGE BEEBE
[Knight Newspapers]

ESTORIL, Portugal, June 24
—Former Cuban President Fulgencio Batista is still puzzled and resentful that "the three sick men in Washington" ignored his warnings that Castro was a dangerous Communist.

President Eisenhower and Secretaries of State John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter thought "I was crying wolf, and now the wolf controls Cuba," he said at his hillside villa here where he has spent most of his exile since 1959.

He noted that all three United States leaders were preoccupied with physical ailments and "showed not one bit of interest in what was happening in the Caribbean."

U. S. Arms Embargo

The State Department during the Eisenhower administration in 1958 slapped an arms embargo on the Batista government, while making no effort to halt the flow of arms to the Castro insurgents.

"It is unfortunate that the United States in its attempt to help defend the world against the spread of Communism has gone so far from the Western Hemisphere to do so," Batista said.

He implied that the U. S. effort in Viet Nam would have been better spent on Cuba.

The one-time army sergeant who became Cuba's strongman when President Gerardo Machado was overthrown in 1933, and who twice was his country's dictator-president, still is a powerful man physically.

Batista is robust and vigorous at 71. A daily exercise period is part of his unchanging schedule.

"I have kept my weight at 180 pounds thru the many tears," he comments with a note of achievement.

Keeps Mind Alert

He keeps his mind alert by reading eight daily newspapers—in four languages, Portuguese, Spanish, English, and French.

He and his attractive wife, Marta, live a comparatively quiet life in this Portuguese resort community.

When they go to their apartment in Madrid every few weeks, they are swept into a social whirl that includes many other Cuban exiles.

Batista once again emphasized that he is retiring from politics.

"I am too old to have any political aspirations. It is time now for young leadership among the exiles."

The former Cuban leader shows no bitterness. He believes he brought considerable progress to his homeland in the pre-Castro years.

He said that he has given up hope of ever visiting the U. S. again. His previous requests for visas have been denied.

"But if I did go, I fear my friends and followers would think that I had come with a magic plan to restore Cuba to the people," he said.

"What would I say to them? I would not want to raise their hopes for I do not have the answer."

Nostalgic Note

Batista digressed briefly with a nostalgic note:

"I greatly miss Cuba, and particularly the friends with whom I have lost contact—perhaps forever. No one likes to die outside the country he loves. This is something you can't comprehend until it happens to you. It is difficult to spend the last years of your life away from the land of your birth."

He keeps well informed about Cuba developments. But naturally I have no direct word for inside Cuba."

It is obvious, that if Premier Fidel Castro dies that another Communist will take his place

Fulgencio Batista: "I was crying wolf, and now the wolf controls Cuba."

"and conditions will be the same, or possibly worse," he said.

Batista has written three books since his overthrow by Castro.

He now has 70 chapters completed on the history of Cuba.

"But I doubt that I ever will finish it. This is about the country; not about my memories. Unfortunately, I do not have access to the documents that would help me finalize such a volume."

EPHRATA, WASH.
GRANT CO. JOURNAL
JUN 22 1972

SEMI-WEEKLY - 3,439

Insight by Hal Suit:

Secret Documents Shouldn't Hide Stupid Blunders

The illegal release of the Pentagon Papers and the more recent use of secret documents by columnist Jack Anderson has re-opened the problem of what should and should not be classified.

During a conversation a few years ago with the late Senator Richard Russell I asked why the CIA reports on Lee Harvey Oswald's travels in Mexico had to remain classified as secret and why they had to stay secret for many years to come.

The senator was at that time, and had been for more than a decade, chairman of a special appropriations sub-committee which controlled all CIA funds. There wasn't anyone who was in a better position to answer the question than Russell.

He gave me a plausible reason for the secrecy. The senator noted, and it's true, that we have people in every country in the world who are friendly to the U.S. and though not citizens of this country they often supply our intelligence people with information. Some are businessmen, some fishermen, artists, students and so forth. They are basically loyal to their own country, but still willing to help us. The CIA report on Oswald's travels in Mexico contains not only the facts about his movements in that country but the names of the individuals who provided those facts. If the report was made public at this time some of the contacts would end up facing a firing squad and if they weren't shot or imprisoned, they would no longer be of any value as contacts. Their future services would be nil. Since they are still needed it makes good sense to keep their identity unknown.

But what about thirty years from now? This

is the time frame being recommended by the National Security Council as a reasonable time to keep papers secret yet there are opponents around who want the lid to stay on far beyond three decades.

That's pretty hard to buy even from the individuals who claim diplomatic or military secret codes can be endangered by releasing thirty year old data. It seems illogical to assume that codes aren't changed in more than thirty years and even more illogical to believe any nation can keep a code unbroken for thirty years. If this is happening it is a first for all time. A recent rash of non-fiction books have pretty well dispelled the idea that unbreakable codes exist. If a man or woman can conceive them sooner or later another man or woman will be able to unravel them.

Anyone who reads my columns very long knows I am pro-military, but I've long been aware of the military's inclination to mark anything and everything secret and keep that tag on forever. In some cases this practice can be defended, but not for 50 or 100 years. While true military secrets should be carefully guarded military blunders should not. Time doesn't erase stupidity, but it hides it and that's wrong.

During World War II many a bulletin board was so plastered with memos that it was a standard joke that if one dug deep enough he'd find a KP order from Valley Forge still tacked up. If one could actually dig deep enough in Pentagon records there's a chance that some of George Washington's actual orders are still stamped secret. In a free society that's no joke.

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S - 1,016,275

JUN 15 1972

CIA-Backed Commando Raids into N. Viet Told

BY WAYNE THOMIS

[Aviation Editor]

[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

SAIGON, Viet Nam, June 14

Hanoi broadcasts infrequently mention "works of saboteurs" in North Viet Nam's panhandle, and Saigon's vernacular press occasionally report odd little aircraft accidents with nonmilitary planes in mountainous regions of Laos, Northwestern South Viet Nam, and sometimes in Northeastern Thailand.

These are mere peeks by the general public at a tremendous submerged "iceberg" of clandestine operations continuously and now increasingly carried out against the Communist North.

These actions probably never will be disclosed in full detail but it can be said responsibly that today they constitute an important phase of this Southeast Asia battle.

It is a silent war. It is carried out by special forces and by mercenaries. It is a hit-and-run war in which units are airlifted or sea borne deep into North Viet Nam for demolition missions, for seizure of prisoners, for probing forays, and—it now is understood—for accumulation of information on American prisoner of war camp locations.

This type of action has been taking place in the North Vietnamese panhandle from the Demilitarized Zone to well north of Vinh during the last 60 days.

An increasing series of such raids have come from the sea-coasts and from helicopter air-bridge links in Laos and Thailand to points where damage can be done or information obtained from the North Vietnamese, it was learned from reliable sources.

Communist broadcasts from Hanoi in the past have used "saboteur" in an ideological sense. Now they are referring to actual dynamitings by these raiders. They specialize in targets which are too difficult for bombers to identify from the air, or are too well hidden to be spotted by aerial photography. They also carry out a traffic in agents not otherwise possible under present conditions.

Size, Duration Vary

Reports filtering from Central Intelligence Agency and associates military establishments indicate such raids may vary from 20 to several hundred men. They may stay in North Viet Nam from a few minutes to 24 hours.

Mercenaries enlisted for such secret actions include Europeans, Chinese, Malays, Japanese and Americans. The operations are carefully planned and surrounded by the tight security.

The CIA now believes the large-scale American attempt to free prisoners from a camp near Hanoi a year ago failed because of a security leak

which resulted in a prisoner shift.

The raiders are heavily armed. Not one operation has failed, and none of the raiders have been trapped, according to informed sources.

Casualties among these special forces have been low. Pay scales are said to be "quite high" and morale among these specialists in demolition, electronics sabotage, and interrogation is very high. The men regard themselves as an elite corps.

Financed by CIA

The mysterious, CIA-financed Air America civil flying fleet seems to operate on a super-national basis across Cambodian, Thai, Laotian, and South Vietnamese borders. It has had a part in some of this work. However, much of the work is being done by military detachments, temporarily posted to the special forces.

The military establishment here generally attempts to suppress mention of this side of the war for a number of reasons, with security against enemy knowledge being the least important. The North Vietnamese are fully aware of the nature of the CIA-directed and financed special operations.

It is known that after each such raid all civilians and military personnel in the North who have had contact with the raiders are subjected to rigorous and lengthy questioning by

Communist secret police and political commissars.

The U. S. forces seek to hide the clandestine side of the war to prevent embarrassment to Thai, Cambodian, and Laotian governmental departments.

It is recognized by American leaders that such concealment is merely "token" but is required in certain diplomatic relationships which the countries fringing South Viet Nam maintain.

U.S. Air-Drops Asian Guerrillas**Saboteurs Raid N. Vietnam**

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, June 14—Use of Laotian territory and specially recruited Asian mercenaries for CIA-sponsored espionage and sabotage missions in North Vietnam has been confirmed here by American sources close to the operation.

The missions are originating from a number of small mountaintop sites in northern Laos within 30 miles of the North Vietnamese border. The guerrilla troops are transported by unmarked Air America planes.

The existence of the guerrilla missions inside North Vietnam was first reported in Saigon earlier this week. Such missions were known to have been initiated in early 1960s, but were not regarded at the time as very effective and were apparently suspended after the 1968 bombing halt.

Highly trained mountain tribesmen from northern Laos and some Thai mercenaries with long experience in special operations are said here to make up the teams. Most of the guerrillas are said to speak Vietnamese, some fluently.

Officially, the Air America management in Vientiane is unaware that the company's pilots or planes are flying such missions. Air America is a quasi-private airline under contract with U.S. government agencies.

Pilots used on the espionage-sabotage mission flights are carefully selected and receive special pay for hazardous duty by a "white envelope system." This means that the money received is not accountable or traceable, even for tax purposes, sources say.

Official U.S. spokesmen in Vientiane decline to comment on the operation, but information pieced together from American and Lao sources here indicates that virtually

inaccessible CIA-maintained bases in Laos are used to train, house, and transport the guerrillas.

Nam Yu, the CIA's most secret base in Laos, situated in northwestern Laos near the town of Ban Houei Sal, is reported to be the primary training center.

Nam Yu was formerly a base for intelligence teams being sent into South China to report on telephone and road traffic, a program discontinued last year when President Nixon accepted an invitation to visit China.

From Nam Yu, the guerrillas are moved to the Long Cheng area 80 miles north of Vientiane where they continue to train, making forays into the surrounding mountains inside Laos on lower-level reconnaissance missions for seasoning and practical experience in avoiding capture and inflicting harm on Communist forces.

Many of the potential North Vietnamese infiltrators are "weeded out" during this training period, sources say.

Resident newsmen here have been unable to visit Long Cheng in recent months.

Jump-off points for the guerrillas are considerably east and northeast of Long Cheng, according to the sources, most being tiny hilltop positions hardly known to exist. A major point of departure is said to be at Bouam Long, sometimes called "the fortress in the sky," about 40 miles northeast of Long Cheng, a base the Communists have never been able to wrest from its Meo defenders.

Practical training exercises are also conducted at Bouam Long. Communist radio broadcasts frequently note the presence, capture or killing of commandos from Bouam Long in the Sam Neua area of northeast Laos. Caves in nearby mountains contain the headquarters of the Communist-supported Laotian rebels.

The highest priority, however, is given to missions that cross Sam Neua Province and

where they conduct sabotage, espionage and propaganda missions in that country's least inhabited and defended areas. Precise information on targets and types of guerrilla action is not available here.

It is known, however, that the CIA is distrustful of many claims made by the guerrilla infiltrators and frequently equips the units with cameras so they can photograph themselves at targets. The photographs prove the missions were carried out, and provides intelligence data for CIA analysts.

Each mission uses at least one specially equipped twin-engine Otter plane, said to

carry half a million dollars worth of radio and electronic gear for pinpoint navigation and locating of ground forces. Because of the twin Otter's virtual silent operation as it passes close over the ground, its short take-off and landing capability, and the load it can carry, its basic function has been the clandestine insertion, pickup and resupply of guerrilla missions.

There are also reports of guerrillas being snatched from enemy-occupied territory by a hook dangling from rescue aircraft. The guerrilla on the ground inflates a large balloon with lighter-than-air gas, attaches it to a thin line which is then attached to a harness he fastens to himself. The rescue craft passes over the balloon, hooks on and hauls him up.

Qualified sources here say, meantime, that they believe that such espionage missions will be increased in northern Laos, and may be resumed inside China itself, to sabotage war material that—because of the mining of Haiphong—is expected to flow increasingly through China's Yunnan Province and the Laotian Province of Phong Saly on its way into North Vietnam.

CHE GUEVARA'S SECRET AFRICAN WAR

by Colin McGlashan

He was his adopted country's Minister of Industry, and a roving ambassador for revolution, but he was no statesman; for one thing, he could never hide what was on his mind. Addressing the U.N. General Assembly, he mixed a new anger with the familiar cold analysis of colonial-

Faded newsreel film: almost the only evidence of Che Guevara's secret visit to the Congo in 1965

ism. "Western civilisation," he told them, "disguises under its showy front a scene of hyenas and jackals. That is the only name that can be applied to those who have gone to fulfil 'humanitarian' tasks in the Congo. Bloodthirsty butchers who feed on helpless people . . . The free men of the world must be prepared to avenge the crime committed in the Congo." Three weeks later, on January 2, 1965, as Cubans celebrated the sixth anniversary of their revolution, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara was in Brazzaville planning his second war: the battle for the Congo.

The stakes were high. Like Bolivia, the Congo was the key to a continent: its borders touched nine nations. Victory would throw a socialist girdle around Africa. The rebels against Moïse Tshombé's central government had lost Stanleyville in November to Belgian paras and mercenaries in U.S. planes, but still controlled most of the northern half of the country, an area twice the size of France. The big powers were quietly moving in for what looked like the start of an African Vietnam: the Congolese Air Force acquired some elderly fighter-trainers and B-26s from the U.S., with the CIA's Cuban exiles, veterans of the Bay of Pigs, to fly them, plus helicopters and 14 huge C-130 transports with American crews. Russian and Chinese arms were coming by sea.

ville, in Ilyushin transports from Algeria, in trucks through the Sudan. At Heliopolis, outside Cairo, 3000 Congolese trained under Algerian instructors; others trickled home from Havana and Peking.

Guevara toured the diplomatic and physical boundaries of the growing struggle: Ghana, Guinea, Algeria, Peking; and met rebel leader Gaston Soumaliot in Dar es Salaam for a tour of bases and supply lines around Lake Tanganyika. On March 15 Fidel Castro embraced Guevara at José Martí Airport in Havana; but the exact date on which he joined the struggle in the Congo is unknown; he may have spent several months as a strategist, away from the conflict. From February on, Tshombé's men met a few determined resistance in the north-east; on February 9 a column of 60 Congolese troops (and 100 mercenaries) is repeatedly ambushed with heavy casualties by rebels with bazookas who came up close and stood their ground. A week later 750 government troops were chased out of a small town. For the first time, roads were mined, and Tshombé's River Congo supply lines thrown into chaos by the sabotage of marker buoys. Armoured cars fell into pits that had let lighter traffic pass over them, a classic trick from Guevara's *Guerrilla Warfare*. But the struggle in the north-east was waning: supply lines were being closed, Nasser was losing interest.


In June, Guevara secretly joined Soumaliot's rebels in their last stand in some of Africa's most savage and inaccessible country just to the west of Lake Tanganyika.

The rebels had plenty of arms, but Congolese army gunboats, with U.S. advisers, were harassing supply lines across the lake; Colonel Mike Hoare was moving north with a strong new force of mercenaries. No account of what happened has been published, although Tshombé's forces found a Cuban's diary, and the Foreign Ministry in Havana is said to have two rolls of film that Guevara took at the time. The official biographies mention the Congo struggle. At the

start, some determined ambushes carried the signature of the *Sierra Maestra*, but by September it was as good as over. Nasser, almost certainly following CIA pressure, stopped arms shipments to the rebels. Guevara probably returned to Havana in November to tell Castro Cuban support should be withdrawn.

What went wrong? Ciro Roberto Bustos, the Argentinian captured with Régis Debray, was later to tell the Bolivians that Guevara had said of the Congo rebellion: "The human element failed. There was no will to fight. The leaders were corrupt." The way the rebels treated prisoners disgusted him: the butchers were not all on the other side. In a last message - read to the Tricontinental conference in Havana in April 1967 - he wrote: "There are no great popular upheavals. In the Congo these characteristics appeared briefly . . . but they have been losing strength." The Congo rebels had controlled half the country; for guerrilla theory and its leading practitioner it was a little-known but disastrous defeat.

Colin McGlashan, who has visited Cuba, has written articles on guerrilla warfare.



GLOBE

JUN 4 1972

M - 237,967

S - 566,377

Ex-CIA man will give White

By Fred Pillsbury
Globe Staff

liaison with police

WASHINGTON — For months Robert Kiley, a 37-year-old former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) man turned police expert, has been shuttling back and forth between the Police Foundation here and Boston City Hall.

Tomorrow morning he will move permanently into an office down the corridor from Mayor White where he will start a new career in city government.

Kiley will be a key assistant to the mayor. Unlike the other six staff personnel white recently hired, he will also head a department — the Office of Public Service, which administers White's proudest innovation, the Little City Halls.

His assignment as Public Service director, however, will be second in importance to his duties as a link between the mayor and the police department, although \$25,000 of his \$32,000 salary will come from Public Services.

He is the city's chief recruiter for a new police commissioner who will take over the job recently vacated by Edmund L. McNamara. He will also work closely with the new commissioner in bringing about a substantial overhaul of the police department.

Why would the executive assistant to Richard Helms, the CIA director, decide to get involved in city government?

Kiley, who studied government at Harvard for two years after graduating from Notre Dame, talked about it in his Washington office.

He became involved with the CIA after learn-

ing that it supported the National Student Association of which he was vice president.

"I suppose if I were a student today and heard about it (CIA fund support) I would react with horror," he said. "However, in the 50s government help was the popular, democratic thing."

He describes the CIA as a "first rate government bureaucracy." But it was a bureaucracy, and last year he decided that, "leaving aside moral judgments," the Vietnam war was wrong and that the country's domestic problems were far more important.

He went to work for the Ford Foundation, which funnels money to police departments, as associate director and since then has acquainted himself with policemen and police departments throughout the country. For someone who has never lived or worked in Boston he appears to have a fairly detailed impression of what the department is like.

Boston may have the oldest police force in the country (sergeants average about 51), and it has few blacks or Spanish-speaking officers. Kiley made those points and then he said that Boston was lucky that it has resisted reforms of the 50s made by so many other big cities.

The vogue, he said, was to centralize police operations, "but, somehow, the wave just washed over

Boston and it didn't happen." Today, Boston's police force still has a "strong neighborhood tradition," which is just the sort of thing police administrators are advocating today. Other cities, which centralized, are rebuilding, while Boston, Kiley feels, has a good foundation.

When people talk to him about the police in Boston, Kiley said, they inevitably ask him about police corruption. He does not feel knowledgeable enough to make an assessment at this point, but his guess is that police corruption is a problem, as it is in many other big cities.

He lists only three or four large American cities — Los Angeles, Kansas City, Cincinnati — as having clean police forces. "The corrupt list is much longer."

But a lot depends on one's definition of corruption, he pointed out.

"A businessman would think nothing of being taken out for lunch," he said. "but there are some people who would say that if a policeman accepts a cup of coffee, he's corrupting himself. On the other hand, we can say that there is one man in a department who is involved in any drug traffic, and if

there is knowledge of his actions, the whole department stinks. There has been evidence of that going on in New York."

The police of the future, and he specifically means Boston's police, must become involved in new areas. They must also become involved in fighting "white collar" crime.

Boston's police force he hopes, will also be younger, employ more blacks and be better educated and more specialized.

However, Kiley said that he is "delighted" that White "is trying to understand the role of the police in the city."

Kiley has been sending police professionals and experts "ostensibly" to give him the benefit of their opinions on what the new commissioner should be and which direction the department should take. It is quite possible, he admitted, that an adviser could become a candidate. "Unless we go inside the city, that's probably how the commissioner will be chosen, Kiley said."

The list of candidates with the proper qualifications is short, but the mayor has not ruled out choosing somebody from within the department, he said.

Saturday Review Press

Fall Books

AUGUST 1972 January 1973

Patrick J. McGarvey

CIA: THE MYTH AND THE MADNESS

This important new book by a veteran intelligence agent shatters the myth that the CIA is a super-efficient organization, capable of conceiving and pulling off every imaginable kind of trick and strategy. Plagued by the same problems that beset all large organizations, the CIA is actually a bureaucratic morass deluged in paper and sorely out of touch with both policy-making and reality.

In *CIA: The Myth and the Madness*, Patrick J. McGarvey shows how the various intelligence agencies duplicate each other's efforts, often competing with each other and refusing to share information (the *Pueblo* affair was a classic example). He protests the unnecessarily massive accumulation of raw intelligence data in quantities far beyond the capacity of the analysts. And he explores for the first time the human side of intelligence work, picturing the strain, the broken marriages, the trauma of exposing children to danger in foreign outposts, the overwork and tension that can lead to ulcers, even death.

McGarvey believes that intelligence operations are imperative for the safety of the country, but believes that our agencies need a complete overhauling. His carefully considered but impassioned analysis not only examines the major problems but also offers some sound recommendations about what can be done to correct them.

Patrick McGarvey was a member of the United States intelligence community for fourteen years.

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1 JUN 1972

CIA, State and Defense Had Doubts About Attacking Haiphong

Documents from Nixon's Secret Study of the War: National Security Study Memorandum No. 1

QUESTION 28d

What are current views on the proportion of war-essential imports that could come into North Vietnam over the rail or road lines from China, even if all imports by sea were denied and a strong effort even made to interdict ground transport? What is the evidence?

The Defense Department's Answer

Land Import Capacity

In 1968, NVN imported an average of 6,800 STPD (short tons per day); 6,000 STPD by sea, and 800 STPD by land. Imports by land were higher in 1967, amounting to about 1,100 STPD. However, the land lines of communication from China were not used to capacity. It is estimated that the two rail lines from China have a theoretical uninterdicted capacity of about 8,000 STPD and the road network could provide an additional 7,000 STPD during the dry season (normally June-September) and about 2,000 STPD during the poor weather months. The combined capacity of the land routes (9,000-15,000 STPD) is more than enough to transport North Vietnam's total import requirements of about 7,000 STPD. If all seaborne imports were to come through China, considerable logistic problems would have to be solved by the Chinese regime.

Interdiction of Imports from China

If seaborne imports can be denied to NVN, her ability to successfully pursue the war in SVN would be dependent on land imports from China.

A strong effort to interdict road and rail transport from Communist China through North Vietnam would require a concerted and coordinated air interdiction campaign against all transportation: military support; petroleum oil, and lubricants; power; industrial; air defense, and communications target systems. The interrelationship of the effects of destruction of targets in one category to the effectiveness of others is such that a cumulative impact is achieved. The air campaign would be conducted in such a manner as to be free of the militarily confining constraints which have characterized the conduct of the war in the north in the past. The concept would preclude attacks on population as a target but would accept high risks of civilian casualties in order to achieve destruction of war-

supporting targets.

An interdiction campaign as described above, when employed in conjunction with denial of sea imports, would, in large part, isolate Hanoi and Haiphong from each other and from the rest of the country. Isolation of Hanoi, the focal point of the road and rail system, would be highly effective in reducing North Vietnam's capability to reinforce aggression in South Vietnam. Importation of war-supporting material would be seriously reduced. Road capacities would be reduced by a factor well in excess of the estimated 50 percent believed to have been accomplished during the summer months of 1966 and 1967. Over time, North Vietnam's capability to cope with the cumulative effects of such an air campaign would be significantly curtailed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that resumption of an interdiction campaign similar to that carried out in Route Package I between July and 1 November 1968 would assure almost total interdiction of truck and waterborne movement of supplies into the demilitarized zone and Laos. Naval blockade offshore and interdiction of Regional Package II to Thanh Hao would further enhance this effort.

Commitment of B-52 forces following heavy and unrestricted suppression of defenses by fighters, could reduce the amount of time to accomplish the above. Although the North Vietnamese have established a significant by-pass capability, the transportation nets remain vulnerable at many key points. The locomotive population could be attrited quickly if all buffer restrictions were removed near the Chinese border.

There is not sufficient data available at this time on either the cost or the effectiveness of an air campaign against these land lines to reach a firm conclusion as to the chances of isolating NVN from her neighbors. Past attempts to cut rail, road, and water networks in NVN have met with considerable difficulties. It has been estimated that a minimum of 6,000 attack sorties per month would be required against the two rail lines from China. Even at this level of effort, the North Vietnamese could continue to use the rail lines to shuttle supplies if they were willing to devote sufficient manpower to repair and transportation operations. Interdiction of the road system would be still more difficult. Since the bombing halt north of 19° in April 1968,

North Vietnam has repaired all major road and railway bridges, constructed additional bypasses and alternative routes and expanded the railroad capacity by converting large segments from meter to dual gauge track. These improvements would make even more difficult prolonged interdiction of the overland lines of communication.

We currently fly approximately 7,000 sorties per month against two primary roads in Laos without preventing through-put truck traffic; the road network from China has 7-10 principal arteries and numerous bypasses. Finally, the monsoonal weather in NVN would make it difficult to sustain interdiction on the land lines of communication. Poor visibility would prevent air strikes during 25-30% of the time during good weather months and 50-65% of the time during poor weather months. Thus, it is not possible to give a definitive amount to the question of how much war-essential imports could come into NVN if sea imports are denied and a strong air campaign is initiated.

Attention would also have to be given to interdiction of supplies coming into SVN from Cambodia. Over the past 2 years, the enemy's use of Cambodia as a supply base and a place of refuge has become more pronounced. During the period October 1967 to September 1968, 10,000 tons of munitions transited Sihanoukville and are suspected of having been delivered to enemy forces in the Cambodia-Republic of Vietnam border regions. This amount represents more than enough ordnance to satisfy the arms and ammunition requirements for all enemy forces in South Vietnam during the same period. Thus, the act of sealing off the enemy's Cambodian supply lines must be considered as an integral part of any plan to prevent supplies from reaching enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam.

The State Department's Answer

The crux of this question is the definition of "war-essential imports." There is room for considerable disagreement on this subject, but in our judgement, the category of war-essential imports should include most of the economic aid provided by the Soviets and Chinese, as well as nearly all of their purely military aid. The reason for this is that economic aid is equally if not more important than military aid in keeping North Viet-Nam a

going concern. (During 1968, economic aid totaled some \$340 million). In fact, it can probably be assumed that all North Vietnamese imports in the past few years have been directly related to the war effort. The regime would not have used its sparse funds and credits, or burdened its strained transport system, with non-essential goods.

Food imports constitute a growing percentage of total imports, in 1968 replacing general cargo as the single largest category of imports. This reflects the steady decline in crop acreages and yields that began in 1965 and has continued through the present. The importance of food imports can hardly be overstated; even with them, North Vietnam has been forced to strictly ration foodstuffs on the official market and progressively to reduce the composition of the rice ration so that at present it consists 60 percent of rice substitutes such as domestic corn and imported wheat. In addition, a thriving black market has grown up, dealing in foodstuffs (and other items as well) and involving large numbers of DRV lower level officials and cadres, as well as average citizens.

Economic aid has been essential in keeping North Viet-Nam afloat; under present conditions it is extremely doubtful that Hanoi could dispense with any substantial portion of this aid.

The question becomes, therefore, "Could North Viet-Nam continue to receive and distribute most of the economic aid and nearly all of the military aid it is now obtaining from foreign suppliers if Haiphong and other key ports were closed and if the road and rail lines from China were heavily bombed?" A second question is: "What would happen if it could not?"

To begin with, it must be noted that in practical terms it would be impossible to deny all imports by sea. Even if the one principal port (Haiphong) and the two secondary ports (Cam Pha and Hon Gai) were closed, there would still be twelve minor ports as well as numerous coastal transshipment points suitable for over-the-beach off-loading. Lightering operations would permit an indeterminate amount of supplies to enter North Vietnam from the sea. It is nearly certain,

however, that these minor ports and transshipment points could not handle anything like the present volume of imports going into Haiphong. (It is estimated that 85 percent of the total aid to Hanoi arrives by sea, i.e., through Haiphong. Almost all of this is economic aid, since military supplies are generally believed to come overland via China.)

We do not believe that the capacity of the DRV-CPR road and rail network is great enough to permit an adequate flow of supplies in the face of an intense day and night bombing. Earlier analyses which have claimed

a virtually unlimited capacity for this aid are based on unrealistic economic considerations of transport capacities and did not give adequate weight to the very real difficulties the North Vietnamese have experienced in handling imports even when Haiphong was relatively untouched. It is true that these difficulties were overcome, but to our knowledge there is no evidence that Hanoi would be able to deal as successfully with the closing of Haiphong and heavy attacks on lines of communication from China. We therefore believe that interdiction of Haiphong and heavy attacks on the rail lines from China would over time prevent North Viet-Nam from receiving sufficient economic and military aid to continue the war effort. But it would be difficult to quantify this, since it depends on the type and intensity of interdiction.

On the other hand, one important point should be kept in mind. The North Vietnamese surprised many observers, and confounded many predictions, by holding the North together and simultaneously sending ever-increasing amounts of supplies and personnel into the South during 3½ years of bombing. It is clear that the bombing campaign, as conducted, did not live up to the expectations of many of its proponents. With this experience in mind, there is little reason to believe that new bombing will accomplish what previous bombings failed to do, unless it is conducted with much greater intensity and readiness to defy criticism and risk of escalation.

This brings us to the second part of the question, "What would happen if Hanoi could not obtain sufficient war-essential imports, as defined earlier?" Here again, there does not seem to be any quantifiable answer; we are reduced to educated estimates. If we arbitrarily assume that nearly all military aid reached North Viet-Nam (because it is relatively compact and could be transported by a small number of freight cars or a larger number of trucks, and because it has a high priority) but that only half of the economic aid did, we think that by strenuous exertions and considerable belt-tightening the North Vietnamese could continue on their present course for perhaps at most two years more. Beyond that time, barring a ceasefire or protracted lull in the fighting in South Viet-Nam (either of which would greatly ease Hanoi's burdens), we would estimate that Hanoi would be forced (1) to make concessions to the US in order to get Haiphong reopened, or (2) at least to reduce the scale of the war in the South to manageable proportions, perhaps by reverting to political struggle backed by terrorism and selected guerrilla operations which did not require Northern aid and personnel. Of course, other factors such as manpower shortages would figure in the same time-frame.

It should be noted, in conclusion, that the advisability of closing Haiphong, nor the question of the Soviet and Chinese responses. These matters, clearly the most central problems, lie outside the terms of reference of Question 28 (d).

The CIA's Answer

All of the war-essential imports could be brought into North Vietnam over rail lines or roads from China in the event that imports by sea were successfully denied. The disruption to imports, if seaborne imports were cut off, would be widespread but temporary. Within two or three months North Vietnam and its allies would be able to implement alternative procedures for maintaining the flow of essential economic and military imports. The uninterrupted capacities of the railroad, highway, and river connections with China are about 16,000 tons per day, more than two and a half times the 6,300 tons per day of total imports overland and by sea in 1968, when the volume reached an all-time high. Experience in North Vietnam has shown that an intensive effort to interdict ground transport routes by air attack alone can be successful for only brief periods because of the redundancy of transport routes, elaborate and effective countermeasures, and unfavorable flying weather.

Almost four years of air war in North Vietnam have shown—as did the Korean War—that, although air strikes will destroy transport facilities, equipment, and supplies, they cannot successfully interdict the flow of supplies because much of the damage can frequently be repaired within hours. Two principal rail lines connect Hanoi with Communist China, with a combined capacity of over 9,000 tons a day. Eight primary highway routes cross the China border, having a combined capacity of about 5,000 tons per day. In addition, the Red River flows out of China and has a capacity averaging 1,500 tons per day.

An intensive and sustained air interdiction program could have a good chance of reducing the northern rail capacity by at least half. However, roads are less vulnerable to interdiction, and waterways even less so. In the June-August 1967 air attacks—a previous high point of US interdiction efforts against targets in the northern part of North Vietnam—the transport system was able to function effectively.* Strikes in August 1967 against the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line were effective in stopping through service for a total of only ten days. Strikes during this period against the highways that parallel the Dong Dang line showed no insignificant [sic] or sustained reduction of capacity. The Hanoi-Lao Cai rail line, which carries the bulk of the tonnage of the

continued

for parachuted operations against the Soviet Union. He dispatched a large team of agents into Hungary when Imre Nagy took power in October, 1956, accompanied by a well-armed shock unit from the CIA's private army in Germany." During the 1953 uprising in East Germany, according to Cookridge, Gehlen directed the movement of his East Berlin agents from street to street by radio. He used the facilities of Radio Free Europe, both the staff and the equipment, for his own purposes whenever it suited him, with the diligent support of American officers from the "Office of Policy Co-Ordination." He spied elaborately on Britain and France and, through American military installations in West Germany, on the United States itself.

Mr. Cookridge takes a robust, uncritical view of the cold war. If the Reds get it in the neck, he cheers, and, being a sportsman, he gives some applause to the best-managed triumphs of the other side. This approach misses some points. For instance, he gives a disagreeably lip-smacking account of the huge sentence handed out to Teodor Szczendzielorz, a member of a Polish spy ring who was the first agent to be tried by a West German court. It would have done Mr. Cookridge credit not to have gloated over this case. The agent, like his master Colonel Kowalski, was a noncommunist Pole who had been, in his country's service before the war. West Germany was rearming with the declared intention of seizing back a third of his country's territory. In such circumstances, Szczendzielorz and his colleagues deserve some honor or at least understanding for what they did.

But in the later Fifties, Gehlen's outfit began to show signs of age. The East Germans methodically infiltrated and rolled up his best networks there, and agent after BND agent appeared at East Berlin press conferences to confess his sins. Gehlen's reports became wilder and less reliable, and his organization became dangerously cozy (Professor Trevor-Roper, in his preface to *The General Was a Spy*, points out that all intelligence services require constant change and renewal if they are not to fossilize). There followed two disasters.

In 1962, as Defense Minister, Strauss arranged for the arrest of the *Spiegel* editors for alleged disclosure of military secrets, and had the *Spiegel* building searched. Gehlen, who disliked Strauss, had to some still disputed degree been in touch with *Spiegel*,

moreover, an emissary from head-
 Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0
 had hoped the BND. Gehlen can't be blamed for everything. Allied spooks, who after all put him at the head of the BND, have been almost equally hysterical about the Soviet menace and the *Ostpolitik*. Not long after Gehlen retired, the CIA asked Pullach for surveillance on Herbert Wehner, a senior Social Democrat minister whom the CIA supposed to be a KGB agent (the request was thrown into the shredder, which at least shows that the BND's sense of political realism is improving). And when the He and his accomplices, Clemens and Social Democrats came to power in Tielbel, were old SS men from Dresden, 1969, the Allied intelligence services now in the East, who regarded both half-states of Germany as impostors with fat wallets. In his long career as a double agent, Felfe sold the East to East Berlin or Moscow. Suggestively, Germans tens of thousands of secret documents (confirming one's suspicion Höhne and Zolling's book, but has that both Germanies know so much about each other that they are unable to make sense out of the mass of information, a common intelligence paradox). His trial in 1963, with its revelations of corruption and incompetence, and its suggestion that Pullach was a nature reserve for old Nazis, brought the whole liberal press down on Gehlen.


The Felfe affair was a terrible blow, from which Gehlen's reputation never recovered. While the BND continued to subvert Middle Eastern scientists, prepare "glowing pictures of Latin American military dictatorships," and send the government intelligence digests full of information that ministers had already seen in their morning papers, the decision was gradually taken that Gehlen must go. This itself turned into a long, dirty fight. Chancellor Erhard threw the BND men out of the Chancellery, where they had lodged themselves like bats in an attic. Chancellor Kiesinger ordered a full report into the BND, which revealed among other facts that Gehlen had given no fewer than sixteen of his relations posts in the service. The old man's intelligence career drew to an ignominious close. Ambitious to the end, he now runs a Protestant church mission in Catholic Bavaria.

Part of the trouble lay in the original deal with the Americans. They allowed an intelligence service to be headed by a professional who was politically illiterate. This did not matter, perhaps, while the CIA used Gehlen simply as a source of raw information. But when he became Adenauer's full-blown intelligence chief, this weakness was catastrophic. Much extraordinary information came to Gehlen in the postwar years, only to be evaluated by middle-aged gentlemen whose outlook on the world had been formed in the service of the Third Reich. One of the saddest comments on the cold war is that such evaluations could seem reasonable to the leaders of the West. □

DIPLOMATIC NOTES

The Ten Commandments of
the foreign-affairs bureaucracy

by Leslie H. Gelb
and Morton H. Halperin



THE AVERAGE READER of the *New York Times* in the 1950s must have asked: why don't we take some of our troops out of Europe? Ike himself said we didn't need them all there. Later, in 1961, after the tragicomic Bay of Pigs invasion, the reader asked: how did President Kennedy ever decide to do such a damn fool thing? Or later about Vietnam: why does President Johnson keep on bombing North Vietnam when the bombing prevents negotiations and doesn't get Hanoi to stop the fighting?

Sometimes the answer to these questions is simple. It can be attributed squarely to the President. He thinks it's right. Or he believes he has no choice. As often as not, though, the answer lies elsewhere—in the special interests and procedures of the bureaucracy and the convictions of the bureaucrats.

If you look at foreign policy as a largely rational process of gathering information, setting the alternatives, defining the national interest, and making decisions, then much of what the President does will not make sense. But if you look at foreign policy as bureaucrats pursuing organizational, personal, and domestic political interests, as well as their own beliefs about what is right, you can explain much of the inexplicable.

In pursuing these interests and beliefs, bureaucrats (and that means everyone from Cabinet officials to political appointees to career civil servants) usually follow their own version of the Ten Commandments:

1. Don't discuss domestic politics on issues involving war and peace.

On May 11, 1948, President Harry Truman held a meeting in the White House to discuss recognition of the

new state of Israel. Secretary of State George Marshall and State Undersecretary Robert Lovett spoke first. They were against it. It would unnecessarily alienate forty million Arabs. Truman next asked Clark Clifford, then Special Counsel to the President, to speak. Arguing for the moral element of U.S. policy and the need to contain Communism in the Middle East, Clifford favored recognition. As related by Dan Kurzman in *Genesis 1948*, Marshall exploded: "Mr. President, this is not a matter to be determined on the basis of politics. Unless politics were involved, Mr. Clifford would not even be at this conference. This is a serious matter of foreign policy determination . . ." Clifford remained at the meeting, and after some hesitation, the U.S. recognized Israel.

The moral merits of U.S. support of Israel notwithstanding, no one doubts Jewish influence on Washington's policy toward the Middle East. And yet, years later, in their memoirs, both Truman and Dean Acheson denied at great length that the decision to recognize the state of Israel was in any way affected by U.S. domestic politics.

A powerful myth is at work here. It holds that national security is too important, too sacred, to be tainted by crass domestic political considerations. It is a matter of lives and the safety of the nation. Votes and influence at home should count for nothing. Right? Wrong. National security and domestic reactions are inseparable. What could be clearer than the fact that President Nixon's Vietnam troop reductions are geared more to American public opinion than to the readiness of the Saigon forces to

defend themselves? Yet the myth makes it bad form for government officials to talk about domestic politics (except to friends and to reporters off the record) or even to write about politics later in their memoirs.

And what is bad form on the inside would be politically disastrous if it were leaked to the outside. Imagine the press getting hold of a secret government document that said: "President Nixon has decided to visit China to capture the peace issue for the '72 elections. He does not intend or expect anything of substance to be achieved by his trip—except to scare the Russians a little." Few things are more serious than the charge of playing politics with security.

Nevertheless, the President pays a price for the silence imposed by the myth. One cost is that the President's assumptions about what public opinion will and will not support are never questioned. No official, for example, ever dared to write a scenario for President Johnson showing him how to forestall the right-wing McCarthyite reaction he feared if the U.S. pulled out of Vietnam. Another cost is that bureaucrats, in their ignorance of Presidential views, will use their own notions of domestic politics to screen information from the President or to eliminate options from his consideration.

2. Say what will convince, not what you believe.

In the early months of the Kennedy Administration, CIA officials responsible for covert operations faced a difficult challenge. President Eisenhower had permitted them to begin training a group of Cuban refugees for an American-supported invasion in order to carry out the plan, they then had to win approval from a skeptical new President

whose entourage "erals" likely to oppose it. The CIA director, Allen Dulles, and his assistant, Richard Bissell, both veteran bureaucrats, moved effectively to isolate the opposition. By highlighting the extreme sensitivity of the operation, they persuaded Kennedy to exclude from deliberations most of the experts in State and the CIA itself, and many of the Kennedy men in the White House. They reduced the effectiveness of others by refusing to leave any papers behind to be analyzed; they swept in, presented their case, and swept out, taking everything with them. But there remained the problem of the skeptical President. Kennedy feared that if the operation was a complete failure he would look very bad. Dulles and Bissell assured him that complete failure was impossible. If the invasion force could not establish a beachhead, the refugees, well-trained in guerrilla warfare, would head for the nearby mountains. The assurances were persuasive, the only difficulty being that they were false. Less than a third of the force had had any guerrilla training; the nearby mountains were separated from the landing beach by an almost impenetrable swamp; and none of the invasion leaders was instructed to head for the hills if the invasion failed (the CIA had promised them American intervention).

Kennedy was told what would persuade him, not the truth or even what the CIA believed to be true. Bureaucrats like Dulles and Bissell are confident that they know what the national security requires. The problem is to convince an uninformed and busy President. To do that you do not carefully explain the reasoning that leads to your position, nor do you reveal any doubts you may have. Rather you seek to figure out what the President's problem is as he sees it and to convince him that what you want to do will solve it.

3. Support the consensus— Option B.

Vietnam policy under President Johnson exemplified the concept of Option B. The papers to the President went something like this: Option A—Use maximum force (bomb Hanoi and Haiphong and invade North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). Recommend rejection on the ground that the Soviets and the Chinese might respond. Option C—Immediate uni-

mend rejection because it will lead to a Communist victory in Vietnam. Option B—Bomb a little more each time and seek negotiations (even though the bombing was preventing negotiations). Turn more of the fighting over to the Saigon forces and send more U.S. troops (even though the American buildup obviated the need for the South Vietnamese to shoulder more of the burden). Press Saigon for reforms and give them all they want for the war effort (even though aid without conditions gave Saigon no incentive to reform). Option B triumphed.

Option B solves a lot of problems for the bureaucrat. Bureaucrats do not like to fight with each other. Option B makes everybody a winner (by letting everyone do the essence of what he wants), preserves the policy consensus, and provides ultimate comfort to the bureaucrat—deference to his expertise and direct responsibility. Very few will be so dissatisfied as to take their case to the public.

Unfortunately, while this process allows the President to keep his house happy, it also robs him of choice. The alternatives he is given are often phony, two ridiculous extremes and a jumbled, inconsistent "middle course." Unless a President knows enough and has the time to peel off the real alternatives from within Option B, he ends up being trapped by the unanimity of advice.

4. Veto other options.

Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, summoned by President Kennedy to join the Executive Committee of the National Security Council debate on Soviet missiles in Cuba, favored a "surgical strike," a limited air attack designed simply to destroy the missiles before they could become operational. Each time the military was asked to come in with a plan for a surgical strike, they asserted that a limited air strike could not destroy all the missiles—despite their having the capability to do so. Instead, they produced a plan for their favored option—an all-out air assault on Cuba eliminated by a ground invasion. Their plan had something in it for each service—the Air Force and Navy would pound the island by sea and air, the Marines would storm ashore as the Army paratroopers descended—and the military would be left free to do as they chose. The military insisted

that a surgical strike was "infeasible" in part because they assumed that Soviet missiles were "mobile" (i.e., capable of being moved in a few hours) rather than "movable" (i.e., their actual capability of being moved in a few days). Kennedy was intrigued by the surgical-strike option and met with the commander of the Tactical Air Command. When the commander solemnly assured the President face-to-face that the option was "infeasible," Kennedy with great reluctance abandoned it.

"Infeasibility" is one technique to disqualify an option; demanding full authority is another. Early in his administration, Kennedy confronted a deteriorating situation in Laos. He was reluctant to commit any American forces, but neither was he prepared to have Laos overrun. At a critical White House meeting he asked the military what could be done with various levels of force. The Joint Chiefs' answer was clear. They would not recommend any landing of American forces and could guarantee nothing unless the President was prepared to authorize the use of nuclear weapons whenever, in their judgment, that use was required. Kennedy reluctantly decided not to send any forces to Laos.

5. Predict dire consequences.

With the Chinese Communist guns firing at the tiny island of Quemoy three miles from the mainland and an invasion expected momentarily, President Eisenhower's principal advisers met to frame a recommendation. The problem, as they saw it, was to formulate an argument that would persuade the President that the U.S. must defend Quemoy. The advisers resorted to the prediction of dire consequences, recognizing that only if the alternative could be shown to be very adverse to American interests would Eisenhower agree to the use of force. They warned the President that in their unanimous judgment, if he permitted Quemoy to be captured, "the consequences in the Far East would be more far-reaching and catastrophic than those which followed when the United States allowed the Chinese mainland to be taken over by the Chinese Communists."

Did Eisenhower reject this prediction as absurd? On the contrary, he accepted it and defended Quemoy. The complexities of international politics are so great that it is difficult

neddy authorized Soviet ships. And despite the President's order to halt all provocative intelligence, an American U-2 plane entered Soviet airspace at the height of the crisis. When Kennedy began to realize that he was not in full control, he asked his Secretary of Defense to see if he could find out just what the Navy was doing. McNamara then made his first visit to the Navy command post in the Pentagon. In a heated exchange, the Chief of Naval Operations suggested that McNamara return to his office and let the Navy run the blockade.

Bureaucrats know that the President and his principal associates do not have the time or the information to monitor compliance with all Presidential orders. Often, the bureaucrats can simply delay or do nothing, and no one will notice. If the President is actively involved, they may find it necessary to obey the letter, but not the spirit, of his orders. As Henry Kissinger observed to a journalist recently, the problem is not to know what to do, but rather to figure out how to get the bureaucracy to do it.

9. Don't tell likely opponents about a good thing.

The commandments discussed thus far have all dealt with relations between the Departments and the White House. When issues get that far, one of the fundamental rules has already been violated: keep issues away from the President. Bureaucrats prefer to be left alone to do their own thing. They will not voluntarily bring issues to the attention of the President (or senior officials) unless they conclude that he is likely to rule in their favor in a conflict with another agency. Consider the case of surplus and long supply arms transfers to other countries.

One of Secretary McNamara's goals in the Pentagon was to reduce the level of military assistance, particularly to countries that did not need the weapons and could afford to pay for what they needed. A prime objective was Taiwan. McNamara and his office of International Security Affairs engaged in a yearly battle with the State Department and the military over the level of aid to Taiwan. The White House was drawn in because a number of influential Congressmen were strong supporters of aid to Taiwan. One year in the late 1960s a battle raged over whether

million in military assistance. During the same year, the military quickly shipped to Taiwan more than \$40 million worth of military equipment, which the Pentagon had labeled "excess or long supply." No senior civilian official was aware of the fact that these transfers were taking place, and no junior official aware of what was going on felt obliged to report up. Thus while senior officials argued over irrelevant ceilings on expenditures, Taiwan got more aid than anyone realized.

Observers sometimes assume that the bureaucracy bucks the hard choices to the President. Nothing could be further from the truth. Left alone, the bureaucracy will settle as many issues as it can by leaving each organization free to act as it chooses. When and if the President learns of an issue, bureaucrats will try to incorporate current behavior into "Option B."

10. Don't fight the consensus and don't resign over policy.

If an official strongly disagrees with a consensus or dislikes a key man behind the consensus, he might chance a leak to the press. But frontal assaults on a consensus happen only rarely. In the summer of 1965, Undersecretary of State George Ball was among the first to confirm this fact with respect to the policy of bombing North Vietnam. Ball thought U.S. bombing of the North was folly—and worse than that, would only stiffen Hanoi's will. But he did not propose a unilateral cessation. In a TV interview last year, Ball explained himself as follows: "What I was proposing was something which I thought had a fair chance of being persuasive . . . if I had said let's pull out overnight or do something of this kind, I obviously wouldn't have been persuasive at all. They'd have said 'the man's mad.'"

Ball's remarks express at once the futility of resisting agreed policy and the bureaucrat's concern for his personal effectiveness. Ball knew he could not convince anyone if he revealed his true beliefs. He knew he would have been dismissed as "mad" and would not have been in a position to argue another day. So, he tempered his arguments and went along. Like all other bureaucrats, he hoped to preserve his effectiveness.

As it turned out, Ball's more mod-

est arguments were not persuasive either, but he did not resign over Vietnam and did not take his case to the public. No one resigned over Vietnam policy. Indeed, there seems to be no evidence that any civilian official has resigned over any foreign-policy matter since World War II.

The only officials with a record for resigning are the professional military. Generals Ridgeway, Taylor, and Powers are notable examples. What is more, they tour the hustings, write books, and complain out loud. Military officers feel strongly about the interests of their military organization and often believe that if the people of the country only knew "the truth," they would support the military's position. With this record on resigning and going to the public, it is no wonder the military has been so influential in Presidential decisions.

But again, it is the President and the nation who ultimately suffer. If the President remains confident that none of his civilian advisers will resign and take their case to the public, he has little incentive ever to question his own assumptions.

THE TEN COMMANDMENTS POSE a serious problem for a President, who is after all the one who got elected and has the responsibility. Truman understood the problem but feared that Eisenhower would not. But evidence abounds that President Eisenhower, precisely because of his background in Army politics and international military negotiations, was far from a novice. President Kennedy was quite expert and attuned to the ways of the bureaucracy—especially after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. His famous calls to State Department desk officials made the point well. President Johnson was a master of such maneuvering. Even as he stepped up the bombing of North Vietnam he would say, "I won't let those Air Force generals bomb the smallest out-house north of the 17th parallel without checking with me. The generals know only two words—spend and bomb."

The Nixon-Kissinger team is second to none in its sensitivity to bureaucratic behavior. The elaborate National Security Council decision-making apparatus they established is predicated on tight White House control of the bureaucracy. Their system is designed to neutralize narrow or-

to disprove any **Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0** puts the President in a bind. If he fails to act and things go badly, the overruled advisers are likely to leak their warnings. In fact, much of the dialogue within the government is in terms of worst cases. An advocate who does not warn of extreme consequences is often viewed as not seriously supporting his prediction.

6. Argue timing, not substance.

Although the advocates of the Bay of Pigs landing had convinced President Kennedy that the invasion of Cuba was worth a try, they recognized that they were not yet in the clear: they still had to persuade the President to act immediately. Presidents are, in the eyes of bureaucrats, notorious for putting off decisions or changing their minds. They have enough decisions to make without looking for additional ones. In many cases, all the options look bad and they prefer to wait. The Bay of Pigs plan called for an effective "now or never" argument, and the CIA rose to the occasion. The agency told Kennedy that the invasion force was at the peak of its effectiveness; any delay, and it would decline in morale and capability. More important, it warned the President that a vast shipment of Soviet arms was on the way to Cuba; the Castro forces would soon have such superior weapons that substantial American combat involvement would be necessary to bail out the anti-Castro Cuban invaders. Faced with these arguments, Kennedy gave the order to proceed.

Conversely, when a President wants to act, bureaucrats can stymie him by arguing that "now is not the time." President Eisenhower reported in his memoirs that he came into office believing, after having served as commander of the allied forces in Europe, that the United States should withdraw most of its forces there; he left office eight years later still believing that the U.S. had far too many troops assigned to NATO. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles knew better than to argue with the military substance of General Eisenhower's position. Instead he argued timing. Each time Eisenhower raised the issue, Dulles pointed to some current NATO difficulty. This was, he would argue, a critical moment in the life of the alliance in which one of our NATO country was experiencing a domestic

troops would be to risk political disintegration. The moment for troop withdrawals never arrived. To this day, pressures for some American withdrawals from Europe have been headed off by the same ploy.

7. Leak what you don't like.

We had a glimpse of this phenomenon last January with the publication of the Anderson Papers, in which we read about Henry Kissinger warning his State, Defense, and CIA colleagues: "The President does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise." And, "The President is under the 'illusion' that he is giving instructions; not that he is merely being kept apprised of affairs as they progress." The President's subordinates disagreed with the President's policy toward the India-Pakistan crisis. They were undermining him by resisting his orders and then by leaking his policy. He knew it and did not like it; but apparently could not do much about it.

Although leaking the texts of many documents, à la Pentagon and Anderson papers, is relatively rare, much classified information regularly makes its way into the press. Presidents are surprised not when something leaks but rather when any hot item remains out of the press for even a few days. Providing information to the press—whether in press conferences, backrounders, or leaks—is the main route by which officials within the executive branch bring their supporters in the Congress and the interested public into action. Only bureaucrats with potential outside support are tempted to leak. In some cases, it is sufficient to leak the fact that an issue is up for decision; in others, what is leaked is information on the positions of key participants. In many instances sufficient factual material must be leaked to convince Congressmen and others to join the fray.

Presidents don't like leaks by others and complain about them whenever they occur, often asking the FBI to run down the culprit. Such efforts almost always fail.

8. Ignore orders you don't like.

On March 20, 1948, President Harry Truman rose from bed early,

as his custom, and began scanning the morning newspapers. He was astonished to read that his ambassador to the United Nations, Warren Austin, had told the Security Council the previous day that "there seems to be general agreement that the plan [for the partition of Palestine] cannot now be implemented by peaceful means." Truman had agreed to no such thing. He was firmly committed to partition and on the previous day had reiterated his support in a private meeting with Chaim Weizmann, the leader of worldwide Zionism. Austin and the Arabists in the State Department did not know about the meeting with Weizmann, but they knew that the President wanted partition and believed that it could be carried out peacefully. Austin and his associates had no doubts about what the President wanted; they simply felt no obligation to do what he wanted them to do.

At the end of his term in office, Truman was acutely conscious of the limited ability of Presidents to have their orders obeyed, and he worried about his successor. "Poor Ike," he was heard to muse, "he'll sit here and say do this and do that and nothing will happen." And so it continues.

During the first week of the Cuban missile crisis, in October 1962, an adviser warned Kennedy that the Russians were likely to demand that the United States withdraw its missiles from Turkey in return for the Soviet withdrawal of its missiles from Cuba. Kennedy was astonished. Months before, he had ordered the missiles removed from Turkey and could not believe they were still there.

Most students of the Cuban missile crisis have emphasized the degree to which Kennedy controlled every detail of what the American Government did. However, a closer look by Graham Allison, in his book on the crisis, *Essence of Decision*, has shown that the bureaucracy was behaving otherwise, choosing to obey the orders it liked and ignore or stretch others. Thus, after a tense argument with the Navy, Kennedy ordered the blockade line moved closer to Cuba so that the Russians might have more time to draw back. Having lost the argument with the President, the Navy simply ignored his order. Unbeknownst to Kennedy, the Navy was blocking Soviet submarines to surface long before Ken-

ganizational interests (meaning the viewpoints of State and Defense), force the bureaucracy to suggest real alternatives and provide more accurate information (meaning, as has been done, to centralize the intelligence functions around Kissinger).

While this new system has been an improvement in some respects over the past, it has decisive costs and limitations. It has totally demoralized the State Department. The Department's expertise has been for naught, and its exclusion had led to a rash of pointless leaks from disgruntled Foreign Service Officers. With all its reins on the bureaucrat, the new system did not prevent part of the bureaucracy from tilting the "wrong way" (meaning against the President, as revealed in the Anderson papers) in the recent India-Pakistan crisis.

The problem, then, boils down to this: given the fact that the President cannot either chain the system or entirely work around it without serious costs, and given the judgment that a President strong enough to collar the bureaucracy would be too strong for the good of the nation, is there a better way to make foreign policy?

The answer is yes—probably. The President, we think, should make a determined effort to use the system. The personal and organizational interests of the bureaucrat are a reality. So are the different viewpoints on what is good policy. The President's main theme of operation should be to force bureaucratic differences out into the open. Pick strong and able men to lead State and Defense. Let them use their judgment and be advocates for their organizations. Encourage debate and contention rather than asking for agreed upon recommendations. Such tactics may be the only way for the President to ferret out hidden or conflicting information and to leave himself with real choices.

Perhaps, in the end, neither this suggested system nor any system will produce better decisions. Perhaps better decisions really depend on beliefs and events and guesses. But a fuller, more honest and open treatment of the bureaucracy might make for more honest and open treatment of the American people. Presidents might be less inclined to spend a good deal of their time denying differences and hiding policy. This would mean less deception and less manipulation. What better reason for trying it? ☐

HOW U.S. KEEPS TABS ON THE RED WORLD

Thanks to aerial surveillance and space-borne cameras, the world is now virtually an open book to U. S. They've become vital tools of American policy.

President Nixon, directing war moves in Southeast Asia and peace moves with Russia, has at his fingertips a major weapon brought to a peak of reliability during his Administration.

The weapon is this: a constant flow of aerial photographs providing, in minute detail, the kind of intelligence information that no previous President was able to count on.

Over North Vietnam, reconnaissance pilots flying at altitudes of 10 miles or more are able to take pictures that can distinguish between tank models, show the types of trucks and artillery pieces, expose troops in camouflaged bunkers—and even count rifles.

Over Russia, reconnaissance satellites orbiting at 100 miles up—or more than 300 miles—can detect the construction of rocket sites and the firing of missiles. From their pictures, aircraft at landing strips can be identified. The most effective cameras, from 100 miles, can depict objects two feet in diameter and show the writing on billboards.

"Silent army." Such surveillance intelligence—when properly interpreted—is seen as a major key both to the fighting in Vietnam and the possibility of an arms-control pact with Russia. Behind the information fed to the President is a silent army of intelligence specialists using new advances in photography, aeronautics and space technology.

In Southeast Asia, these technicians depend heavily on reconnaissance planes and pilotless drones for the pictures they need. Space satellites are used for back-up material.

Worldwide, however, the important business of keeping tabs on the Russian and Communist Chinese nuclear-missile build-up rests primarily with the space satellites. Aircraft give better pictures at lower cost. But, since the incident in which a U-2 spy plane was shot down over Russia, aircraft reconnaissance of the Soviet Union has been ruled out.

How they work. Reconnaissance planes and drones have been flown routinely over Southeast Asia since the Unit-

ed States first began bombing North Vietnam in 1965.

The drones have their cameras turned on to take wide-angle pictures continuously while in flight. Reconnaissance pilots, after studying earlier drone photography, can pinpoint their cameras on suspected military activity for closer, more detailed pictures.

The photos are analyzed within minutes at U. S. bases in Southeast Asia. In some cases, the photos are also sent to Washington—either by air or by radio beam, depending on whether the priority is secrecy or speed.

Over the past decade, the U. S. has kept watch on the Soviet Union and Red China with a series of "search and find" satellites whose very names are classified. They are equipped to photograph and radio back to



"Sky spy" model is readied for testing. Satellite cameras can photograph most of the world.

ground stations prints that can be put together to depict the entire country.


Ground stations for receiving these pictures are located at New Boston, N. H.; Vandenberg Air Force Base in California; Oahu, Hawaii; Kodiak Island, Alaska; on Guam; on the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean, and in Ethiopia. In addition, six ship-board stations, each with a 30-foot antenna, can be deployed around the world to fill blank spots in the network.

The photos are radioed from the satellites and wind up at Sunnyvale, Calif., or in Washington for interpretation.

Another series of "close look" satellites is used to focus on known or suspected subjects of military significance. These photos, of a much higher quality, are dropped by parachute to be retrieved and sent on to the National Photographic Interpretation Center in Washington, D. C.

What's ahead. New and improved reconnaissance satellites, officials say, are in the offing. One, dubbed the "Big Bird," is expected to have an orbital life of several months and to carry a quantity of film packs that can be returned at frequent intervals.

Success of the sky spies has been credited with removing an important hurdle to a U. S.-Russian agreement on limiting arms. Without the satellites, it



Gemini V photo shows African airfield from 100 miles up. Sky spies give much more detail.

is argued, no significant agreement could be possible because of the Kremlin's steadfast opposition to on-site inspection teams to enforce a treaty.

Even before arms-control talks started, U. S. officials say the satellites have helped to stabilize relations between the U. S. and Russia—through increased knowledge—and at the same time have significantly reduced U. S. defense spending to protect against the unknown. [END]

HERALD

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WHO MISJUDGED IN VIETNAM?

For months in advance of the savagely successful Communist offensive in South Vietnam, American military and diplomatic and intelligence sources had been predicted that an enemy blow would fall. For months these sources noted a buildup of men and supplies in this staging area and that — of North Vietnam, of Laos, of Cambodia, and even in the demilitarized zone. Our planes were assigned the task of interdiction, and they bombed away, ton after ton after ton of high explosives.

How, then, did the enemy gain the advantage that lies with major tactical surprises on the battlefield? How did he advance for virtually the first five days unimpeded and seize the entire province of Quang Tri, including the provisional capital of the same name?

No one is saying at this juncture, of course. Too many faces are too red at this point — and in Washington no less than at the American military headquarters in Saigon.

The question that no official is discussing openly is this: Were we caught with our intelligence down? Generally speaking, there are two schools of thought on this score.

The first is to the effect that, on the contrary, intelligence reported all too accurately what the enemy was doing — where he was massing, with what armament, et cetera. This data, in turn, was relayed to the higher commands, and from the higher commands to the area of the policy-makers in Washington. What the policy-makers made of this intelligence — or what they failed to do with it — was not the responsibility of the intelligence establishment.

This theory, if it in fact fits the reality, validates the general philosophy of intelligence-gathering as explained to the members of the American Society of Newspapers Editors in April 1971 in Washington by Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms. It is not the task of the intelligence community to make policy and, indeed, it eschews this role altogether, Mr. Helms stressed. The CIA, and its military and other counterparts throughout the Federal Government, must operate like a well-drilled newspaper city room. It unearth facts, it reports them — but as a reporter does not make policy for a newspaper, neither does an intelligence agent do so for the Government of the United States.

The second school of thought about our Vietnam intelligence is a contra view. It argues that our intelligence failed utterly, because while it may have known of the enemy concentrations, it misjudged the direction which the Communist thrusts finally took. That may have been because the North Vietnamese divisions, committed to fighting set-piece battles with tanks and infantry and co-ordinated artillery for the first time since the American intervention, dropped all pretense at "infiltration" and struck boldly down main transportation arteries. In this case it was coastal Highway 1.

Nor, says the second school of thought, did intelligence estimate correctly the vast stores of huge and complex weapons and their firing systems which the enemy succeeded in emplacing and deploying. The fact that the North Vietnamese were able to lob 2,000 artillery shells into the

Loc in a single day quite obviously astonished not only military intelligence but the Abrams headquarters in Vietnam. And all this despite the presence in the American technological arsenal of such devices as acoustical "sensors," sky-spy aerial techniques, infrared photography and who knows what other super-snooper devices and systems. So sophisticated have the North Vietnamese become in warfare that they actually employed counter-measures which the Americans, to say nothing of the South Vietnamese, did not know they possessed.

As a consequence, whether American intelligence was at fault, or whether Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's National Security Council Intelligence Committee failed to anticipate the enemy's movements and his strength despite good intelligence, the result on the battlefields of South Vietnam has been the same: Once again, we have grossly underestimated our foe.

For that error, we are paying price. It is high indeed.

Three Marines Seized On Grounds of CIA

By MICHAEL SATCHELL
Star Staff Writer

Three Marine Corps corporals have been charged with trespassing after breaking into the Central Intelligence Agency compound in Langley and getting to within 500 feet of the power plant.

Some authorities say they think the Marines entered the highly guarded spy headquarters on a dare. But Richard Helms, CIA director, said he did not rule out the possibility of a sabotage attempt.

The incident occurred between 2 a.m. and 3 a.m. on May 6. Security guards spotted a car parked on Georgetown Pike near the CIA headquarters and requested assistance from Fairfax County police.

After a search of approximately 45 minutes, according to a police sergeant who participated, the Marines were found and arrested.

FAIRFAX POLICE identified the three arrested as Larry Peter Kreps, 21, Charles Stephen Huff, 24, and Terry Wayne Weatherly, 22.

In a letter to Dr. William S.

Hoofnagle, chairman of the Fairfax Board of Supervisors, CIA boss Helms wrote in part:

"I have been informed of an incident which occurred early in the morning on 6 May 1972 and involved unauthorized physical penetration of this agency's headquarter compound. Although the case is still under investigation, a review of the facts available to us now does not rule out the possibility of sabotage."

The letter goes on to thank members of the Fairfax police department for their assistance.

An officer who participated in the search said the Marines were carrying a flashlight and a pair of pliers. They had scaled a four-foot outer fence and then had climbed the main perimeter fence, which is eight feet high and tipped with barbed wire. They were climbing a third inner fence guarding the power plant when they were captured, the officer said.

ASKED HOW three men would have penetrated so far into the compound and re-

mained undiscovered for nearly an hour without being spotted by security guards, a CIA spokesman said yesterday the intrusion was not regarded as a major breach of security.

"The whole thing was minor," said the spokesman. "Nothing happened."

The Marines were taken by Fairfax police to the McLean substation and charged with trespassing on federal property, a state offense. They were released on \$1,000 bond each, police said. The men were questioned at length by federal authorities but no federal charges have been filed.

A Marine Corps public information officer said the men were members of A Company attached to battalion headquarters at Henderson Hall in Arlington.

"They have been returned to a normal work routine and they are under no restraint," the officer said. "It is a civil matter at this point and no Marine Corps action is anticipated until after the civil action is completed."

Weatherly was reached by telephone yesterday but refused to discuss the incident.

Convict in Spy Case Slain In Prison by Visiting Son

LEWISBURG, Pa., May 19 —A former Army sergeant serving a 25-year term for conspiring to give secrets to the Russians was stabbed to death Thursday by his son who visited him at the federal penitentiary.

Robert Lee Johnson, 56, was brought into the prison's open visiting quarters to see his son for the first time in years, prison officials said. As he entered the room, his son, a Vietnam war veteran, lunged at his father with a knife, stabbing him in the chest.

Johnson died an hour later in the emergency room at Geisinger Medical Center.

Robert L. Jr., 22, of Greenwood, Ind., was disarmed immediately by prison guards. He was taken to Williamsport, Pa., by FBI agents where he was arraigned on a first-degree murder charge.

"It was just one of those

things," Warden Noah Alldredge said. "It happened almost instantaneously. His father came into the visiting room and the incident occurred right then.

"I don't know a lot about the man. I do know that he hadn't seen his son for a long time and he didn't get many letters from him."

The warden said visitors were never searched, and rooms for them were set up informally.

"It's just like meeting in a living room, very informal."

Alldredge, who described Johnson as a model prisoner, said to his knowledge this is the first time "anything like this has ever happened at a federal penitentiary."

As a Pentagon courier in the sixties, Johnson collaborated with the Soviet government in a scheme which in-

volved embarrassing the U.S. government by baring outdated American defense projects.

The Soviet KGB intelligence service "disinformation" section obtained the plans from Johnson and James Alan Mintkenbaugh, once a real estate agent in Alexandria, Va., and leaked them to the West German news publications.

The document that attracted the most attention was known as "Plan 10-1." It detailed a purported Defense Department strategy to drop atom bombs on German cities in the event of a nuclear war. The Pentagon never acknowledged the authenticity of the documents.

Mintkenbaugh and Johnson both pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to commit espionage and received identical 25-year terms in July, 1965.

Alleged Spy May Return to Russia

NEW YORK (AP)—A U.S. district judge in Brooklyn ruled Friday night that Valeriy I. Markelov, a Russian accused of trying

to steal plans for the Navy's new supersonic fighter, may return to the Soviet Union while his case is pending.

Markelov, a translator in the U.N. secretariat, was arrested on espionage charges Feb. 14 outside a

Patchogue, N.Y., restaurant.

A federal indictment accuses him of trying to get plans for the F-114A fighter from an engineer at the Grumman plant on Long Island where the plane is being developed.

In a two-minute hearing

held after normal court hours, Judge Mark A. Constantino extended the travel limits of Markelov's \$100,000 bail to include Russia.

"I don't want this yelled from the rooftops," the judge added.

19 MAY 1972

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'Son Held in Killing Of Red Spy in Prison

LEWISBURG, Pa. (AP) — A former U.S. Army sergeant who was serving a 25-year prison term for passing government secrets to the Russians was stabbed to death in the U.S. federal penitentiary here, allegedly by his own son.

An FBI spokesman said Robert Johnson, 22, of Greenwood, Ind., has been charged with murder in the death of his father, Robert Lee Johnson, 52, of Alexandria, Va. The son was held without bail in Williamsport, Pa.

Prison officials said the knifing occurred yesterday in the prison visiting room, just 100 feet away from the warden's office.

As a Pentagon courier in the 1960s, Johnson collaborated with the Soviet government in a scheme which involved embarrassing the U.S. government by baring outdated American defense projects.

The Soviet KGB intelligence service "disinformation" sec-

tion obtained the plans from Johnson and James Alan Mintkenbaugh, an Alexandria real estate agent, and leaked them to West German news publications.

The document that attracted the most attention was known as "Plan 10-1." It detailed a purported Defense Department strategy to drop atom bombs on German cities in the event of a nuclear war. The Pentagon never acknowledged the authenticity of the documents.

Mintkenbaugh and Johnson pleaded guilty to charges of espionage and conspiracy and received identical 25-year terms in July 1965.

The government claimed during their trial that Johnson was recruited by the Soviets while serving with the Army in Berlin in 1953. He in turn enlisted Mintkenbaugh, who was also an Army sergeant at the time.

The younger Johnson is a veteran of the Vietnam War.

17 MAY 1972

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Whose Intelligence Failed?

NOTHING beats hindsight when choosing where to kick for making a mistake—the mistake in this instance being wrong about where, when and with how much the North Vietnamese would attack.

The military intelligence community says that Washington's strategists—meaning the National Security Council led by Henry Kissinger—took the intelligence reports and decided an attack would come, if it came at all, west from Cambodia to cut South Vietnam in half.

U.S. intelligence flights were curtailed. The electronic surveillance devices employed on the ground couldn't tell a truck from a Soviet-built tank. But our intelligence knew that something was moving on the supply trails and that the North Vietnamese had strengthened their forces north of the demilitarized zone.

Intelligence reports predicted an attack in February or March. When it didn't come, some credibility was lost. When it did come—in April—from an unexpected direction with unexpected force, Washington was stunned.

It's difficult to run a war from the banks of the Potomac, 9,000 miles from the battlefield. But if intelligence reports are weighed in Washington and the decisions are made in Washington, the blame belongs in Washington. As the long-distance strategist, the NSC took responsibility for the conduct of the war.

If intelligence officials are correct in claiming that we were caught off guard because of NSC misinterpretation of their reports, it doesn't take much hindsight to know exactly where to kick.

Where the KGB don white coats

By DAVID FLOYD and STEPHEN CONSTANT

HARDLY A MONTH goes by in the Soviet Union without the official celebration of some kind of anniversary, jubilee or centenary.

But only a brief unsigned article in the Soviet journal *Socialist Legality* just published revealed that last year was the 50th anniversary of the Serbsky Institute in Moscow, or to give it its full official title, the Central Scientific Research Institute of Legal Psychiatry named after Professor Serbsky.

The institute owes its infamous reputation to its leading role in confining healthy people to mental institutions for their political opinions. It was indeed uppermost in the mind of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Nobel prize-winning Russian novelist, when he wrote:

"It is time to think clearly: the incarceration of free-thinking healthy people in madhouses is spiritual murder, it is a variation of the gas chamber, but even more cruel: the torture of the people being killed is more malicious and more prolonged. Like the gas chambers these crimes will never be forgotten, and all those involved

with them will be condemned for all time, during their life and after their death."

The institute is in fact under the orders of the KGB, the secret police. Gen. Pyotr Grigorenko, the prominent Russian campaigner for civil rights, described in an account which reached the West how, when he himself was being kept at the institute, he saw the notorious head of department, Prof. Lunts, arriving to work in the uniform of a KGB colonel. But inside the building he changed into a white coat. He also saw other institute doctors in KGB uniforms.

The anonymous article which celebrated the institute's anniversary declared praisingly that the Serbsky "today possesses highly qualified cadres of specialists in psychiatry and the disciplines allied to it and it carries on extensive scientific research, expert, pedagogical and organisational-methodological work."

"It deals with such practically important problems as irresponsibility and incapability, the prevention of socially dangerous acts, including the application of compulsory measures of a medical character."

It is only too easy to read between such lines.

Is Freedom Inalienable?

If not, it will be alienated, and ultimately destroyed. That is the paramount issue of the Victor Marchetti censorship case. [See Marchetti's "The CIA: The President's Loyal Tool"; *The Nation*, April 3.]

Marchetti, now 42, graduated from Pennsylvania State University in 1955 with a degree in Russian studies and history. He was recruited for the CIA by a professor, who, interestingly enough, was secretly on the agency's payroll as a talent scout. In time, Marchetti was promoted to the CIA executive staff and served finally as executive assistant to Adm. Rufus L. Taylor, deputy director from 1966 to 1969. Marchetti was with the agency for fourteen years, resigning in the same year as did Admiral Taylor. Obviously, Marchetti knows a lot about the CIA—that is part of the trouble.

He was well thought of by his colleagues. Richard Helms, CIA director, presented him with an autographed picture inscribed, "To Vic—With appreciation for his support." But the longer Marchetti served the CIA the less he appreciated it and its work. Among his reasons for leaving he cites "the clandestine attitude, the amorality of it all, the cold-war mentality—these kinds of things made me feel that the agency was really out of step with the times." And: "It's one of my strong beliefs that the CIA has to be more tightly overviewed by Congress. As it is now, the agency operates almost exclusively under the authority of the President." Thus the CIA is one of the factors in the subordination of the legislative branch to the executive. For that matter, once it is let loose on a project, the agency is subordinate to the executive itself only in a very loose sense. As everyone now knows, it is carrying on a war in Laos at a cost of roughly \$500 million a year, using tribesmen as mercenaries and running its own airlines, etc. In the Kansas City area it maintains an arsenal, with a "huge inventory" of weapons for its foreign operations; it has bases for training and other purposes elsewhere in the United States.

The Marchetti case assumes constitutional importance because Mr. Marchetti, when he joined the CIA, signed the usual agreement not to write or talk about the agency's activities even after he left it. Marchetti came to the attention of *The Nation* when he wrote a spy novel, *The Rope Dancer*, which had apparent reference to the CIA. Since this was in fictional form it does not appear to have agitated the CIA management; nor did *The Nation* article which, together with some interviews Marchetti gave to newspapers, was read by Admiral Taylor, who had some reservations about accuracy but concluded that there was nothing damaging in any of the material. But when Marchetti contracted with Alfred A. Knopf to write a non-fiction book about the CIA, the government got into action. Although Marchetti is willing to have the CIA review the book for classified material, the government went before U.S. District Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr. in Alexandria, Va., and obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting Marchetti from writing the book for Knopf—a book of which he has not yet set down a single line. The American Civil Liberties Union is trying to get the restraining order dissolved.

ernment is whether a U.S. citizen can agree to waive his freedom of conscience, of thought, of moral sentiment in the manner prescribed by the CIA. The case dramatizes the fact that the CIA is essentially an alien institution—alien to American custom, alien to the Constitution, and incompatible with both the forms and the spirit of democracy. In our view, Marchetti not only has the right but the moral obligation to write his book, just as it was his moral obligation to write the article commissioned by *The Nation*.

A ruling to that effect by the federal courts would not impose an unreasonable limitation on the proper and lawful activities of the CIA, or any other agency. It can set up rules, office policies, and normal administrative means of enforcement, but it cannot compel a former employee to waive his freedom to say or write what he sees fit, once his employment is terminated. If an agency of the government deems something that has been published to be in violation of law, it may proceed against the author and publisher, but pre-censorship is repugnant to American institutions.

The question raised by the action on behalf of the gov-

Life claims mining split Nixon aides

New York (Reuter)—President Nixon's closest advisers were split over his decision to mine North Vietnamese harbors and escalate the bombing, according to *Life* magazine.

In an article in its current issue, the magazine says that John B. Connally, Secretary of the Treasury, firmly supported the President's decision, but that Henry A. Kissinger and Melvin R. Laird, secretary of defense, had doubts, as did officials in the State and Defense Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency.

During White House deliberations, *Life* says, "another Nixon aide was heard to mutter not once, but several times, 'we ought to nuke 'em' "—an allusion to use of nuclear weapons.

Informing congressional leaders of his decision just before his television speech, *Life* says, Mr. Nixon told them: "They spit in our eye in Paris. What else can we do."

Five weeks before his decision to escalate the war, *Life* says, Mr. Nixon "felt that his whole plan for world stability was falling into place just as he had wanted it to. His China summit had been a success; Russia seemed eager to limit nuclear weapons to stabilize Europe. The Moscow summit gleamed ahead as another presidential spectacular, providing, in addition, the prospect of real progress toward peace."

But then Dr. Kissinger's secret trip to the negotiation table in Paris "was a disaster," *Life* says, and the North Vietnamese began their offensive.

"It is by such dashed hopes that his disappointment must be measured," the magazine says. "It's depth is still not fully appreciated."

M - 125,376
S - 273,394

MAY 14 1972

Faulty Intelligence

When the North Vietnamese invasion came six weeks ago, why didn't the United States know where it was coming and what size it was likely to be?

How could the enemy prepare an offensive involving the arming and positioning of hundreds of thousands of men with American intelligence knowing so little of what was about to happen?

For months we had been told that the enemy was preparing an offensive. It was reasonable to assume that both Washington and Saigon had some idea where he would hit and in what fashion.

But our military men and our South Vietnamese ally were surprised. The Soviet-built tanks came scudding across the Demilitarized Zone and smashed South Vietnamese positions. Some of the South Vietnamese obviously did not fight well and some did not fight at all. The failures cannot be excused, and the forebodings of disaster for the South Vietnamese cause may become the reality unless the South Vietnamese fight better.

* * *

But the United States also had a responsibility and that responsibility included assessment of intelligence as well as providing air support for the South Vietnamese.

United States News and World Report magazine reported that American officials were presented by opposing analyses of the pre-invasion buildup. The Central Intelligence Agency thought the enemy would not invade across the Demilitarized Zone. The Defense Intelligence Agency predicted that the neutral zone would be the invasion route and said that the United States should prepare for the worst.

The New York Times Service had a different report. It said that the National Security Council's Intelligence Committee, headed by Henry Kissinger, thought the thrust would come from West to East against Kontum in the Central Highlands.

The Times quoted other intelligence analysts as saying there had been no intelligence failure, that the policy makers had been fully informed about the enemy capability "though we couldn't tell just when or where he would strike."

We find it hard to believe that intelligence did its job adequately when our side was caught so completely by surprise.

Columnist Bill Buckley and others have talked darkly of sacking American generals for having been too optimistic and for having made too many mistakes and miscalculations on the basis of information that proved erroneous.

But this isn't the American Civil War, when Lincoln sifted his generals until he found Grant. The denigration of the military in this country has gone much too far, in our opinion, and the advice to rough up the generals for the errors of the Vietnam War adds to the emotional heat without pointing the way to end the war.

This is not the time to be finding scapegoats. Not when the President is trying to withdraw American forces under honorable conditions and has risked a confrontation with Soviet Russia and Red China in order to accomplish that end.

But America's intelligence must do better in other parts of the world — the Mideast, Latin-America — if we are to escape the sorry consequences of wrong guesses about our Communist adversaries and their capabilities. When the stakes are so high, our country cannot afford to miscalculate.

1969: Blockade Lacks Support

Shortly after his inauguration in 1969, President Nixon ordered a report on exactly where the United States stood in Viet Nam. The report, known as National Security Study Memorandum 1, consisted of the answers to 28 questions sent to various government agencies concerned with the war. Here are excerpts from responses by the Defense Department, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency on shutting off the flow of supplies to North Viet Nam.

QUESTION 28d

What are current views on the proportion of war-essential imports that could come into North Viet Nam over the rail or road lines from China, even if all imports by sea were denied and a strong effort even made to interdict ground transport? What is the evidence?

CIA

All of the war-essential imports could be brought into North Viet Nam over rail lines or roads from China in the event that imports by sea were successfully denied. The disruption to imports, if seaborne imports were cut off, would be widespread but temporary. Within two or three months North Viet Nam and its allies would be able to implement alternative procedures for maintaining the flow of essential economic and military imports.

Experience in North Viet Nam has shown that an intensive effort to interdict ground transport routes by air attack alone can be successful for only brief periods, because of the redundancy of transport routes, elaborate and effective countermeasures, and unfavorable flying weather.

Almost four years of air war in North Viet Nam have shown—as did the Korean war—that, although air strikes will destroy transport facilities, equipment, and supplies, they cannot successfully interdict the flow of supplies, because much of the damage can frequently be repaired within hours.

Two principal rail lines connect Hanoi with Communist China, with a combined capacity of over 9,000 tons a day. Eight primary highway routes cross the China border, having a combined capacity of about 5,000 tons per day. In addition,

the Red River flows out of China and has a capacity averaging 1,500 tons per day.

An intensive and sustained air interdiction program would have a good chance of reducing the northern rail capacity by at least half. However, roads are less vulnerable to interdiction, and waterways even less so. In the June-August, 1967, air attacks—a previous high point of U. S. interdiction efforts against targets in the northern part of North Viet Nam—the transport system was able to function effectively.

Strikes in August, 1967, against the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line were effective in stopping thru service for a total of only 10 days. Strikes during this period against the highways that parallel the Dong Dang line showed no insignificant or sustained reduction of capacity.

The Hanoi-Lao Cai rail line capacity, after destruction of the Viet Tri bridge, was maintained at 700 tons per day by use of a rail ferry. If more capacity had been required, however, there is every reason to believe that additional facilities would have been installed at this location to restore the thru capacity of the line.

Moreover, total interdiction of seaborne imports would be difficult because shallow-draft lighters could be used to unload cargo from oceangoing ships anchored in waters outside the mined major harbor areas. Large numbers of small coastal ships and junks could move cargoes from ships diverted to southern Chinese ports.

State

The crux of this question is the definition of "war-essential imports." There is room for considerable disagreement on this subject, but in our judgement, the category of war-essential imports should include most of the economic aid provided by the Soviets and Chinese, as well as nearly all of their purely military aid.

The question becomes, therefore, "Could North Viet Nam continue to receive and distribute most of the economic aid and nearly all of the military aid it is now obtaining from foreign sources?"

ports were closed and if the road and rail lines from China were heavily bombed?"

To begin with, it must be noted that in practical terms it would be impossible to deny all imports by sea. Even if the one principal port [Haiphong] and the two secondary ports [Cam Pha and Hon Gai] were closed, there would still be 12 minor ports as well as numerous coastal transshipment points suitable for over-the-beach off-loading. Lightering operations would permit an indeterminate amount of supplies to enter North Viet Nam from the sea.

It is nearly certain, however, that these minor ports and transshipment points could not handle anything like the present volume of imports going into Haiphong.

We do not believe that the capacity of the DRV-CPR road and rail network is great enough to permit an adequate flow of supplies in the face of an intense day and night bombing campaign. In our view, earlier analyses which have claimed a virtually unlimited capacity for this network were based primarily on theoretical considerations of transport capacities and did not give adequate weight to the very real difficulties the North Vietnamese have experienced in handling imports even when Haiphong was relatively untouched.

It is true that these difficulties were overcome, but to our knowledge there is no evidence that Hanoi would be able to deal as successfully with the closing of Haiphong and heavy attacks on lines of communication from China.

We therefore believe that interdiction of Haiphong and heavy attacks on the rail lines from China would over time prevent North Viet Nam from receiving sufficient economic and military aid to continue the war effort. But it would be difficult to quantify this, since it depends on the type of intensity of interdiction.

On the other hand, one important point should be kept in mind. The North Vietnamese surprised many observers, and confounded many predictions, by holding the North together and simultaneously sending ever-increasing amounts of supplies and personnel into the South. It is clear that the bombing campaign, as conducted, did not live up to the

expectations of many of its proponents.

With this experience in mind, there is little reason to believe that new bombing will accomplish what previous bombings failed to do, unless it is conducted with much greater intensity and readiness to defy criticism and risk of escalation.

It should be noted, in conclusion, that this paper does not address the advisability of closing Haiphong.

Defense

If seaborne imports can be denied to NVN, her ability to successfully pursue the war in SVN would be dependent on land imports from China.

A strong effort to interdict road and rail transport from Communist China thru North Viet Nam would require a concerted and coordinated air interdiction campaign against all transportation, military support, petroleum oil and lubricants power, industrial, air defense, and communications target systems.

The air campaign would be conducted in such a manner as to be free of the militarily confining constraints which have characterized the conduct of the war in the North in the past. The concept would preclude attacks on population as a target but would accept high risks of civilian casualties in order to achieve destruction of war-supporting targets.

An interdiction campaign as described above, when employed in conjunction with denial of sea imports, would, in large part, isolate Hanoi and Haiphong from each other and from the rest of the country. Isolation of Hanoi,

the focal point of the road and rail system, would be highly effective in reducing North Viet Nam's capability to reinforce aggression in South Viet Nam. Importation of war-supporting materiel would be seriously reduced.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that resumption of an interdiction campaign similar to that carried out in Route Package I between July and 1 November 1968 would assure almost total interdiction of truck and waterborne movement of supplies into the Demilitarized Zone and Laos. Naval blockade offshore and interdiction of Regional Package II to Thanh also would further enhance this effort.

Commitment of B-52 forces, following heavy and unrestricted suppression of defenses by fighters, could reduce the amount of time to accomplish the above. Altho the North Vietnamese have established a significant by-pass capability, the transportation nets remain vulnerable at many key points.

There is not sufficient data available at this time on either the cost or the effectiveness of an air campaign against these land lines to reach a firm conclusion as to the chances of isolating NVN from her neighbors. Past attempts to cut rail, road, and water networks in NVN have met with considerable difficulties. It has been estimated that a minimum of 6,000 attack sorties per month would be required against the two rail lines from China. Even at this level of effort, the North Vietnamese could continue to use the rail lines to shuttle supplies, if they were willing to devote sufficient manpower to repair, and transshipment operations.

We currently fly approximately 7,000 sorties per month against two primary roads in Laos without preventing thru truck traffic; the road network from China has seven to 10 principal arteries and numerous bypasses.

MIAMI HERALD
14 MAY 1972

'Soviet Sub in Cuba Violated 1962 Missile Ban, Scholar Says

By FRANK SOLER
Herald Latin America Staff

A prestigious Washington scholar believes the recent visit of a Soviet nuclear missile submarine to Cuba violated the Kennedy-Khrushchev pact which ended the 1962 missile crisis.

That pact, which never has been acknowledged officially by either Washington or Moscow, banned Soviet "strategic weapons systems" from Cuba and the hemisphere, according to Prof. James D. Theberge, director of Latin American studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Georgetown University.

"In his news conference of Nov. 20, 1962, President Kennedy said, 'Chairman Khrushchev agreed to remove from Cuba all weapons systems capable of offensive use (and) to halt the further introduction of such weapons into Cuba,' " says Theberge.

WITH THE arrival in Cuba April 29 of G-II Soviet sub — which carries three one-megaton Serb ballistic missiles with a 650-mile range — Russia "clearly and openly reintroduced a 'weapons system capable of offensive use' in the hemisphere," he says.

The submarine, accompanied by a Soviet destroyer and a sub tender, sailed from the Bay of Nipe on Cuba's northeastern coast last week, presumably en route home.

It was the first time that a Soviet vessel equipped with long-range nuclear missiles visited Cuba since the first Russian Navy ships sailed through the Caribbean in July 1969.

An expert in Cuban affairs, Theberge blames the "vagueness" of the 1962 pact — as well as President Nixon's failure to "strictly" interpret its meaning — for allowing the Soviets "to continuously probe and test U.S. reactions to a gradual . . . escalation of Soviet strategic power" in Cuba.

"IT IS worthwhile noting," he says, "that the Soviets first sent to Cuba an F-type, diesel attack submarine armed with eight torpedoes, followed by an E-II class, nuclear-powered guided missile submarine with eight surface-launched (missiles), and now a G-II class, diesel-powered nuclear submarine.

"Next, the Soviets can be expected to send an H-II or Y-class nuclear-powered, nuclear missile submarine — the latter with 16 underwater launched missiles with a range of approximately 1,500 nautical miles."

In addition to testing the U.S. reaction, the purpose of such escalation in the firepower of Soviet ships visiting Cuba also is to demonstrate support for the Castro regime, familiarize the U.S. with a strategic nuclear naval presence in the area and "ultimately to influence the political environment in the hemisphere in Moscow's favor," Theberge adds.

More important than the size or military significance of the Russian presence in Cuba at this stage, Theberge says, "is the fact that the Soviet Union appears to have decided to commit herself to the area, at least politically if not yet strategically . . . with all the consequences this entails."

THIS COMMITMENT "reflects an important change in Soviet strategic doctrine . . . that better suits Soviet ambitions as a super-power and protector of her friends overseas in time of crisis," he says.

The greatest effect of the Soviet naval buildup in the Caribbean is now "largely psychological and symbolic and more a cause for concern than alarm," the professor says.

"Still, it would be extremely short-sighted to believe . . . that the Soviet naval presence . . . will have no effect

on the political and military future of the Caribbean area," he adds.


Theberge says the Nixon Administration apparently made a "substantial concession" to the Russians in the fall of 1970, when a U.S.-Soviet confrontation loomed over new naval installations at the port of Cienfuegos, in southern Cuba. It was suspected that the installations might serve to support the latest-type Soviet vessels in the Caribbean area.

INSTEAD OF strictly adhering to the meaning of the 1962 pact at that time, Nixon only opposed "the servicing of nuclear submarines 'either in or from Cuba,' " says Theberge.

"It is impossible, of course, to exclude Soviet strategic submarines from hemispheric waters, but the U.S. could have held to the 1962 agreement instead of modifying it to the apparent advantage of the Soviet Union.

"As long as there is no clear prohibition of the reintroduction of strategic weapons into Cuba, it will be difficult to determine whether Soviet strategic submarines are being 'serviced' from Cuba, since what constitutes 'servicing' is itself somewhat ambiguous.

"The Soviet Union is counting on a continuation of the pattern of no firm U.S. reaction to the gradual increase in the level of forces deployed to Cuba and the Caribbean — and the tactic appears to be working so far."



Soviet Submarine in Caribbean Waters

CIA SPY KIT: CHINA ATLAS PUT ON SALE

WASHINGTON (UPI)

—For \$5.25, any citizen can have his own Central Intelligence Agency document.

The Government Printing Office in Washington is offering for sale 30,000 copies of the CIA's new 82-page, multicolored atlas of the People's Republic of China.

Officials at the GPO said that except for an annual four-volume series listing the broadcasting stations of the world, the atlas was the only CIA document they had produced for sale to the public.

In addition to maps of modern China, the atlas, with the CIA's seal on the cover, also contains historical maps, a number of charts describing the growth of the Chinese economy and a narrative accompanying the maps and charts.

FORMER CIA AGENT COMMENTS ON MIDDLE EAST

/Interview with Miles Copeland by Abdullah Schleifer; Paris, Jeune
Afrique, French, 13 May 1972, pp 38-41/

The name and fame of Miles Copeland -- along with those of Philby -- add a bit of dash to the dull business of kidnappings, bribing of political parties and newspapers, assassinations, bombings, and recurrent attempted coups d'etat that highlight the activities of intelligence services and secret agents in the Middle East.

After having been one of the founders of the CIA, Copeland came to this area in the late Forties and was assigned responsibility for "crypto-diplomacy" at the United States Embassy in Damascus. After having been involved in at least one coup d'etat, he appeared a few years later in Cairo during those first intoxicating years of the Egyptian revolution, this time as a management expert. He became friends with Nasser and other revolutionary leaders and played some part in that still historically obscure brief honeymoon between the United States and Egypt.

When the honeymoon was over, the United States withdrew its offer to finance the Aswan Dam, and the Suez Canal was nationalized. These actions highly displeased Copeland. He returned to Washington where he served as a member of the Middle East Policy Planning Committee and also played the part of Abdel Nasser in the State^oDepartment's round-the-clock "Peace Games." This computerized peace gaming represented an effort on the part of the Americans to predict political events on a world-wide scale.

Copeland describes these years in his book Le Jeu des Nations [The Game of Nations] which is much more revealing about the subtle maneuvers and endless machinations masked by the rhetoric of the Arab-Israeli conflict, than most of the scholarly works produced by American or European writers who read the Arab press from afar and take it too seriously. Even though he is quite blase, Copeland is still somewhat disturbed by the double-dealing tactics employed in the cold war. He asserts that he no longer has had anything to do with the CIA for years. (He now works out of London as a specialist in confidential assignments for large Western companies who have business interests in the Arab world). But he does acknowledge that he has an instinctive tendency to give a helping hand to the American embassies in the area. This has kept him in touch with things long after his official departure. "In that sense," he says, with a disarming smile, "we are all CIA agents." He frequently

visits Beirut and that is where Abdullah Schleifer interviewed^{we} him for Jeune Afrique.

Question: People who champion American interests always claim that the only reason United States policy is constantly pro-Israeli is the financial and political strength of the pro-Zionist or Zionist-manipulated Jewish community...

Answer: The Zionist-pressure theory is certainly the one closest to the truth. I remember very well when I was stationed in Syria and we were getting ready to recognize Israel, that Ambassador Wadsworth (United States ambassador to Baghdad at the time) sent a telegram to President Truman through the State Department, requesting that they take note of his prediction that if we precipitately recognized Israel and gave it unqualified support, as we apparently intended to do, then within 20 years from now the Soviets would wield the dominant influence in the Arab world.

In the wake of this telegram, each embassy, legation, and consulate in the region, without exception, sent its own message more or less in the same vein. From that moment on, the hassle inside the State Department between the people in the field -- in the different embassies -- and the desk officers in the Department, covered the issue of how to act without making powerful pressure groups, Congress, etc, mad at them. There were never any strategic considerations. Everyone knew then, as they do now, that the Russians are in the Middle East for one single reason. It is

because we are backing Israel, and not because we are backing Israel to counter that Russian presence. Remember that in those days it was totally unthinkable for the Arabs to look solely toward Moscow. I knew Hussni Zaim very well at that time (Zaim was the Chief of Staff of the Syrian armed forces who, on 30 March 1949, organized the first coup d'etat in that country with CIA assistance and encouragement). I was acquainted with President Kuwatli and other regional Arab leaders. Even Azzam Pacha (leading advocate of Syrian-Soviet cooperation in the mid-Fifties) absolutely never considered looking to Moscow. You just cannot imagine how much that was unthinkable to all those people. Even if the United States was siding with Israel, we were the victors. In those postwar years, it was just simply impossible for anyone to venture to be anti-American. It was as in the motion picture Nicholas and Alexandra -- no one slaps the Czar in the face. But finally, when someone does realize that the Czar can be slapped like any other person, everything collapses. Someone then asked: "Why couldn't we work with the Russians?" This took a long time coming, thanks to some excellent diplomacy practiced by career officials in the State Department. But we all knew it would inevitably happen. And the Russians for their part were slow in waking up.

Question: But outside of the "Arabizers" in the State Department, there were other groups, powerful forces who strongly opposed Truman's

pro-Israeli policy in 1947-1948 for example, the Pentagon and the oil companies. How did these people happen to eventually reverse engines or at least drop their opposition?

Answer: I think that the staunch opposition in Washington to the government's policy broke under the weight two critical observations or realizations. If you had access to State Department files you would see that dispatches little by little develop and make these two points:

First of all, that the Arabs were content to use Israel for domestic political purposes, without seriously concerning themselves with fighting that country. The behavior of various Arab governments, the corruption, Ministers of Defense who had grown rich from the 1948 war, politicians who rose from obscurity by exploiting the situation, etc. We noted that unlike what had happened in the United States at the time of Pearl Harbor when people jammed military recruiting offices to enlist against Japan, no lines could be seen forming in front of any Arab recruiting station. We were getting excited over nothing. We thought the Arabs were going to rise up in a body to fight against Israel, and they did not do so. They started fighting among themselves.

The second argument is that -- also contrary to our expectations -- it was a continued "business as usual" situation in oil production activities. Everything carried on in normal fashion.

Question: If I recall the figures, the American share of oil production and also of the Arab trade market -- grown larger through oil

fees and royalties -- did actually increase spectacularly in the 10 years following the 1948 war.

Answer: That is perfectly true. Consequently, for a long period of time, until the Soviet awakening (and before Nasser's arrival they made no progress whatever), it seemed that we could be as pro-Israeli as we wanted and this in no way affected our position in the Arab world.

Nasser's assumption of power introduced a third factor, namely the simply desperate nature of the situation. We could do nothing with the Arabs unless we first met Gamal Abdel Nasser's conditions. And so in our government, officials began to argue about ways and means of reverting to the situation existing prior to Nasser's seizure of power. That was the reason behind the Baghdad Pact and other matters of that type. We wanted to undermine Nasser's position. But at the same time we wanted to cooperate with him. We unceasingly kept changing. We were forced to recognize that Nasser's was the leading voice in the Middle East whether we liked it or not, and that if anyone could achieve peace with Israel, Nasser was that man, and the only one. As you know, ours is not a monolithic government. It can pursue two opposing policies at one and the same time. And you can be damned sure that we did.

But Nasser himself knew what to make of it. The State Department which is not necessarily pro-Arab but which was criticizing Israel -- as it continues to do today -- just simply had no influence because each time an

official ventured to say "We are mistaken, this support of Israel is wrong," he knew that a trap would be set for him, that he would be accused of being a homosexual or something like that. You have no idea of what a man had to put up with when he had the courage to stand up and say what he thought about the Arab-Israeli question. A committee would rush to the White House, the Secretary of State, or to a Senator each of whom immediately grabbed his telephone. Jim Keeley who was our ambassador to Damascus about 1949, had his career ruined by daring to say that Washington was making a mistake. One day he received a letter from the Under Secretary of State telling him: "We have the impression that you are anti-Semitic and we cannot accept this type of emotion; some of your reports are motivated by emotion." But all of us at the embassy had a hand in drafting dispatches and reports. Keeley did not write them all. There was, among others, myself and another staff member named Henton. Can you picture me, of all people, drafting reports inspired by emotion? Thus Keeley, a man who could have been the ambassador to the Court of Saint James, ended his career as Consul General in Palermo.

During that same period, we had here in Beirut, a security officer named Jack Bowie. We had never seen anyone as strict on security. Well Jack went to Israel when McDonald was our ambassador there. He found out through the Marine guards and other persons at the embassy that McDonald was taking top-secret messages and other classified information

received from our embassies in various Arab capitals and was having them read to the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Bowie had witnesses to these actions. It was also known that McDonald had on repeated occasions received favors from the Israelis. They had paid him excessively high fees for lectures praising Israel and for other like activities. Thus he was receiving Israeli money and delivering top secret information to them. I remember having asked Bowie: "Are you going to report this?" He answered: "Not me, heck no." He was much too afraid ^{of} getting himself in trouble.

Question: In 1949 McDonald acted as an individual. But according to David Nes (U.S. Charges d'Affaires in Cairo at the time of the Six-Day War), and I quote from his article, Is Israel the 51st State, published about one year ago in the New York Times, "military intelligence collected by American embassies throughout the Arab world were regularly transmitted to the Israelis in Washington in the years preceding the 1967 war." And Nes wrote that a major part of what the Israelis knew about Egyptian aircraft deployments, they had learned from these reports. Hence what McDonald had formerly done on his own, was official policy in 1967.

Answer: Well Nes knows what he is talking about. And if that is what he says, it must be true, because he is an honest and responsible man. He read all the secret telegrams during that period, I did not. I recall having been surprised on reading his article, because I did not believe we

had gone that far. But to me it is not inconceivable, because from a military viewpoint if there is a war we are on the side of Israel, and the Russians, for whatever they are worth, and I do not think it is much, are on the side of the Arabs.

I say that because there is no example of the Russians having ever come to the help of their friends. They can get their friends into trouble but when they have to show their cards, they disappear. But we, well we do come to the help of our friends. We sent troops into Lebanon and recently we let it be clearly understood that we were prepared to do as much in Jordan. We were not joking, and the Russians did not stir.

They intervene in Czechoslovakia or Hungary, but not in the Arab world. If some day there should be a confrontation, the Arabs must not expect much help from the Russians. Therefore why not exchange intelligence information with Israel? If Nes says we went that far, it means we did.

Question: Since you once played the part of Nasser in the State Department "games," I would like to assign you a new role and ask you to take the part of a Palestinian who is determined to liberate his country, or whatever you might call that action in your "games."

Answer: Well that is difficult to do because I do not believe that any Palestinian intelligent enough to play the game can present that as a reasonable objective. He ought to tell himself that Israel is destined to

last -- and that is damned true -- and thus should accept that fact and select a secondary objective.

But this player's aim is to recover Palestine. Fine, I agree, let us try it out.

I would first join Georges Haba^Sche's organization (PFLP) and would do exactly what he is doing. In fact, it would take a general disruption of the entire region, one that would bring about a change in the rules of the game, thus making Israel such an anomaly that it could not survive. The objectives should take account of the world situation as a whole. The first objective, just like Haba^Sche's, should be to overthrow Faisal and Hussein, seize control of Arab oil, and eventually establish a single unified Arab oil policy.

Energy is a much greater problem for today's world than pollution. In fact, unless new sources are found, and nothing currently being investigated indicates that they will be discovered by the year 2000, we will not have enough energy to pollute the air, even if we wanted to do so deliberately.

Therefore if the Arabs could agree on a common policy, their strength would be such that they could immediately change Europe's attitude, for, I ask you, what would happen to NATO if the French and Italians could no longer get their elevators to work. It is not a matter of completely cutting off the oil supply. Economic war is not waged in that manner.

Rather the situation is manipulated by occasionally interrupting supplies for a week, raising prices, and so forth. I would therefore direct all my efforts toward overthrowing the Arab oil-producing governments. I would get everyone together, I would wage economic warfare against Europe and tell the Europeans that it was up to them to deal with the United States.

At the time of the Suez Crisis, I was working in Washington for Herbert Hoover Jr (Under Secretary of State). We had had a rough day, and in a very offhand manner I told him: "Herbert, I think we should initiate a project "Gas Can." By leaking information here and there, we could get the Russians and Arabs to believe that we had made a revolutionary discovery in the energy field that made the atomic bomb look like a mere ordinary firecracker." Hoover told me to see him the next day to discuss the matter. When I reported to his office, the room was full of generals and I was asked to explain my plan.

I was beaming. I had only made an off-the-cuff suggestion, but I know how those things work. So I elaborated upon my plan, becoming more and more persuasive. I told them that we should choose a large field in Colorado, surround it with a fence guarded by police dogs, move in the Army's 31st Division to protect it, place searchlights all around the area, then build some odd-looking structure inside it. The Russians would probably send a few of their best spies to check it out with binoculars.

We would have a lot of people entering and leaving so that the Russians would see them and say "oh, oh, a biologist, a physicist..."

At the same time we would arrange to have the fifth secretary in our embassy in Portugal become intoxicated in the presence of the local Tass correspondent and make a few indiscreet remarks. In this way we would drop small bits of information here and there. These would be correlated in Moscow and elsewhere and intelligence services would conclude from this data that a revolutionary advance in the energy field was in the making. The Arabs could thus drink their oil for no one would need it any more.

We actually went to Colorado and selected an area upon which the Russians could easily spy, although it did have some appearances of being secure. In the meantime, we learned that to do all this we had to conduct genuine negotiations and transactions for certain rare metals like antimony and wolfram which are found in Turkey and the Congo. These had to be real transactions because it is easy to verify such matters.

I said: "Fine, I will handle that. I know David Rockefeller well, I will go see him in New York." A certain Colonel Simms and I went to see Rockefeller and we explained the whole plan to him. He shook his head very sadly and said: "I am afraid that we have already sabotaged your project." He called a Mr Poug who is the world's leading expert in energy matters and in charge of Chase Manhattan's research in that field. Poug gave us his report that had just been published. When we had read it in the train, we could not even eat lunch because our whole project had fallen through.

Poug had shown in an irrefutable manner that even if all the energy-related projects then under study were to prove successful -- including use of atomic, solar, and volcanic energy and a better utilization of oil and hydraulic energy (the French were working to harness the power of tides) -- even in that case, the West would in 1970 need two and a half times more Arab oil than at that time (it was then in the mid-Fifties). Actually, in 1970 it amounted to three times more. We are in one terrible bind.

I suggested to the executives of an oil company for whom I work, that if they wanted to influence Congress, they should publish a report showing how critical the situation was. But they told me "No, not at all. We must not let the Arabs know how strong their position is. We are in the process of negotiating with them in Iraq." "But hell," I told them, "they already know it." They replied: "Yes they do know, but they do not really believe it. Because they know it through people like Abdullah Tariki (former Saudi Arabian Minister for Oil and founder of the OPEP, who advocates nationalization of Arab oil) and we do not want to make that something spectacular." Moreover the company also realized that such a report would be considered as an anti-Israeli argument, which is indeed true.

With the situation as it is, if I were an Arab, I would realize that the only weapon available to me is oil.

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13 MAY 1972

Elsewhere in Indochina

If anyone requires further documentation of Vietnam's corrosive effect on American institutions, let him read the new Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report entitled "Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia: January 1972." In the 1971 Defense Procurement Act, the Congress—with Laos foremost in mind—declared that American defense funds could not be used to support the soldiers of a second country fighting in a third country. But the Nixon administration determined that Laos needed help. So now, says the report, the United States—through the Central Intelligence Agency—provides up to \$100 million a year for Thai "irregulars" to fight in Laos. Thailand doesn't acknowledge this arrangement. The United States, deferring to the Thais, acknowledges it just barely. But the Laotian Prime Minister, in a moment of candor shared last January with none other than the Voice of America, spilled most of the beans all the same.

So much for that sordid corner of American policy. The report illuminates others as well. Its chief value, however, lies in its incisive description of the pickle in which Laos and Cambodia are in: victims not only of North Vietnam but of the United States, South Vietnam and Thailand which all "use Laos and Cambodia for their own purposes,

regarding them as the preferred battleground on which to engage the North Vietnamese." The United States drops bombs in Laos and Cambodia, South Vietnam periodically invades (or used to, before its current difficulties closer to home), and Thailand sends "volunteers" for money.

So it is, the report concludes, that a partial settlement in Laos and Cambodia, no less than a collapse, would discomfit American policy: "our present strategy requires that these two countries be supported and kept in the war. Without our military and economic assistance, and the leverage which it affords, there would be no way of preventing settlements from being imposed or compromises from being struck."

It is, of course, not a partial settlement in Laos and Cambodia but a settlement or at least a cease-fire throughout Indochina that is President Nixon's goal. He stated it again last Monday. The longer he fails to bring off an end to the war in Vietnam, however, the longer he will feel compelled to attempt devious circumventions of restrictions laid down by Congress. The longer, as well, will Laos and Cambodia remain battlegrounds regardless of their own national wills, and the more vulnerable to eventual North Vietnamese domination will they become.

CLEVELAND, OHIO
PLAIN DEALER
MAY 12 1972
M - 409,414
S - 545,032

CIA Atlas on China Looks Like 'Sellout'

The first Central Intelligence Agency publication ever to be sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office "looks like it might be a sellout," Robert Kling, superintendent of documents, told The Plain Dealer yesterday.

The Government Printing Office already has received more than 6,000 orders for "The People's Republic of China Atlas," an 82-page, six-color book, designed originally as briefing material for President Nixon's trip to Mainland China. It was put on public sale a week ago.

GPO ordered 30,878 copies of the atlas printed, with delivery slated for late May.

Kling, phoned in Washington, said he now believes advance orders could total 25,000, and, if so, "We'll have to go back to press with it."

The atlas, priced at \$5.25, measures 10 1/4 by 17 inches, and contains foldout maps as big as 10 1/4 x 34.

It employs a number of unconventional graphic techniques, in addition to standard regional and thematic maps, charts and photographs, and "is designed as an introduction and general reference aid for those interested in the



People's Republic of China."

The atlas contains comparisons of the United States and mainland (Communist) China to make its statistics more meaningful to the average American.

A CIA spokesman said the agency had never before offered any such publication to the American public.

But, he said, President Nixon showed the atlas to reporters and before live TV cameras before his trip. So the CIA decided to make it public.

Orders for the atlas can be sent to the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

It Isn't the Cuban Missile Crisis

By THEODORE C. SORENSEN

The Naval quarantine proclaimed by President Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was, like President Nixon's mining of North Vietnamese harbors, an interdiction of Soviet shipping that risked the nightmare of nuclear war. There all resemblance ends.

The sudden secret delivery of long-range nuclear weapons only ninety miles from our shores posed a very different kind of threat to this nation than does the open delivery of conventional weapons nearly 9,000 miles away. In 1962 Soviet equipment and combat units in Cuba sought to transform that country into a strategic nuclear base capable of striking any city in the United States and Western Hemisphere. In 1972 Soviet equipment (with almost no personnel) in Indochina has no mission beyond those borders. In contrast with the deliberately false statements made about the missile shipments to Cuba, the Kremlin has openly acknowledged its determination to supply its allies in Hanoi with at least a fraction of what our own country is supplying its allies in Saigon.

President Kennedy, advised that Moscow as well as our maritime allies would be concerned with legalities, obtained a unanimous vote in the Organization of American States authorizing his action and the participation of Latin-American vessels in the blockade. He invoked the Treaty of Rio as well as a new and specific joint resolution of Congress. President Nixon prefers to act alone, without authorization or participation by either allies or Congress.

Although both Chief Executives were criticized by Congressional leaders for their actions, the criticism in Mr. Kennedy's case accused him of not going far enough. But President Kennedy deliberately sought to maintain a degree of discretion and flexibility that this latest interdiction fails to offer. Military developments in the neighboring Caribbean were then far more subject to our control than are events today in the Gulf of Tonkin and South China Sea.

U.S. picket ships, unlike mines, could be (and were) instructed from Washington to let certain vessels pass. Prohibited vessels were to be turned back or taken into custody—not blown up. The ban applied only to those ships carrying offensive weapons. The Russian blockade of West Berlin in 1948, Mr. Kennedy noted, had kept out food, petroleum, medicine, the necessities of life, everything; but this the United States would not do. This week it did.

Yet the interdiction of Soviet ship-



President Kennedy speaking on T.V. Oct. 22, 1962, on the Cuban situation.

ping in 1962 was far more focused on the immediate threat that gave rise to it than is the interdiction initiated by President Nixon. Nuclear missiles and rocket launchers needed to complete the sites then being prepared on Cuba could reach that island only by sea; and the quarantine was to last only until that specific threat had been removed. But halting all Soviet deliveries to North Vietnam now, even if feasible, would not halt Hanoi's present offensive in the South, nor make impossible its indefinite waging of guerrilla war with supplies coming overland as they did during Lyndon Johnson's bombardment of rail lines.

President Nixon, moreover, has tied his interdiction not to the withdrawal of Soviet military equipment but to an end of the war itself.

By more carefully limiting his aims and holding his fire, President Kennedy used the 1962 quarantine to pave the way for an early negotiated settlement of the missile crisis. But mines that sink every incoming and outgoing vessel, regardless of their cargo or identity or the opening of negotiations, are likely to produce confrontation between two nuclear powers before an alternative solution can be found. If as predicted they accomplish little inside Vietnam itself but a hardening in Hanoi's will, President Nixon's own words will then require him to seek

We all had reason to be fearful in 1962. But the Soviets are comparatively stronger today than they were then, in both naval and nuclear power in particular. Their leadership, less free-wheeling than Khrushchev's, may be more reluctant to change courses as quickly. Nor is world opinion arrayed behind the United States as it was then. Finally, and frankly, we may not be as lucky this time as we were in 1962.

But however reckless the President's brinkmanship appears to be, his criticism can take no comfort from a Soviet reply in kind. Instead, before it is too late, if it is not already too late, both sides must be urged to get back on the 1962 track: secret negotiations and communications, contacts at the United Nations, more cautious rhetoric in public, and above all the exercise of military restraint. One mistake is all it takes; and saving one's face is not worth losing our planet.

Theodore Sorensen, a New York attorney, was an aide to President Kennedy.

Around the Nation

• Former U-2 spy plane pilot Francis Gary Powers has been appointed to an executive post with a subsidiary of the Garrett Corp. of Los Angeles.

From staff reports and news dispatches

CHARLESTON, W.VA.

GAZETTE

M - 63,294

GAZETTE-MAIL

S - 106,775

MAY 11 1972
Is Association

With CIA Good?

Some candidates in West Virginia have made certain that their biographies include the information that they had been employees of the Central Intelligence Agency.

We don't know why. The CIA apparently is the world's largest, most powerful and most inept espionage agency.

It was the CIA, you will recall, that didn't have the slightest advance knowledge of the meticulously-planned 1968 Tet offensive launched against all the major cities in South Vietnam.

It was the same CIA, presently busy with its own private war in Laos, that didn't anticipate the North Vietnamese thrust across the demilitarized zone.

The massing of troops, the stockpiling of supplies and other activities that precede large military offensives should have been noticed by somebody on our side, we would think.

U.S. Intelligence Was Surprised By Enemy's Drive, Aides Assert

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 10—Evidence has begun to emerge here that United States intelligence was caught by surprise by the direction, timing and power of the North Vietnamese offensive in South Vietnam.

The National Security Council's Intelligence Committee, headed by Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, reportedly concluded that the main enemy thrust would come from west to east against Kontum in the Central Highlands and not, as happened, from north to south across the demilitarized zone to Quangtri.

Some senior intelligence analysts here insist that there has been no "intelligence failure" during the five-week offensive in Vietnam. They add that the enemy build-up had been observed and meticulously reported since it began early in the year.

"We've kept the policy-makers fully informed" said one source, who asked not to be identified. "There's been no disagreement about the enemy capability. We saw the build-up—though we couldn't tell just when or where he'd strike. What our policy-makers or the South Vietnamese did with our reports is out of our hands."

Nonetheless, there are other veteran United States intelligence officials who concede that the North Vietnamese gained a major tactical surprise—and four or five days of virtually unimpeded advance, which led to the seizure of Quangtri—by hitting where and when it was least expected.

"The intelligence people did not anticipate that the North Vietnamese would take the short route,"—one such source said. "The surprise was that for the first time in 18 years the Communists stopped the pretense of 'infiltration' and went down the coastal Highway 1. Frankly we were surprised that the claim of a 'people's' civil

war was destroyed."

In addition, intelligence sources here acknowledge that they have been surprised by the vast quantities of bulky and often complex weapons moved as much as 600 to 700 miles south by trucks, river boats and even on bicycles pushed or ridden over jungle trails.

"We knew an offensive was coming," said one intelligence analyst, "but we didn't know the quantity, and the types of their supplies, the distribution into future battle areas, and especially the amount of their ammunition. They dropped more than 2,000 artillery rounds into Anloc a few days ago."

Some officials here concede that the United States, despite its array of electronic technology, infrared photography, acoustical "sensors" and aerial-surveillance techniques, appears to have been outwitted by the North Vietnamese.

"We've been listening in on their radio communications for years—and they know it," said one informant. "They're getting more sophisticated. They're beginning to use counter-measures."

The United States aerial flights that used infrared devices to pick up heat arising from large masses moving at night and the electronic "sensors" scattered by the thousands by United States aircraft over the Ho Chi Minh trail retrack are "imperfect,"

sources here say.

"We know when something's going along the trail," said one source, "but we don't always know whether it's a truck—or a tank."

The appearance of about 30 North Vietnamese tanks—half of them 40-ton T-54's and the rest 15-ton amphibious PT-76's around Tay Ninh and Anloc surprised both the United States and South Vietnamese.

Whether they were disassembled and brought south by truck or river boat, or whether they were driven at night and camouflaged by day to avoid United States air attacks, is still unclear. But each trip must have taken two to three months, in the view of specialists here.

The steady reduction in United States ground combat in recent months and the cut-back—until the current offensive—of much American aerial surveillance are cited as reasons why the North managed to achieve these surprises.

"We've cut way back on our SLAR," an informant said, referring to Sideways-Looking Airborne Radar flights. "Even radar isn't much help when you're trying to peer through two or three canopies of jungle or through camouflage strung for miles over trails."

The Federal Diary



By
**Mike
Causey**

Central Intelligence Agency's John Maury will surface May 19 to address a luncheon meeting of the Reserve Officers Association at the Rayburn Building. Maury is legislative counsel for CIA. Call 599-6548 for reservations.

1969 ADVICE TO NIXON

CIA Doubtful on Port Mining

By MORTON KONDRACKE
and THOMAS B. ROSS

Chicago Sun-Times Service

ger said it had been "carefully President Nixon was advised by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1969 that the type of action he now has ordered to cut off supplies to North Vietnam would not work.

"Within two or three months," the CIA declared in a secret memo, "North Vietnam and its allies would be able to implement alternative procedures for maintaining the flow of essential economic and military imports."

The State Department and the Defense Department were less pessimistic. But both conceded that the effort to prevent resupply through alternative land routes from China would involve much heavier bombing and a much higher risk of civilian casualties.

The estimates of the three agencies are contained in National Security Memorandum 1 (NSSM-1), a secret study of the war compiled by the President's national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger.

Gravel Reads Memo

This section of the memo was read into the Congressional Record on the Senate floor yesterday by Sen. Mike Gravel, D-Alaska, although two weeks ago he had been blocked by Republicans from doing so. Copies of the memo also have been obtained and their contents reported by some newspapers recently.

Asked about the CIA's gloomy forecast at a press conference yesterday, Kissinger said it had been "carefully considered" but that Nixon also had before him recent and "much more detailed studies," which he implied were more optimistic.

In the 1969 study, Kissinger asked: "What are current views on proportion of war-essential imports that could come into NVN (North Viet-

nam) over the rail or road lines from China, even if all imports by sea were denied and strong effort even made to interdict ground transport?"

The CIA replied: "All the war-essential imports could be brought into North Vietnam over rail lines or roads from China in the event that imports by sea were successfully denied. . . ."

Pessimistic View

"Almost four years of air war in North Vietnam have shown — as did the Korean war — that, although air strikes will destroy transport facilities, equipment and supplies, they cannot successfully interdict the flow of supplies because much of the damage can frequently be repaired within hours. . . ."

"An intensive and sustained air interdiction program could have a good chance of reducing the northern rail capacity by at least half. However, roads are less vulnerable to interdiction, and waterways even less so. . . ."

"In addition to the overland capacity, an airlift from Chinese airfields could potentially provide a means for importing a large volume of high-priority goods. Moreover, total interdiction of seaborne imports would be difficult because shallow-draft lighters could be used to unload cargo from oceangoing ships anchored in waters outside the mined major harbor areas."

The State Department commented: "we do not believe that the capacity of the DRV-PRC (North Vietnam-China) road and rail network is great enough to permit an adequate flow of supplies in the face of an intense day and night bombing campaign. . . ."

"On the other hand, one important point should be kept in mind. The North Vietnamese surprised many observers, and confounded many predictions, by holding together and simultaneously sending ever-increasing amounts of supplies and personnel into the South during 3½ years of bombing."

"With this experience in mind, there is little reason to believe that new bombing will

accomplish what previous bombing failed to do, unless it is conducted with much greater intensity and readiness to defy criticism and risk of escalation."

The Defense Department declared: "An interdiction campaign . . . when employed in conjunction with denial of sea imports, would, in large part, isolate Hanoi and Haiphong from each other and from the rest of the country."



The short-wave spies of the CIA

Senator J. W. Fulbright, as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, inserted, into the March 6 Congressional Record, studies on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, the CIA media, which had been prepared for the committee by the Library of Congress. Those studies provide the raw material for this column.

By ERIK BERT

Radio Free Europe was conceived in 1949 by the Truman administration as an anti-Soviet instrumentality "outside the realm of government," that is, outside the possibility of Congressional scrutiny or control.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, one of the inspirers of the cold war, had directed Joseph C. Grew to "establish a private group to help deal with certain aspects of Eastern European exiles" who "were paying frequent visits to the State Department." The idea had been suggested originally in February, 1949, by George Kennan, a State Department official.

DeWitt C. Poole, a former Foreign Service officer, gathered a group of prominent Americans to form the National Committee for a Free Europe, formally incorporated in New York on June 2, 1949, as Free Europe, Inc.

Grew told a press conference at the time that the purpose was in part to find jobs for the "democratic" refugees from the socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

The National Committee for a Free Europe was not primarily an employment agency, however. It was a CIA channel for organized warfare against the Soviet Union, with these "democratic" characters as its troops.

By July, 1949, a Radio Committee had been established within NCFE-CIA. A year later, in July, 1950, the Radio Committee went on the air as Radio Free Europe, a division of NCFE-CIA.

This period was roughly concurrent with the persecution of the top U.S. Communist Party leaders who were indicted under the Smith Act in 1948 and, following a nine-month trial and appeals, went to prison in 1951 for long terms.

By the end of 1950, RFE-CIA had established a short wave radio in West Germany and was broadcasting one and a half hours daily to Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. By the end of 1951, RFE-CIA was operating three transmitters in Germany and one in Portugal.

Czechoslovakia became the prime target, with one of the transmitters broadcasting a full day's program to the republic. There were limited short-wave broadcasts to the other targets. By the mid-1950s, RFE-CIA was broadcasting 18-20 hours per day, through some 29 transmitters, primarily to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. All of these became subsequently the scenes of counterrevolutionary attempts.

The CIA's Free Europe, Inc., its holding company, established, in addition to its broadcast operations, the Free Europe Press which until the fall of 1956 engaged in balloon leaflet-distribution and "has also carried out various other publishing activities," and Free Europe Exile Relations, the CIA's liaison with various counter-revolutionary groups, including the Assembly of Captive European Nations.

Radio Liberty-CIA

The Library of Congress study does not reveal when Radio Liberty was conceived. Formally, it emerged in January, 1951, with the incorporation in Delaware

of the American Committee for Freedom of the Peoples of the USSR, Inc. This committee was the forerunner of the present Radio Liberty Committee, Inc.

RL-CIA began operations on a small scale in March 1953, broadcasting short wave to the Soviet Union.

Its mercenaries were anti-socialist, anti-Soviet emigres from the USSR.

Its single transmitter was located in West Germany.

CIA behind Thai regulars in Laos

From Fred Emery
Washington, May 8

The Central Intelligence Agency is the paymaster for an expeditionary force in Laos of some 8,000 Thai "volunteers," with plans to increase it to some 14,000 men at a yearly cost of \$100m (£40m), it was disclosed today in a staff report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The numbers and cost involved in this operation have been previously kept secret, with the Nixon Administration invoking Thai Government sensitivities.

However, Senator Stuart Symington, chairman of a Foreign Relations sub-committee, says in a preface to the staff report that the Congressional ban on American support for third country forces in Laos "is apparently being violated in letter as well as in spirit." The Administration's defence is that the troops are "local" forces.

The report questions the Administration's contention that the men are volunteers drawn from the large community of ethnic Lao living in Thailand. It asserts the men are recruited "by the Royal Thai army from all over Thailand" with a specific cadre of officers and men from the regular army.

The report, written before the current Communist offensive in South Vietnam, states that "Laos is closer to falling now than any time in the past nine years. Cambodia has lost half its territory, and is insecure in the remainder. . . . The North Vietnamese will be able to continue to use the territory of Laos and Cambodia to pursue the war in South Vietnam, no matter how successful Vietnamization proves to be and to keep South Vietnam in a permanent state of siege".

U.S. report gives grim Laos, Cambodia facts

By Lucia Mouat
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

While world attention focuses chiefly on the Hanoi offensive in South Vietnam, the war also continues in neighboring Laos and Cambodia—and the prospects for a favorable end are not a great deal brighter.

Such is the thrust of a detailed report just released by the Senate foreign relations subcommittee on U.S. security agreements and commitments abroad.

Based in part on a three-week visit to Southeast Asia last January by subcommittee staff members James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, the report essentially updates visits they made to the area over the last couple of years and information gleaned in the course of past committee hearings.

A covering letter from subcommittee chairman Sen. Stuart Symington (D) of Missouri to committee chairman Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D) of Arkansas refers in blanket terms to the "deteriorating military, political, and economic situations" in Laos and Cambodia and notes, "We are offered nothing but the prospect of more of the same at higher cost." According to the report, the countries are preserved, in the final analysis, "only by the restrictions that the North Vietnamese have imposed on themselves."

Full access reported

Mr. Lowenstein and Mr. Moose had full access to unclassified information — agreeing in turn to let the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Departments of State and Defense censor what they deemed necessary from the final report. That process has taken the better part of the last two months.

The result is that the 39-page report is as fascinating in parts for what has been left out as for what has been left in.

Sensitivity of the Thai Government, for instance, was given as the reason for deleting such statistics as the number of Thai troops fighting the counterinsurgency effort in Thailand and the number of Thai irregular troops helping to fight the ground war in Laos. Yet left intact in the report are such potentially damaging conclusions as the suggestion by some Thais (with whom the staff members talked) that Thailand's

counterinsurgency effort suffered more from complacency than coordination problems and that action taken has been the result above all of American urging.

Among the more discouraging statistics included: Top estimates of the total number of enemy forces in Laos went up from 139,000 in April, 1971, to 145,000 in January, 1972. In the same period, Lao irregular troops, considered the prime fighting force on the other side, dwindled from 30,000 to 27,000. The report also notes that Khmer Communist strength in Cambodia, estimated at 3,000 in May, 1970, is believed to be closer to 20,000, and some estimates put it as high as 50,000.

Delving in detail into United States military and economic assistance in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, the report concludes that government cooperation in each is imperative to current U.S. strategy and, despite the lack of formal requirements, forecasts an unending commitment in U.S. funds. The report argues that the situation is such that these countries, dependent on U.S. support, are left with no possibility of agreeing to a compromise that might offer an alternative to the continued fighting.

Strong theme

One theme that comes across strongly in the report is that Washington is far more concerned about the Thai insurgency than the Thais themselves. Many Thais, the report notes, are relatively preoccupied with China and its role in the insurgency and in road building near the Thai border and are not that concerned about the war in the other Indo-China countries.

One of the purposes of this report, as with those that preceded it, is to try to get more information about the U.S. role in Indo-China into the public realm. (Noticeably, Washington is becoming much more open about the role of the CIA in the Laotian war.) This report for the first time, for instance, describes in detail the CIA installation at Udorn air base in Thailand and allows mention of the fact that it serves as the liaison office for the Thai irregular forces in Laos. Also made public for the first time are such details as the number of U.S. planes in Thailand (450), the fact that helicopter gunships are in use in Laos, and a series of figures on tactical air sorties in Indo-China.

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM George Putnam Report

STATION WAVA Radio

DATE May 8, 1972 8:20 AM

CITY Washington, D.C.

REPORT ON CIA

GEORGE PUTNAM: Chile's President Salvador Allende has spit in the face of every American. What's more, he's making us pay for it. This and much more in one reporter's opinion, after a quick time out.

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PUTNAM: It is this reporter's opinion that freedom of expression is one thing, a foreign sell-out of our people and their money is quite another. Here is a startling example of what can happen when restraint is not employed.

President Salvador Allende of Marxist Chile was negotiating to purchase most of the beleaguered ITT's interest there, including telephones, hotels, and other companies. Then came a column published in an American newspaper alleging that ITT once approached the CIA to cooperate in preventing Allende's inauguration.

Well, that gave the Chilean President the excuse that he needed. Allende wasted little time exploiting that published story. And it led to the expropriation of all of ITT's interests without any payment.

The estimate of this highway robbery: \$200,000,000.

Now, taxpayers should know that in addition to American business losses there, our government makes good \$100,000,000 of this money as the result of its insurance program for overseas investment. So one newspaper column resulted in a staggering financial loss to the United States.

Now, the fact is that even if all the charges were true, nothing ever happened. And Washington obviously did not make any effort to stop Allende. As a matter of fact, foreign aid continued to flow to Chile in an effort to keep it from slipping totally into the Soviet bloc.

The printing of such allegations was not only damaging to the United States but focused attention on an accepted practice of any intelligence organization. Agents hired by the CIA must maintain a cover; they must offer a credible explanation for what they're doing in a foreign country. The use of business firms and other organizations that travel or work abroad becomes an obvious necessity.

In many cases the company may know nothing of such activity. In others there may be close cooperation at the top echelon. As example, recall the tremendous publicity that broke over the story that members of the National Students Association were working for the CIA in their travels to Iron Curtain countries. There was indignation and investigation of our intelligence operations. And once again the apparatus was badly damaged, and the cover needed to obtain vital results was shattered by publicity.

Recently New Jersey Senator Case announced that the CIA was financing Radio Free Europe, bringing the future of that vital function, so feared and hated by the Russian secret police, under withering fire.

Other examples include the Pentagon Papers, publication of secret sessions of the National Security Council, a former agent of Central Intelligence telling all in a magazine and later a book.

And now members of Congress are demanding that CIA reports be furnished to them on a confidential basis.

It is this reporter's opinion that there are a few Congressmen and Senators whose access to such highly secret information might have serious consequences to the security of our nation.

Now, suppose one of these were to call a press conference at midnight and to read a CIA report to the world, the way that Senator Gravel read the Pentagon Papers and then cried. The damage to our national security has reached unacceptable proportions.

It is this reporter's opinion that out of self-protection and survival, our government ought to prosecute some of those who publish and be damned.

Thai Force in Laos Financed By U.S., Secret Report Says

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Foreign Service

In order to prevent a military defeat in Laos, the United States undertook to finance and organize a 25-battalion expeditionary force of Thai "volunteers" at an estimated yearly cost of \$100 million, according to a heavily censored Senate staff report released yesterday.

Although the presence of Thai units in Laos was officially acknowledged after press disclosures of their presence, their numbers and costs have been kept secret by U.S. officials in Washington and Vientiane—primarily because of Thai governmental sensitivities.

The Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the Defense and State Departments, spent more than two months clearing the staff report which was prepared for the Symington subcommittee on security commitments abroad. The document was riddled with official deletions. It was prepared by Foreign Relations Committee staff members James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose.

The purpose of the report was to give Congress a comprehensive picture of U.S. financed military activities in Laos, Thailand and Cambodia.

As described publicly for the first time in the staff report, the salaries of the Thai irregulars are paid by CIA officials to Thai officers at Udorn Air Base near the Lao border in northeast Thailand. The method of payment, by U.S. government officials to regular Thai officers, has been previously classified.

In earlier statements administration spokesmen have said that the Thai units were primarily ethnic Lao who had volunteered as local forces to fight the Communists in their ancestral homeland. The staff report said, however, that the irregulars were recruited from all over Thailand. An irregular private, according to the report, is paid

month—three times the salary of a regular Thai private.

Portions of the report that apparently tended to question the voluntary nature of the program were deleted from the sanitized version made public.

An example of the intense censorship applied to the staff document was the following paragraph on the Thai presence in Laos:

"At the time of our visit, there were (deleted) Thai irregular infantry battalions in Laos and (deleted) on leave in Thailand. Of the (deleted) in Laos, (deleted) were in (deleted), (deleted) in the (deleted) and (deleted) at (deleted)."

The Thai units, introduced into Laos in 1970, were designated as "volunteers" after Congress adopted an amendment by Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) to prohibit U.S. funding of "third country forces" to support the Lao and Cambodian governments. Fulbright's purpose was to limit further American military and financial commitments in Indochina.

Despite the tight secrecy maintained on all details of the irregular operations, the report cited a previously-unnoticed Voice of America interview with Laotian Premier Souvanna Phoum. It provided the first and only official statement on the size of the force.

In the January 14 broadcast Souvanna confirmed that American and Lao officials had agreed on a "volunteer" force of 25 to 26 battalions to fight in Laos but had been able to raise about 15. (There are about 400 men in a Thai irregular battalion.)

Souvanna told the VOA interviewer that he hoped to have five or six more battalions recruited for duty by this month. "They can't be called Thai battalions," Souvanna emphasized in the interview. "We must call them volunteer battalions."

Recruitment Moves

Moose and Lowenstein reported interviewing two irregulars at training camps in Thailand to find out how they had been recruited.

"One was a private, and he told us that he had volunteered because (deleted). The other was a non-commissioned officer. He told us that (deleted) . . . We were told subsequently in Bangkok that (deleted)."

Introduction of the Thai forces came at a time when the war started going very badly for the Lao irregulars, who like their Thai counterparts are CIA supervised. Officials in Vientiane, said the staff report, asserted that were it not for the Thais the strategic CIA base at Long Cheng would have fallen to North Vietnamese infantry units during the past year.

The censoring agencies refused to declassify the Thai casualties in Laos, although figures were given for the Lao irregulars as well as regular Laotian army units. News reports at the time of last winter's operation near Long Cheng said there were heavy casualties among Thai artillery units.

The casualty figures showed that the Lao highland irregulars who bear the brunt of the combat were dying in battle at about four times the rate of the regular Lao army units. In 1971, according to official figures, there were 2,259 Lao irregulars killed as against 537 regular army troops.

Heavy Losses

The CIA-supervised irregular force numbered 27,000 this year as compared to 30,000 in April, 1971—another indication of the heavy battle losses among the Lao government guerrillas.

Though strong efforts have been made to minimize the Thai government's role in the irregular program because of Congressional restrictions, the report notes—for the first time publicly—the existence of a \$15 million "Additional Aid to Thailand" allocation in the Pentagon's fiscal 1972 military aid budget.

The Defense Department's special military aid budget for Southeast Asia has been used as a means of making extra payments to the Thai government for military services in Vietnam. The "Additional Aid to Thailand" program was described in the Senate report as a "one shot injection" to build up Thai forces "to cope with the greater external threat posed by developments in Laos and Cambodia . . ."

Air sortie raids by American aircraft in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam also were broken down for the first time in the report. The breakdown showed that while the overall rate of tactical air sorties had dropped by 10 per cent during 1971 there was a sharp rise in both Cambodia (from about 9,000 to 16,500) and North Vietnam (from 2,000 to 4,500). There were no figures for the stepped-up air war during the current offensive in South Vietnam.

Moose and Lowenstein note that in Cambodia U.S. Embassy officials had no idea of the extent of B-52 bombing of the country.

"The general impression in the embassy was that there had been only a half a dozen or so B-52 strikes in Cambodia during the past six months," the report said. "In fact there were almost 1,000 in the last six months of 1971 and (deleted) in January 1972 alone."

CIA Said To Support Thai Force In Laos

By WILLIAM K. WYANT JR.
A Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, May 8 — About 25 battalions of Thai irregular troops fighting in Laos are maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency at a cost of about \$100,000,000 a year, a report to the Senate indicated today.

The report was made public by Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, chairman of the foreign relations subcommittee on United States security agreements and commitments abroad. Many deletions were made by the Executive Branch from the published version, for security reasons.

"The Administration has said it is lifting the veil of secrecy that has surrounded so many Government activities," Symington said in a statement complaining about the deletions.

"Yet it insists on keeping classified certain information for which we see no legitimate security argument."

The Symington subcommittee report, which the panel received in closed session March 1, said the Thai irregular battalions in Laos were supposed to have a strength of about 550 men each.

Thai private soldiers in Laos were said to be paid about \$75 a month from funds provided by the CIA. That is nearly three times the \$26 a month received by regular Thai army soldiers in their own country.

Symington said today that the Administration of President Richard M. Nixon still was insisting that the number of Thai troops in Laos was a secret even though the Laotian Prime Minister, Souvanna Phouma, has talked publicly about the number involved.

This remains true, Symington said, "even though all of the costs... are borne by the United States."

The Symington panel's report said United States forces and advisers had been kept out of

Cambodia, as required by the Cooper-Church Amendment, but that the Executive Branch had circumvented Congress's ban against American financing of "third-country troops" in Laos.

Symington said the Executive Branch contended that the Thai irregulars, who have been doing most of the fighting in Laos, were "local forces".

The Thai troops in Laos are trained in Thailand at sites built or rebuilt with Department of Defense Military Assistance Program funds and operated by the CIA. Training is supervised by 60 United States Special Forces personnel sent from Okinawa.

James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose of the subcommittee staff made the 39-page report after a visit to Thailand, Laos and Cambodia last January. Their findings originally were classified secret, making deletions for a public version took eight weeks. Symington commented that the picture of the situation in Laos and Cambodia in January "is a gloomy one indeed."

"Now that our attention is focused primarily on events in Vietnam, with no immediate crisis in either of those two countries, there may be a tendency to forget Laos and Cambodia," Symington said.

"Nevertheless, the weakness of the Government's position in both countries, along with the enemy's ability to continue to prosecute the war, remain vitally important factors when considering the future course of events in Indochina."

The Lowenstein-Moose report said Laos was closer to falling to the Communist foe than at any time in the last nine years. Cambodia, it was said, has lost half its territory and is not secure in its tenure of the other half.

"Both countries are pre-served, in the final analysis, only by the restrictions that the North Vietnamese have imposed on themselves," the report said.

A C.I.A. Atlas of China Goes on Sale for \$5.25

WASHINGTON, May 6 (UPI)

—For \$5.25, any citizen can have his own Central Intelligence Agency document.

The Government Printing Office is offering for sale 30,000 copies of the C.I.A.'s new 82-page, multicolored atlas of the People's Republic of China.

Officials at the printing office said that except for an annual four-volume series listing the broadcasting stations of the world, the atlas was the only C.I.A. document they had produced for sale to the public.

In addition to detailed maps of modern China, the atlas, which has the C.I.A.'s seal on the cover, also contains historical maps, a number of charts depicting the growth of the Chinese economy, and a narrative accompanying the maps and charts.

Columnists

7 MAY 1972

Clayton Fritchey

Accurate Reports by CIA Go Unheeded



WASHINGTON—if we didn't know better, there would be reason to suspect the Central Intelligence Agency of being in back of the celebrated "leaks" that have stood Washington on its head in recent times, for each of the revelations has enhanced the reputation and standing of the CIA.

In that respect, the latest expose revolving around the disclosure of the so-called "Kissinger Papers," is no different from the famed "Pentagon Papers" of last year or the more recent "Anderson Papers." No matter how you slice these papers, the CIA comes out looking realistic and dependable, at least comparatively so.

Nixon Had Good Advice

It is possible to see now [thru the just-revealed Kissinger Papers] that President Nixon, like President Johnson, had good advice, much of it supplied by the CIA, as well as bad advice, and that both chief executives chose to listen to what they wanted to hear, which is why the war is still going on.

Soon after taking office in 1969, Nixon, thru his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, initiated a review of the Viet Nam conflict. The results of the study, leaked to the press and Congress last week, showed the CIA was bearish on the war. On bombing, for example, it said:

"The air war did not seriously affect the flow of men and supplies to Communist forces in Laos and South Viet Nam. Nor did it significantly erode North Viet Nam's military defense capabilities or Hanoi's determination to persist in the war."

That was nearly four years ago, and still looks like sound advice today. Nixon, however, didn't want to believe it then and apparently can't reconcile himself to it even now. The U. S. Air Force is presently dropping more bombs in Viet Nam than ever before—and the enemy is still advancing.

As pointed out by Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the Pentagon Papers, President Johnson was just as deaf to CIA assessments. Ellsberg showed that Johnson had not lacked accurate intelligence estimates from the CIA before he escalated the war. On that he said:

"The decisions seemed to have been made year after year in the light of what was adequate information to

make better decisions. If the President had this information available, why did he ignore it? Why did he listen to Walt Rostow and McGeorge Bundy as experts on Viet Nam instead of people who had a very good track record for prediction?"

The later Anderson Papers shed some light on Presidential decision-making. The official documents that were brought to light by columnist Jack Anderson center on the recent war between Pakistan and India. They showed the CIA once again providing a realistic estimate of the situation and a President once again choosing to ignore it. Nixon wanted Pakistan to win and ordered all hands to "tilt" against India, even tho he was warned that it was a losing cause.

Key Committee Role

Now that Presidential brinksmanship has spurred Congress to reassert its war making powers, it is imperative that key committees, such as Foreign Relations and Armed Services, have dependable intelligence on which to act. No time should be lost in passing the Cooper bill to bring this about.

This legislation, introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper [R., Ky.], would require the CIA to share its reports "fully and currently" with the appropriate committees on Capitol Hill. "I contend," says Cooper, "that the Congress, which must make decisions upon foreign policy and national security and which is called upon to commit material and human resources of the nation, should have access to all available information and intelligence to discharge properly and morally its responsibility to our government and its people."

The CIA briefings Congress gets now are limited to what the administration wants it to know. There is a so-called "watchdog committee" [a small informal group of senators and congressmen] that is supposed to keep an eye on the CIA, but it didn't hold a single meeting all last year. It will be said that Congress can't be trusted for sensitive information. Well, the greatest secrets of all, involving nuclear developments, are shared with the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of Congress, and there has never been a leak in 25 years.

CIA, Military Differed Over Mines

By Anthony Marro

Newsday Washington Bureau

Washington—Through both the Johnson and Nixon administrations, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have disagreed sharply on the benefits of mining the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong.

The joint chiefs have favored the action. They have long maintained that if all imports from sea were cut off—and if land routes through Laos and Cambodia and rail lines from China were vigorously bombed—the North Vietnamese could not obtain sufficient supplies to continue the war effort.

The CIA has opposed it. The agency has argued that even the combination of mining and unlimited bombing could not halt the flow of supplies, and that the results would not be worth the risk of provoking the Soviet Union.

A secret National Security Council staff study commissioned by presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger in 1969 showed the CIA and joint chiefs "in total disagreement" on the question. Unless the CIA position has changed since then, it appeared last night that President Nixon had cast his lot with the generals.

The dispute between the intelligence agency and the generals surfaces both in the so-called "Pentagon Papers," which are still classified top secret even though large segments have been published in paperback editions, and in the National Security Council study commissioned by Kissinger. Newsday was among a number of newspapers to obtain portions of the latter study, which was titled National Security Study Memorandum No. 1, or simply NSSM-1.

The Pentagon Papers show that, as early as May 23, 1967, the CIA opposed proposals by the military to mine the harbor as early as May 23, 1967. An agency memo then warned that such action "... would place Moscow in a particularly galling dilemma as to how to preserve the Soviet position and prestige in such a disadvantageous place."

It added that if this were done, the Soviets "should be expected to send volunteers, including pilots, to North Vietnam; to provide some new and better weapons and equipment ... and to show across-the-board hostility toward the U.S. (interrupting any on-

going conversations on ABMs, non-proliferation, etc.)."

The Pentagon Papers also show that this CIA analysis was later buttressed by then-Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson, who wrote on March 1, 1968:

"Mining of Haiphong harbor would certainly provoke strong Soviet reaction. As a minimum, I would expect them to provide minesweepers, possibly with Soviet naval crews ..."

Two days later, on March 3, 1968, a Pentagon staff group working for then-secretary of Defense Clark Clifford also shot down the proposal, saying first that "it has become abundantly clear that no level of bombing can prevent the North Vietnamese from [carrying on the war in the South]," and then turning to the port.

"The remaining issue on interdiction of supplies has to do with the closing of the Port of Haiphong," it continued. "Although this is the route by which some 80 per cent of North Vietnamese imports come into the country, it is not the point of entry for most of the military supplies and ammunition. These materials predominantly enter via the rail routes from China ..."

This was the argument the CIA returned to in the 1969 study, when it, the State Department, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others all were asked to submit their evaluations of the merits of mining the port.

The NSSM-1 papers obtained by Newsday show that the CIA position in 1969 was this:

• Total interdiction of seaborne imports would be difficult because shall-

low-draft lighters could be used to unload cargo from oceangoing ships anchored outside the mined harbor areas.

• That even if all imports from sea were blocked, all of the war-essential imports could be brought into North Vietnam over rail lines from China.

• That while air strikes would destroy transport facilities, equipment and supplies, they could not successfully prevent supplies from reaching the North.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff position in NSSM-1 was that the flow of supplies could be stopped to the point where the North Vietnamese could not continue the war in the South, but only by preventing both seaborne imports and rail imports from China.

The joint chiefs estimated that "a minimum of 6,000 attack sorties per month" would be required against the two rail lines from China.

The bombing of the rail and road systems would have to be "free of the militarily confining constraints which have characterized the conduct of the war in the North in the past," they warned. "The concept would preclude attacks on population as a target, but would accept high risks of civilian casualties in order to achieve destruction of war-supporting targets ..."



International

Two studies of how the CIA poisons Europe's airwaves

Senator J. W. Fulbright inserted into the March 6 Congressional Record two studies of the CIA's anti-Socialist communications network in Europe: on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Radio Free Europe is directed at Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania; Radio Liberty at the Soviet Union.

The two studies were prepared by the Library of Congress, which is anti-Soviet and anti-socialist in outlook. The accompanying article is based on these studies.

By ERIK BERT

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty became a problem for the Nixon Administration, for the CIA, and others in January, 1971 when Congress, under persisting public pressure, addressed itself cautiously to the funding and administration of the two radios.

"Both radios had hitherto ostensibly been supported by private funds but had actually been largely funded by the Central Intelligence Agency," the RFE study says.

The Advertising Council, an agency created to give the advertising industry a decent public image, has provided the main cover for the CIA funding of RFE. It promotes campaigns, ostensibly for private donations to RFE-CIA, but actually to conceal the fact that the RFE's money comes from the CIA. The Advertising Council disguises its CIA cover campaigns as a "public service."

The RFE media campaigns sluiced through the Advertising Council had a commercial value of between \$12 million and \$20 million, according to Senator Clifford Case (R-NJ).

However, the returns on these expenditures were pitiable—less than \$100,000. The obvious conclusion has been that the communications media and the advertising industry, or their Big Business clients, supplied the bulk of \$12 million to \$20 million.

Supplementary solicitations from private industry provide only a "small part" of the RFE-CIA budget.

In fiscal 1970, 8,279 corporations contributed to RFE-CIA and halfway through 1971, 4,462 had contributed.

In fiscal 1971 \$22,366,876 was expended for Radio Free Europe operations; \$244,036 for RFE capital investments; and \$501,072 for RFE Fund, Inc.

Radio Liberty's annual budget in recent years has ranged between \$12 million and \$14 million, according to Senator Clifford Case and the General Accounting Office.

RL-CIA has dispensed with the elaborate scenery behind which RFE-CIA received its funds from the CIA. RL-CIA has had no program for corporate funding, and during the decade 1962-1971, it received only \$20,000 in unsolicited funds, or about \$2,000 a year.

The corporate existence of Radio Free Europe-CIA is Radio Free Europe, Inc.

The RFE-CIA report says it is a "safe assumption that contact between (the Central Intelligence Agency) and Free Europe, Inc., was probably a major function of the Free Europe, Inc. corporate headquarters."

RFE's board of directors consists of 19 persons under the chairmanship of General Lucius Clay. The fund raising conduit is Radio Free Europe Fund, Inc., chaired by Steward S. Cort, chairman of the Bethlehem Steel Corp.

Radio Liberty differs from Radio Free Europe in the structure through which CIA control is exercised. RFE's board of directors has participated actively in its affairs.

Radio Liberty's board of trustees, embracing "leaders in the American business community, former government officials and military leaders, educators and publicists," is decorative and "passive." Former President Harry Truman is honorary chairman, a post in which he succeeded Hoover and Dwight Eisenhower. (86/1).

The board of trustees which radio operation, and for what

goes with it, includes, according to a recent RL-CIA pamphlet: Henry V. Poor, assistant dean, Yale College of Law, Howland Sargeant, president, former Assistant Secretary of State; Whitney North Seymour, chairman of the board, Carnegie Foundation, former president, American Bar Association; John W. Studebaker, former U.S. Commissioner of Education; Reginald T. Townsend, vice-president, RL committee; William L. White, editor and publisher, Emporia Gazette; Philip L. Willkie, attorney; Mrs. Oscar Ahlgren, former president, General Federation of Women's Clubs; John R. Burton, chairman of the board, National Bank of Far Rockaway, New York; J. Peter Grace, president, W. R. Grace & Co., a major conglomerate; Allen Grover, former vice president, Time-Life, Inc.; Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, ret., former Allied Commander in Europe (NATO); John S. Mays, former U.S. ambassador to Switzerland; H. J. Heinz, III, chairman of the board, H. J. Heinz Co., and Isaac Don Levine, veteran anti-Sovieteer.

RFE-CIA operates also the West European Advisory Group of Radio Free Europe, a group of influential Europeans who meet once a year with the officers and directors of Free Europe, Inc., to exchange thoughts about policy and such. The West Europe committee was established in 1959. Its current chairman is Dirk Stikker, Netherlands capitalist, politician and one-time secretary-general of NATO. His predecessors were Randolph Pacciardi and Paul van Zeeland.

Pacciardi, former Italian Defense Minister, was accused in 1969 of having been involved in a plot for a Rightist coup in Italy.

Radio Free Europe, Inc., is an outgrowth of the Crusade for Freedom, organized in 1950 by Gen. Clay to support the counter-revolutionary Free Europe Committee.

William P. Durkee, formerly director of RFE-CIA in Munich, is president of both the Radio Free Europe Inc., and Radio Free Europe Fund, Inc.

continued

Radio Free Europe's central headquarters are in Munich, West Germany. It consists of five Broadcasting Departments—Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Polish and Romanian—each of which has a bureau in New York.

RFE-CIA's field network consists of news bureaus in 10 major European cities, and "stringers elsewhere." Its transmitting and monitoring sites are located in West Germany and Portugal.

Radio Liberty has its administrative headquarters in New York, and its main operating center in Munich, with other facilities elsewhere in West Germany, in Barcelona, London, Madrid, Paris, Playa del Pals (Spain), and Taipei (Taiwan).

RFE-CIA's New York staff totals 149, including: Free Europe Fund Inc., 7; Radio Free Europe, 114. Its European staff totals more than 1,500 of whom 1,098 are located in Western Germany, 970 in Munich, and 128 at three transmitting or monitoring sites.

The RFE-CIA transmitting operation in Portugal employs 346 persons. The Bureaus, in Athens, Berlin, Bonn, West Berlin, Brussels, Geneva, London, Paris, Rome Stockholm and Vienna, account for 69.

The report gives the total staff of Radio Free Europe as 1,611, in addition to the Free Europe, Inc., and RFE Fund Inc. staff mentioned above.

(The 1,611 is 98 more than the total of those separate items. The report does not show the reason for discrepancy.)

Of the 1,611 total, 221 are Americans. It is impossible to say, despite a lot of figures in the report, what the others are.

Radio Liberty's staff in recent years has totaled about 1,000.

In addition to its broadcasting operations Radio Free Europe-CIA carries on a special operation for an elite group of scholars, educational and research institutions, government agencies, and in business and the communications industry. RFE-CIA's research papers go to 694 such outlets in Europe and to more than 200 in the U.S., a total of about 900.

Radio Liberty operates a similar service. It distributes its publications to 650 specialists in North America free-of-charge.

CEYLON MINISTER BLAMES CIA

By Our Colombo Correspondent
The American Central Intelligence Agency was accused yesterday of being behind the attempt to overthrow Mrs. Bandaranaike's United Front Government in Ceylon in April last year.

The accusation was made by Dr. N. Perera, the Trotskyite Finance Minister. America was among the countries that came to Ceylon's help during the revolt.

ITT AND THE CIA:

The Making of a Foreign Policy

DALE L. JOHNSON, JOHN POLLOCK, and JANE SWEENEY

When columnist Jack Anderson recently released documents which indicate that International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) engaged in efforts to prevent President Salvador Allende from assuming power in Chile, the revelations provided an occasion to raise a pertinent question: What interests do ITT and other multinational corporations have in Chile that could make such corporate intervention and U.S. Government complicity plausible?

The Anderson documents, which the columnist said came from the private files of ITT's Washington office, to which he seems to have singular access, reveal that ITT put great pressure on the U.S. Government to block Allende, at one point offering "to assist financially in sums up to seven figures." For its part the Government, through the CIA, suggested a scheme designed to "reduce the Chilean economy to chaos," and thus bring about a military uprising, according to one of the documents.

The documents—eighty-two pages in all—covered the period between September and November 1970 when Allende became the first avowed Marxist elected to lead a country in the Western Hemisphere. The ITT confidential memoranda revealed that several weeks before Allende was to take office, U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry "finally received a message from the State Department giving him the green light to move in the name of President Nixon. The message gave him maximum authority to do all possible—short of a Dominican Republic-type action—to keep Allende from taking power."

The recent revelations of ITT's friendly ties to the CIA—and to the Republican Party, as disclosed in other alleged ITT documents made public by Anderson—represent only one part of the conglomerate's relation to the U.S. Government. With \$233 million in

defense business in 1971, ITT ranks number twenty-three on the Defense Department's list of prime contractors.

ITT is among the largest of U.S.-based multinational corporations. Like all multinationals, ITT views economic nationalism, especially when it is combined with efforts, as in Chile, to build a socialist society, as a fundamental threat to its interests. In 1970, forty-seven per cent of ITT's assets and sales were located abroad and fifty-nine per cent of its 1970 profits flowed from foreign operations. Expansion abroad proceeds at an even more rapid clip than ITT's sensational growth inside the United States, where it is now the nation's eighth largest industrial concern. In 1965, ITT was ranked the twenty eighth multinational corporation; in 1971, it was the sixth largest. The giant international conglomerate operates in sixty countries with more than \$3 billion in assets abroad. It operates in twelve Latin American countries, including Chile.

After Anaconda Copper, nationalized along with Kennecott and Cerro Corporation by the Allende government, ITT has the largest U.S. investment in Chile. The conglomerate owns seventy per cent of the Chilean Telephone Company with assets of \$153 million, as well as Standard Electric Company, which operates in twenty-four countries. ITT also owns two Sheraton Hotels in Santiago, All American Cables and Radio, World Directories, Inc., and ITT World Communications.

Given the revelations of the Anderson documents, it is not hard to imagine ITT officials sitting down to talk about the business of politics with CIA agents and the Chilean equivalent to the Republican National Committee in a luxurious suite at the Hotel Carrera, one of ITT's Sheraton holdings in Santiago. The way is doubtless eased by the fact that the former director of the CIA, John McCone, is on the board of directors of ITT. According to the Anderson papers, McCone figured in the clandestine activities of ITT to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency.

Employing many former government personnel and

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continued

correspondents, ITT has its own foreign policy research intelligence units and its own counter-intelligence operation, as well as a fleet of jet liners at the disposal of members of Congress looking for a free ride on some junket or other. One of America's most distinguished newspapers, the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, seemed to sum up recent disclosures when it observed: "Perhaps the ITT was not satisfied to assist the Nixon Administration with political arrangements and advise it on antitrust policy. For ITT now appears to have pursued its own foreign policy."

ITT-CIA intrigues, together with conspiracies by local Chilean rightists, including the assassination of the commander of the Chilean Armed Forces, failed to prevent President Allende from taking office November 3, 1970. Allende's Popular Unity government had promised during the election to bring all large monopolies into the sector of social property. This certainly included the ITT telephone monopoly. Negotiations for Chilean state purchase of the telephone company were begun shortly after Allende took office. The attempt to buy the company occurred after years of notoriously had service and aborted attempts by the previous Frei government to induce the monopoly to provide adequate service.

Negotiations broke down in August, 1971. On September 23, the Chilean government officially took over the company. After company records were examined, the general manager and three other officials were arrested on charges of fraud in company dealings.

ITT is not the only large U.S.-based multinational corporation whose interests in Chile are threatened by the Allende government's economic nationalism. Anaconda Copper is within the sphere of the Rockefeller interests. The Rockefellers are also linked to a number of other U.S. corporations in Chile which face the prospect of nationalization.

The most significant of the Rockefeller holdings in Chile is the International Basic Economy Corporation (IBEC). Like ITT, IBEC is a conglomerate. It operates in thirty-three countries and in 1970 derived sixty per cent of its profits from Latin America, although only thirty-three per cent of its assets were in the region. In Chile, IBEC has a ready-mix cement plant, a construction firm, a mining enterprise, and four investment and management companies. Through these investment companies, the Rockefellers have penetrated many Chilean firms. Their tactic is to recruit close business associates from the local business elite, buy (from funds generated from within the country) into local businesses, and then put their men on the boards, thus increasing the concentration of decision-making in the hands of local oligarchs serving foreign interests. IBEC now participates in thirteen of the twenty-five largest Chilean corporations and controls more than fifty per cent of the stock in three of them. In short, IBEC in Chile operates as ITT does everywhere—it grows by achieving financial control of more and more independent firms.

The Rockefellers' IBEC and ITT are by no means strangers to each other. ITT maintains links to the Rockefeller corporate empire through interlocking directorates with Standard Oil of New Jersey and Chemical Bank, both Rockefeller-controlled corporations. In addition, Russell Erickson, chairman of the board of ITT's Hartford Fire Insurance, is on the Advisory Committee of Chase Manhattan Bank, the main Rockefeller base of operations. Former CIA chief McCone is a board member of the Rockefellers' Standard Oil of New Jersey. And so it goes.

ITT has ties to the principal international centers of corporate power. Eugene Black, for example, came to the board of ITT after fifteen years as president of the World Bank. The World Bank, together with U.S. creditors, is currently pushing Chile hard on the renegotiation of the \$3 billion foreign debt that Allende inherited from previous regimes.

Kennecott Copper is controlled by another major corporate interest group, the Morgans. Through Kennecott Copper, the Morgans are linked to the Guggenheim family (former owners of Chilean nitrates and other businesses in the north of Chile) and to the fiftieth largest U.S. industrial corporation, W. R. Grace and Company. Grace is a huge conglomerate with substantial interests in Chile and Latin America generally.

By the time Allende became president, most of Chile's important areas of industry and finance had passed into foreign (mainly U.S.) hands. Of the eighteen largest non-banking corporations, all but two involved foreign capital. Two-fifths of Chile's largest 100 corporations were under foreign control, while many more were mixed ventures which allowed external influence or effective control. Of the top thirty U.S.-based multinational corporations, twenty-four operated in Chile.

The essential impact of the increase in multinational corporate penetration in Chile has been to lock the country into a situation of increasing foreign dependence. This dependence removed control over more and more of the economic life of the country from Chilean hands and resulted in increased capital transfers abroad.

In the case of mining, the U.S.-owned corporations took out billions of dollars in profits over the years with minimal reinvestment of earnings for the benefit of the Chilean economy. U.S. Department of Commerce figures for 1953-1968, for example, indicate that mining and smelting operations in Chile (about ninety per cent copper) earned \$1,036 million, while new investments and reinvestment of profits together totaled only \$71 million.

In the industrial sector of the economy, the substantial development which had occurred in the 1930s and 1940s under control of Chilean entrepreneurs had come to a practical end by the mid-1950s. Industrial growth meant increased dependence on copper exports to provide foreign exchange with which to import machinery

and equipment, raw materials, and other goods necessary to supply industry. Here Chile ran into Anaconda and Kennecott's manipulation of the price of copper to the detriment of Chile's foreign exchange and tax revenues. The substantial influx of foreign capital in industry, banking, and services during the 1960s did not ameliorate any of the grave structural problems of the economy. The country suffers from runaway inflation, virtual stagnation of the economy as a whole, real unemployment of up to thirty per cent, and a major crisis of food production. Allende's short-term economic policy has curtailed inflation somewhat, picked up the economy, and reduced unemployment, but the structural sources of these problems remain.

Over the last two decades, U.S. corporations, mainly industrials, have transferred more and more wealth and decision making from underdeveloped countries like Chile to the home offices of the corporations. For every dollar that U.S. corporations invest abroad, three dollars are returned. At the same time, the multinational giants have increased by threefold the value of their assets in underdeveloped countries.

Allende's Popular Unity government is attempting to take control of the main pillars of the Chilean economy from multinational corporations and their local business allies. The foreign-owned copper and nitrate mines have been nationalized, the banking system has been brought under state control, and a number of large foreign and domestic monopolies in the industrial sector are now transformed from private to social property.

This policy of economic nationalism and socialization directly affects the interests of some of the most powerful men in the United States. It is only in this context that one can understand the ITT-CIA conspiracy against Allende, the green light apparently given our Chile ambassador by the Nixon Administration "to do all possible short of a Dominican Republic-type operation" to impede Allende's assumption of power, and the subsequent range of economic sanctions that have been employed against Chile.

What emerges is a picture of a series of corporate interest groups—Rockefellers, First National City, Morgans, Mellons, and others—which form a web of corporate power brought together by common interests, complementary activities in the international sphere, and interlocking directorates. "Independent" corporations like ITT (as well as Dow Chemical, GE, Caterpillar Tractor, CPC International, Firestone, and others operating in Chile), which are not within the sphere of control of one of these groups, nevertheless have high-level personnel in close interrelationship with one or more of the established corporate interest groups and other "independent" multinationals.

We cite the apparent existence of distinct "corporate interest groups" and "independent" multinationals because there seem to be some important differences among them in relation to modes of foreign expansion and to ways in which they seek to utilize U.S. Government power to further corporate ends abroad. The

crude conspiracies of the independent ITT with the CIA, for example, are phenomena qualitatively distinct from the institutionalized influence of the Rockefeller interests over all aspects of U.S. foreign relations.

The Rockefellers are more influential in shaping U.S. foreign policy than any other corporate interest group, the CIA, or the State Department. They manage this through a high degree of influence over the Council on Foreign Relations and other policy-oriented, corporate elite-dominated organizations. Chase Manhattan Bank president David Rockefeller is chairman of the CFR, and other family and close business associates are key members. The Rockefellers also frequently participate in Presidential Task Forces and Missions such as the recent Task Force on International Development which recommended that the U.S. foreign aid program be made multilateral.

The policy which the U.S. Government will follow toward Chile in the future, as in other situations where the corporate empire is threatened, will depend essentially upon the constraints built into the situation and upon what the different interests and tendencies among the corporate elite resolve. The Chilean case has been extensively discussed within the Rockefeller-dominated Council on Foreign Relations, and the minutes of last year's secret CFR meetings reveal a certain perplexity and tactical disagreement. A few, Rodman C. Rockefeller of IBEC, for example, seem to favor accommodation if possible. Others, like ITT, favor an even harder line than the Nixon Administration has so far followed. What is certain is that some form of U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Chile and other Third World nations will continue to prevail as long as the private interests of the ITTs, Rockefellers, and Morgans abroad are defined as the national interest of the United States.

It is against this background that we heartily concur in the decision of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to conduct a major investigation into the influence of multinational corporations like ITT on U.S. foreign policy. While the Committee's inquiry will range over the influence of the giant conglomerates on the political affairs of foreign nations, it is clear from statements by Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright and Senator Frank Church, Idaho Democrat, who proposed the inquiry, that the investigation will range far more widely by exploring the economic impact of the corporations on foreign countries as well as their influence in the making of American foreign policy. At stake will be the soundness of the widely huckstered notion that U.S. investments abroad were "a good thing, not only for the United States, but for other countries." Thus, while the Committee's inquiry was triggered by the Anderson disclosures of ITT activities in Chile, the study will be a much broader examination to determine the extent to which our policymakers have equated corporate profits and conglomerate power with the public interest of both client countries and our own nation.

26 MAY 1972

3 Marines Sentenced in CIA Entry

By THOMAS LOVE
Star Staff Writer

Three young Marines stationed in Arlington will have to be a little more careful in the future what they do for excitement while they are drinking. If they aren't, they could end up in jail.

The three were arrested early the morning of May 6 after they entered the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency complex in McLean by climbing over two fences — one 8 feet high and topped with barbed wire.

In court yesterday on charges of trespassing, Charles Stephen Huff, 24, told Fairfax County Court Judge J. Mason Grove that he and his two companions meant no harm but were just "intrigued by the glamor" of breaking into the CIA grounds.

Larry Peter Kreps, 21, testified that the three had been drinking and had "no destructive intent." Perry Wayne Weatherly, 22, said they left the house where they had been drinking while watching a basketball game on television and drove down the George Washington Memorial Parkway.

WHEN THEY SAW the fences surrounding the CIA grounds, they climbed over them in the name of "adventure," he said. He insisted that they had had no intent to destroy anything.

Grove took a dim view of the whole affair, telling the Marines that their escapade was "not a Halloween prank" but "serious and in bad judgment."

After telling them "this is what happens when you start drinking," he fined them \$100 each and sentenced them to 10 days but suspended the jail term as long as they stayed on good behavior.

The three were found on the CIA grounds between 2 and 3 a.m. near a large electric transformer which not only serves the spy installation but much of McLean as well.

SECURITY GUARDS had seen the Marine's car parked near the installation and called on Fairfax County police to help search the grounds. The Marines were arrested about 45 minutes later.

In a letter to the chairman of the county supervisors, CIA Director Richard Helms thanked the police for their assistance and said "although the case is still under investigation, a review of the facts available to us does not rule out the possibility of sabotage."

25 MAY 1972

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Texts of the U.S.-Soviet Agreements on Cooperation in Space Exploration and in Science and Technology

Following are the texts of the United States - Soviet agreements on cooperation in space exploration, as distributed by The Associated Press and on cooperation in science and technology, as distributed by Reuters:

On Space Exploration

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Considering the role which the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. play in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Striving for a further expansion of cooperation between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Noting the positive cooperation which the parties have already experienced in this area,

Desiring to make the results of scientific research gained from exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes available for the benefit of the peoples of the two countries and of all peoples of the world,

Taking into consideration the provisions of the treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, as well as the agreement on the rescue of astronauts and the return of objects launched into outer space.

In accordance with the agreement between the United States of America and the Soviet Socialist Republics on exchanges and cooperation in scientific, technical, educational, cultural, and other fields, signed April 11, 1972, and in order to develop further the principles of mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The parties will develop cooperation in the fields of space meteorology, study of the natural environment, exploration of near earth space,

the moon and the planets, and space biology and medicine, and, in particular, will cooperate to take all appropriate measures to encourage and achieve the fulfillment of the summary of results of discussion on space cooperation between the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. dated Jan. 21, 1971.

ARTICLE 2

The parties will carry out such cooperation by means of mutual exchanges of scientific information and delegations, through meetings of scientists and specialists of both countries, and also in such other ways as may be mutually agreed. Joint working groups may be created for the development and implementation of appropriate programs of cooperation.

ARTICLE 3

The parties have agreed to carry out projects for developing compatible rendezvous and docking systems of United States and Soviet manned spacecraft and stations in order to enhance the safety of manned flights in space and to provide the opportunity for conducting joint scientific experiments in the future. It is planned that the first experimental flight to test these systems be conducted during 1975, envisaging the docking of a United States Apollo-type spacecraft and a Soviet Soyuz-type spacecraft with visits of astronauts in each other's spacecraft.

The implementation of these projects will be carried out on the basis of principles and procedures which will be developed in accordance with the summary of results of the meeting between representatives of the U. S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences on the question of developing compatible systems for rendezvous and docking of manned spacecraft and space stations of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. dated April 6, 1972

ARTICLE 4

The parties will encourage international efforts to resolve problems of international law in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes with the aim of strengthening the legal order in space and further developing international space law and will cooperate in this field.

ARTICLE 5

The parties may by mutual agreement determine other areas of cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE 6

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for five years. It may be modified or extended by mutual agreement of the parties.

On Technology

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Recognizing that benefits can accrue to both countries from the development of cooperation in the fields of science and technology,

Wishing to assist in establishing closer and more regular cooperation between scientific and technical organizations of both countries,

Taking into consideration that such cooperation will serve to strengthen friendly relations between both countries,

In accordance with the agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on exchanges and cooperation in scientific, technical, educational, cultural, and other fields, signed April 11, 1972, and in order to develop further the mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Both parties pledged themselves to assist and develop scientific and technical cooperation between both countries.

tries on the basis of mutual benefit, equality and reciprocity.

ARTICLE II

The main objective of this cooperation is to provide broad opportunities for both parties to combine the efforts of their scientists and specialists in working on major problems, whose solution will promote the progress of science and technology for the benefit of both countries and of mankind.

ARTICLE III

The forms of cooperation in science and technology may include the following:

A. Exchange of scientists and specialists.

B. Exchange of scientific and technical information and documentation.

C. Joint development and implementation of programs and projects in the fields of basic and applied sciences.

D. Joint research, development and testing, and exchange of research results and experience between scientific research institutions and organizations.

E. Organization of joint courses, conferences and symposia:

F. Rendering of help, as appropriate, on both sides in establishing contacts and arrangements between United States firms and Soviet enterprises where a mutual interest develops; and

G. Other forms of scientific and technical cooperation as may be mutually agreed.

ARTICLE IV

1. Pursuant to the aims of this agreement, both parties will, as appropriate, encourage and facilitate the establishment and development of direct contacts and cooperation between agencies, organizations and firms of both countries and the conclusion as appropriate, of implementing agreements for particular cooperative activities engaged in under the agreement.

2. Such agreements between agencies, organizations and enterprises will be concluded in accordance with the laws of both countries.

Continued

Such agreements may cover the subjects of cooperation, organizations engaged in the implementation of projects and programs, the procedures which should be followed, and any other appropriate details.

ARTICLE V

Unless otherwise provided in an implementing agreement, each party or participating agency, organization or enterprise shall bear the costs of its participation and that of its personnel in cooperative activities engaged in under this agreement, in accordance with existing laws in both countries.

ARTICLE VI

Nothing in this agreement shall be interpreted to prejudice other agreements in the fields of science and technology concluded between the parties.

ARTICLE VII

1. For the implementation of this agreement there shall be established a U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint commission on scientific and technical cooperation. Meetings will be convened not less than once a year in Washington and Moscow, alternatively.

2. The commission shall consider proposals for the development of cooperation in specific areas, prepare suggestions and recommendations, as appropriate, for the two parties, develop and approve measures and programs for implementation of this agreement, designate, as appropriate, the agencies, organizations or enterprises responsible for carrying out cooperative activities, and seek to assure their proper implementation.

3. The executive agent, which will be responsible for assuring the carrying out on its side of the agreement, shall be, for the United States of America, the Office of Science and Technology in the Executive Office of the President, and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the State Committee of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers for Science and Technology. The joint commission will consist of United States and Soviet delegations established on an equal basis of which the chairmen and members are to be designated by the respective executive agents with approval by the respective parties. Regulations regarding the operation of the commission shall be agreed by the chairmen.

4. To carry out its functions the commission may create temporary or permanent joint subcommittees, councils or working groups.

During the period between meetings of the commission additions or amendments may be made to already approved cooperative activities, as may be mutually agreed.

ARTICLE VIII

1. This agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for five years. It may be modified or extended by mutual agreement of the parties.

2. The termination of this agreement shall not affect the validity of agreements made hereunder between agencies, organizations and enterprises of both countries.

Done at Moscow this 24th day of May, 1972, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both equally authentic.

Zigzag, the master spy

The Counterfeit Spy, by Sefton Delmer. New York and London: Harper & Row. \$6.95.

The Game of the Foxes: The Untold Story of German Espionage in the United States and Great Britain, by Ladislav Farago. New York: David McKay. \$11.95.

The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945, by J. C. Masterman. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. \$6.95.

By Pamela Marsh

Secrets, even Top Secrets, are out of date. All must be told, all revealed. Spies whose working lives were spent skulking in dark corners, their double-edged daggers concealed under turn-cloaks, are in as bright a spotlight as the literary world can bestow. "The Game of the Foxes" has headed the best-seller list for months, "The Double-Cross System" has only just been edged off.

The idea of spying for both sides at once can't be new. But in wartime Britain it reached a fine art. The Germans sent over their agents, the British picked them up with great dexterity and "turned them around." From then on they lived like Nazi spies, filed reports like Nazi spies, but were employed by British intelligence.

The reports they sent were masterpieces of deception, giving only those details a genuine spy could have ferreted out. Some of the items were accurate, even damaging to their new masters — the Germans had to be strung along. But also included were snippets of completely false information. When the Germans jigsawed them together — a fact from this agent, a rumor from another — they had a hint of a complete, but false, plan of operation on their hands.

The double-cross game

Thus they were hoodwinked into expecting the allies to land in the Calais area and were tricked into "correcting" the range of their rockets so that the V-1's started falling short of London.

Ladislav Farago tells what happened when the Germans insisted that agent Zigzag blow up the de Havilland plant. Zigzag had to act as a genuine saboteur, steal his own explosive, make his own way to the plant. Then it was up to Major Jasper Maskelyne, an ex-

stage magician who bamboozled the enemy more than once. The whole of the powerhouse was concealed under a canvas painted so convincingly with bomb-damage that it fooled the German reconnaissance planes that flew over to check Zigzag's mission.

In "The Counterfeit Spy," Sefton Delmer concentrated almost entirely on one man, "Cato" (Garbo in the Masterman book), an extraordinarily courageous, self-appointed double agent, whose career had elements of the bizarre.

He wanted to spy for the British. But the British wouldn't let him. They thought it was an odd thing for him to want to do. So he offered his services to the Germans. Then, without leaving Spain, he convinced them he was reporting out of Liverpool, quoting those typical British dockers swigging their wine in the local bodegas. Even his geography was wrong, his grasp on the local currency frail. But the Germans believed him. They took off after an nonexistent convoy. Then it was that the British agreed to take Cato on.

Tough, brilliant hoaxes


Double-crossing is only part of Mr. Farago's best-selling "The Game of the Foxes." He has packed it with details on the whole of World War II espionage, down, it seems, to the very smallest spy. Like Mr. Delmer he works hard to keep his style popular, to jazz it up with quoted conversations and local color.

But to my mind Sir John Masterman's brief "The Double-Cross System" is far more dramatic. It must be one of the very few university press books to find its way onto the best-seller list. Now it is about to appear in paperback form.

Actually it is Sir John's official report written in 1945 when his own wartime role in the double-cross system came to an end. His deliberate understatement and quiet humor call to mind every British master spy known in fiction. But his book also speaks eloquently for the dedication and zest of all those real-life gifted young amateurs who pulled off a tough, brilliant intellectual hoax on the Germans.

Pamela Marsh is the Monitor's Book Editor.

American Intelligence: The CIA Presence on Campus



By VICTOR ZONANA
and PHILIP COHEN

Although most people are aware that the United States Armed Forces recruit personnel at the College, it would probably come as a surprise to most to learn that another government agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, quietly but actively recruits on the campus as well.

Some aspects of CIA activity are:

1) One member of the Class of 1971 was introduced to the CIA by a faculty member and is presently employed by that agency.

2) At least three members of the faculty and one member of the Board of Trustees have at one time worked for the CIA. Several other faculty members were employed by CIA "front" organizations.

3) The agency worked through a "contact" at the College, a faculty member, until 1967.

4) The CIA has on several occasions approached faculty members going abroad, and asked them to obtain information while travelling overseas.

5) A significant number of Dartmouth alumni are presently employed by the CIA.

Benjamin Bates '71

It was learned recently that a senior at the College last year, Benjamin Bates, is presently employed by the CIA.

min Bates '71 is presently working for the CIA at the agency headquarters in Langley, Virginia, doing economic research on Latin America. Contacted in Washington last week, Bates confirmed this report, saying that he'd been "working with the agency since September." He termed the job "reasonably interesting, but not fascinating."

Bates, an economics major while at the College, reported that Professor Colin Campbell of the Economics Department introduced him to a CIA recruiter last winter. After a preliminary meeting with the recruiter (a Dartmouth alumnus) at the Hanover Inn, Bates said he was flown to Washington at government expense for interviews and testing.

Bates called his four day stay in the nation's capital during spring break "sort of a free vacation." He began working in September after being granted security clearance.

Professor Campbell

Professor of Economics Colin Campbell, who termed himself "an old alumnus of the CIA," agreed with Bates. Campbell worked for the organization as an economic researcher in Current Intelligence during the Korean War, from 1952 through 1954.

According to Bates' description of last year's meeting, Campbell said, "I

still have some friends in the CIA, and they wrote me and mentioned someone would be coming up. They asked me if I knew anyone interested in working for them."

"I knew Ben was looking for a job," Campbell continued, "so I gave them his name." The economics professor observed that Bates was a straight A student in economics, and that "the CIA program in economics is very good."

Campbell indicated that this year, "either they were up here or they sent me a letter, and I gave them a couple of names." He said that this year's students "weren't really interested," and none were hired.

Discussing his own experiences in the Agency's Current Intelligence Division, Campbell stated that he "really didn't like working for them."

"If you didn't know Russian or Chinese, you were considered a second class researcher," he stated. He also reflected that "there were a lot of Dartmouth alumni working in my division: it was sort of an Ivy League club, with most people from Yale, Dartmouth, Harvard or Princeton."

Campbell added that it may have changed since his time, "but there were very many Dartmouth graduates there, and a lot of them were way up there, in pretty important positions."

Other Faculty Members

A colleague of Campbell's Professor of Economics Meredith Clement, also worked for the agency. Clement did economic research for the CIA, from 1954 to 1956, before coming to the College.

Clement said that the CIA regularly approached university professors going overseas on academic matters, as one means of obtaining information on foreign countries. He explained that the process was known in the agency as "briefing and debriefing."

"Being briefed," he elaborated, "is being told what to look for, while being debriefed is being asked what you saw. Clement said he knows of two Dartmouth alumni now working for the CIA.

Assistant Professor of Geography, David Lindgren, was employed by the CIA from 1964 through 1966 before coming to the College. He served as an analyst doing basic geographic research on the Soviet Union.

Continued

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"As far as I can tell, the only recruiting they do is in Fairbanks." "However," he added, "every year the agency mails us a letter about a summer program for geography students interested in interning with the CIA. I believe a few years ago we placed two students who were also in ROTC with the program."

Lindgren mentioned that he "still had a lot of friends down there," and that "I make no secret of my having worked there." He concluded by saying, "My assumption is that since 1968 the CIA doesn't send recruiters around anymore."

Moorman

Harold Moorman, Placement Officer at the College, said he had no knowledge of the recruiter's visit to Hanover last winter. However, he displayed a letter to him from the CIA's Boston office (reproduced on page 3).

In it, recruiter James Gurll wrote, "We are always interested to receive resumes from able seniors and graduate students. Those fields of Economics, Area Studies, Geography, and foreign languages are of most interest."

Although the letterhead does not read "Central Intelligence Agency," a phone call to the number listed on the letterhead confirmed that the list-

ing was in fact the Department of Personnel for the Boston Offices of the agency.

"I don't think they've had a recruiter on campus since 1968, when I started working in this office," said Moorman. He added, however, that the agency has "kept in touch."

Asked what he would think if a recruiter bypassed his office and went directly to a faculty member, Moorman replied, "It would be unusual and unethical." Told of the CIA recruiter's visit last winter to Professor Campbell, Moorman said, "I think the CIA was wrong. I don't think any organization should do that. That's going outside the proper channels — They should work through my office."

Huke

Another faculty member, Geography-Chairman Robert Huke explained that rumors of his involvement with the CIA began in 1962, when he defended the U.S. government's role in Vietnam. Since then, he said, "people have 'understood' I worked for the CIA."

"That's an out-and-out god damn lie," he declared. The chairman reported that he once brought legal action against someone who accused him of working for the CIA.

Huke said that his only contact with the CIA came several years ago, when a CIA agent names Jaynes questioned him upon his return from a trip to Burma. Huke said he described his experiences on the Chinese border to the agent, spending ten hours with him. He received no remuneration for this.

A short time after he was debriefed, Huke received a letter and asked if I'd work for the CIA." He reported that he spurned the offer.

During the summers of 1958 and 1959, Huke served as a consultant to the State Department's Special Operations Research Office in Psychological Warfare. He said this work was not related to the CIA.

Faculty "Contact"

Huke reported that he was introduced to the CIA's Jaynes for debriefing by Professor of Government Arthur Wilson. Wilson, who retired in

1967 and is now professor emeritus, has been described by many sources as the CIA's "contact" on campus until 1967.

"I'm not sure," Huke explained, "but I think the College had agreed to let him act as a contact person for the CIA on campus." He said it was Wilson who introduced him to CIA agent Jaynes at a cocktail party at Wilson's home in Norwich.

President John G. Kemeny said last week that he had no knowledge of any CIA activity on campus. "The CIA has never contacted my office," he said.

Telephone: 817-823-8328

JAMES W. GURLL
P.O. Box 9111
John F. Kennedy Station
Boston, Massachusetts 02114

21 January 1971

Mr. Harold E. Moorman
Placement Officer
Dartmouth College
Hanover, New Hampshire

Dear Hal:

I was sorry to hear of Don's death. Having missed seeing it in the papers, I was told by Mantle Copeland by phone the day of the funeral.

Our need for new personnel continues to be light, but we are always interested to receive resumes from able seniors and graduate school students. Those in the fields of Economics, Area Studies, Geography, and foreign languages are of most interest.

The following languages especially—Albanian, Arabic, Cambodian, Chinese, French, German, Hungarian, Italian, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Vietnamese, Polish, Japanese. It is hoped applicants will have native or high proficiency, preferably in combination with other languages.

I have one or two of your people applying for the summer program. Also I am hoping to get up there to talk with a few others. If you have any in mind, have them send resumes to me.

Many thanks for your help.

Cordially,

Jim

Letter to College Placement Officer Harold Moorman from CIA Recruiter James Gurll.

ington, the Trustee reflected, "It was a long time ago."
 Braden professed having no knowledge of the present CIA situation at Dartmouth, replying, "I just don't know" to most questions put to him. Asked whether he was still associated with the agency, Braden replied, "No, I'm not — But I wouldn't tell you even if I were."

The columnist referred to an article he had written for the now-defunct Saturday Evening Post. In it, Braden described his role in the decision making process on the now famous CIA program of secret subsidies.

(In 1967, it was disclosed that the agency was subsidizing American and foreign organizations, including academic, labor, church, legal and literary groups, at the rate of millions of dollars per year.)

Braden defended these subsidies as necessary weapons in the Cold War. He described one instance in which he personally handed the late President of the United Auto Workers Union, Walter Reuther, \$50,000 of CIA money ("in \$50 bills"), money that was to be used for anti-Communist purposes. According to Braden, Reuther's brother, Victor, "sent the money, mostly in West Germany, to bolster the (anti-Communist) unions there."

Washington Spokesman


Contacted in Washington last week, a spokesman for the CIA said the agency does not have any faculty contacts at Dartmouth.

"We do our recruiting through the Boston Office and through the individual college's placement office," he asserted. The official, who asked that his name be withheld ("That's the way we do things here," he explained), said the visit to Campbell last year "was not part of the regular agency recruitment program."

"These visits are made to keep in touch with the economics community," he explained. "The visitors usually leave referral forms for students interested in employment." The official added that similar visits are made to geography and political science departments at colleges and universities around the nation.

The spokesman said he did not know how many Dartmouth alumni were employed by the agency. "We do, of course, have Dartmouth men working here. However," he continued, "we don't know how many because we don't break our records down by school."

"I'm sure there must be a lot of Dartmouth people here, though," he added. "We always look for good people."



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

It is the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States to collect, digest, collate, and interpret the vast amount of intelligence information from all over the world which senior officials of the Government must have in order to make the decisions required of them in maintaining our national security.

EMPLOYMENT FIELDS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO CIA

Some Typical Duties

Chemistry	Research, design, and development of technical devices, equipment, and systems in support of intelligence, or analysis and evaluation of the performance capabilities of foreign devices, equipment, and systems.
Engineering (EE, ME, AE)	
Physics	
Mathematics	Computer application in support of scientific and technical intelligence, or mathematical application to photogrammetry.
Computer Programming	
Systems Analysis	
Cartography	Research and analysis of the physical and cultural aspects of foreign areas, or research and compilation of data leading to the preparation of special subject maps; analysis and interpretation of photography of intelligence value.
Geography	
Geology	
Economics	Collection, research, and measurement of aggregative economic performance, or sector performance, of foreign economies.
Economic Geography	
International Trade	
Accounting	Administrative management and support of world-wide intelligence activities.
Business Administration	
Public Administration	
Library Science	Reference, acquisition, cataloging; maintenance of a vast collection of foreign and domestic publications and documents in support of intelligence research.
English	
Foreign Area Studies	Collection, evaluation, research, and analysis of the political, historical, and social dynamics of all foreign countries and areas of the world.
History	
International Relations	
Journalism	
Law	
Political Science	
Psychology (PhD)	Psychological support and research; advisory and consultative services in the selection and utilization of professional personnel.
Stenographer/Typist	Responsible secretarial, clerical and semi-administrative positions in support of the foreign intelligence effort.
Communications	Recently qualified CW Radio Operators, Cryptographers, and Electronic Technicians to provide communications support of world-wide intelligence activities.
Electronics	

NOTE: This list is by no means all-inclusive. Further, as personnel requirements are filed or modified, the Agency's recruitment emphasis upon one discipline or another, or upon certain combinations of disciplines, may vary.

All positions are in the Washington, D. C. area; some require foreign travel.

U.S. Citizenship is Required

Because of the nature of its responsibilities, the Central Intelligence Agency must make a very thorough investigation of the character and qualifications of each applicant who is tentatively selected for employment. You are therefore urged to apply well ahead of the date when you would like to enter on duty with the Agency.

HOW TO APPLY: Complete the attached personal resume, fold, seal with staples or tape, and mail.

CIA circular listing desired fields.

Ex-CIA Agent's Status In Action Is at Issue

United Press International

The revelation that an ex-CIA agent is on the payroll of Action, the government agency which includes the Peace Corps, was deleted from a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report after a personal plea by Action Director Joseph H. Blatchford, it was learned today.

The former agent, Eric H. Biddle Jr., since has been detailed away from Action because such employment would be contrary to the agency's stated policies.

Biddle, who served with the CIA in Greece, Germany, and Washington during the 1950s, currently works in the Office of Economic Opportunity. He continues to be paid through Action.

Blatchford's sensitivity to the CIA issue came to light following questioning by Sen. Claiborne Pell, D-R.I., during an April 7 Foreign Relations Committee hearing on fiscal 1973 authorizations for the Peace Corps.

Written Answers

Pell, though not present, submitted six questions for Blatchford to answer. Included was the question: "Are there any former employees of the CIA or other intelligence agencies now on the payroll of Action, regardless of whether they are now performing duties for Action?"

A week later Blatchford sent written answers to all six questions to Pell, with a handwritten postscript at the bottom of the cover letter.

"I have an understanding with your staff that these questions and answers are for your personal use and will not be put into the record. We appreciate your sensitivity to this issue."

Pell's staff, however, rejected the postscript and demand-

ed a new cover letter without the agreement. This was done.

Nevertheless, when Pell turned over the questions and answers to the committee for publication in the report of the hearing, the two questions involving Biddle's employment were deleted.

Questions Deleted

Thomas Hughes, Pell's press secretary, said yesterday the senator decided to eliminate the material from the public record because it "could very well be very damaging and embarrassing to the Peace Corps."

Hughes and William Young, the senator's administrative assistant, said Biddle had some control over Peace Corps functions during the brief period he actually was working in Action, but an Action spokesman denied it.

Paul Costello, an Action press official, said Biddle was detailed out of Action two weeks after the merger of several agencies in July.

WHERE'S CIA FUNDS?

Full Appeals Court To Hear City Man's Case

By TOM WERTZ
Tribune-Review Staff Writer

A Greensburg man's challenge of the federal government's right to keep a cloak of secrecy over the amount of tax money spent by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been ordered for review and disposition by the full membership of the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

In an order handed down by Chief Justice Collin J. Seitz, the federal suit by William B. Richardson was taken out of the jurisdiction of a three-judge panel and placed in the hands of eight third circuit appeals judges and a federal district judge who first ruled against Richardson in the case.

Judge Seitz' order calls for immediate review and disposition of the case by the appeals court en banc without the submission of additional legal briefs by either the federal government or Richardson.

Warrants Review

The procedural order, according to one spokesman close to the appeals court, does not preclude a ruling one way or the other. However, it does suggest, the spokesman said, that the case is regarded to have such magnitude that it warrants review by the entire court before a decision can be handed down.

Often, the spokesman said, cases are brought up to the court en banc when it appears likely that a lower court is to be overturned or in instances where most recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions directly affect the case before the appeals court.

The spokesman could not speculate on



Richardson

what prompted a full court review on Richardson's case.

Richardson, a staff investigator for the Westmoreland County Public Defender's office and a student of Constitutional law, filed suit against the government about a year ago. He claims that the absence of a public accounting of CIA expenses violates specific sections of the U.S. Constitution.

Account For It

The federal government admits hiding the CIA funds but says it has the specific authority under an act of the U.S. Congress. The CIA money is hidden among possibly thousands of other budgetary categories which could range from research on beans to public relations.

The result is, Richardson says, that the American people and the Congress receive a fabricated report on how their money is being spent on any number of governmental service categories.

Queens memos say RU aided CIA, helped Defense Dept.

Confidential correspondence, apparently taken from files in Old Queens, indicate that the University cooperated with the Central Intelligence Agency for at least 15 years until University President Edward Bloustein put an end to it last October, and engaged in contracts with the defense department.

In addition, other documents indicated that the University administration wanted to suppress publicity of a Gay Cultural Exposition earlier this month, planned to lie if necessary to keep students from interfering with noise tests concerning Route 18, and regularly had, the public relations department collect "intelligence" on the University community.

Some of the memorandums were read to the Board of Governors at its meeting Friday. Bloustein denounced the invasion of privacy, saying that members of the administration had a right to expect confidential correspondence be kept private. He said later that the documents appeared to be authentic.

Came from Old Queens

Student leaders said the documents, which they said they themselves did not take, were procured from Old Queens late Tuesday night when the building was occupied by anti-war demonstrators. Most of them came from the files of the Public Relations department on the third floor.

A memo dated October 7, 1971, from John McDonald, associate director of public relations, to Bloustein explained that the University "for many years cooperated with the New York office of the Central Intelligence Agency by inquiring of certain faculty members, upon CIA request, whether they would be willing to be interviewed by the CIA representative who has Rutgers University as one of several assignments." The memo indicated that the cooperation went back at least 15 years.

According to the memo, the degree of cooperation was limited to only asking faculty members whether they would consent to be interviewed by a representative of a government agency.

Bloustein stops CIA contact

A notation of the memo from Bloustein says he saw no reason to cooperate with the CIA and ordered the practice stopped.

Another document obtained was a list of research and training contracts and grants. Included were expenditures for a "Herbicide Research Fund" for the

last half of 1969, as well as 14 current projects for the Department of Defense totaling \$599,773.

Bloustein said that presently there is no war-related or secret research going on in the University, and that the list the students had was a matter of public record.

Students contend that items for titanium, which they say is used for weapons, and one for biochemical changes in bird tissue, which they affirm could have implications for biochemical warfare, are definitely war related.

A memo from George Holsten, director of public relations, to Bloustein dated April 19, 1972, said that the University administration "can all hope that the cultural exposition scheduled to be held on campus May 5-7 gets as little publicity attention as possible." The memo said that repercussions from the state, alumni, and state chancellor of higher education Ralph Dungan might result.

Dungan attack

Holsten also wrote that Dungan might use the fact that the Student Government Association allocated \$200 to the Student Homophile League as part of his attack on the student fee structure.

A memo from McDonald to Maurice Ayres, assistant to Bloustein, dated Marh 17, 1972, gave suggestions on "disarming" the Rutgers Student Committee on Route 18 (RSCORE), including inviting them to a student meeting, and having Bloustein, if possible, chair the meeting.

McDonald stressed that students should be told that the noise tests to be taken behind Frelinghuysen could not be affected by having students rev up engines in the parking lot behind the dormitory. "I presume this is so," McDonald wrote, "and even if it is not, we might say that it is while detailing the technical aspects of the project."

A last memo, obtained by the *Targum*, and dated February 22, 1972, is from Holsten to Bloustein. "Not much to report in the way of upcoming problems but here are a few bits of intelligence which may be helpful," the memo started, indicating that the public relations department regularly reported on events to Bloustein.

Among other items, Holsten gave Bloustein brief sketches on Dean Parancas, editor-in-chief of *Targum*, and William Barrett, managing editor, both of whom were newly elected at the time.

Candidate Critical Of Nixon Policy

Jed Reveals His CIA Past

By STEVE DIMICK

Of The Journal Staff

U. S. senatorial hopeful Jed Johnson spent more than two years as an undercover agent for the Central Intelligence Agency during the early 1960s, he said Friday.

Johnson said he carried on CIA activities in more than a dozen Asian, African and Latin American countries while working for one of the front organizations exposed in the "CIA on campus" scandals in 1967.

The former Sixth District congressman Friday released a copy of a speech he will deliver to the Oklahoma Jaycees convention Saturday, in which he reveals his CIA involvement.

He said a controversial trip to Cuba he made while a student at Oklahoma University which was later thrown back at him during his 1964 congressional race, also was actually a government-sponsored "intelligence-gathering" trip.

In his speech to the Jaycees, Johnson will attack President Nixon's new interdiction policy against North Vietnamese supply routes. He bases his criticism largely on his knowledge of the CIA, which reportedly has claimed that the blockade will not work.

Johnson quotes from the "Kissinger Papers," a secret government study conducted by the CIA and other information gathering groups and made public by columnist Jack Anderson two weeks ago. The study reported the CIA's belief that no amount of interdiction will be successful in stopping the flow of war materiel to North Vietnam.

"I am personally acquainted in some depth with the degree of precision that the CIA operates within its intelligence activities, because I worked under contract as a covert agent for the CIA prior to my election to the Congress," Johnson said.

"At that time, the CIA had extremely detailed information on such things as which hand an obscure African provincial chief would eat with and the vintage of his favorite wines," he said.

"I am convinced after reading the Kissinger Papers that the CIA estimates of our capacity to interdict supplies was done with similar attention to precision and gave absolutely no reason for encouragement that this military action will successfully bring the war to a conclusion."

In an interview with The Oklahoma Journal before his announcement Saturday, Johnson said he worked for the CIA from 1962 to 1964. He said his experience as an agent has caused him to have "complete faith" in the CIA's assessments of the situation in the agency's non-partisan position.

"I know that the CIA is very, very meticulous and careful in its evaluations and is accurate and precise," he said.

"The point is, if the CIA has given such an evaluation (of the Vietnam blockade), I know they've done a thorough assessment of the situation. They're very capable people and are not political; they're very apolitical.

"While I was never involved in CIA operations in Southeast Asia, I know personally that they literally can tell you the minutest details about minor African political figures and I'm sure they have done the same type of investigation in Vietnam," Johnson said.

Johnson said he was not at liberty to disclose his former CIA ties while he was a member of Congress because the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs, the dummy foundation for which he worked, was still in business.

"For me to say anything would have literally endangered the lives of some of our people overseas," he said.

He came back to the U.S. early in 1964, on leave from the Foundation, and then resigned from the organization before he made his successful race for Congress.

Johnson served in Congress from 1964-66. He said the "whistle was blown" on the cover of the dummy foundation in 1967.

"I'm still not sure how much I'm at liberty to tell you," he said.

The former student leader at the University of Oklahoma said he was approached by the CIA (referred to among agents as "the firm") in 1962, a year after his graduation from college.

"They contacted you to see if you were interested and then did a very thorough security clearance," he said. "Later, you were taken to a hotel room where you had to sign an oath saying you would not divulge any secrets or critical information.

"After that, I was what they call 'under contract' to the CIA until I resigned," he said.

"It was fascinating work," he said. "If I hadn't run for Congress, I might have made a career out of the CIA."

Johnson said he actually worked for the U.S. Youth Council, which was funded by the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs, which in turn was funded by the CIA.

His duties, about which he was never too specific, involved basically being a sort of goodwill ambassador-cum-spy.

"I led delegations of young Americans to developing nations and spoke before various legislative assemblies," he said. "We met with leaders of countries, presidents, prime minis-

"Once at an Indian Youth Congress in Tirupathi, India, I debated a couple of older

Communist officials," he said.

"I also did get information on what the political ideology was of up-and-coming political leaders," he said.

Johnson balked at the word "propaganda" when asked whether his job entailed more gathering of information or disseminating propaganda.

"It involved a lot of both," he said. "But we were never told what to say by the CIA. We were never given any orders about what to say in a speech.

"I was simply a youth leader telling them what we believe, why our economic system is the most productive, why our political system is the best."

Johnson's undercover activity began when he was still in college, with a 1959 trip to Cuba which later returned to haunt him during his congressional race in 1964.

"There were charges made during the campaigning that I had taken this trip with other student leaders in defiance of the State Department," he said. "This was untrue. The trip was sponsored by the U.S. government.

"I was asked by people in the State Department to make the trip to get information about what was going on," he said.

At the time the group of young student leaders made the trip, shortly after the Cuban revolution, "we didn't know that things in Cuba would go the way they went," Johnson said.

He said another of his missions was to debate young Communist leaders in Cuba.

However, he was not able to reveal in 1964 that he had known in 1959 that the Cuban trip was a government-sponsored one.

"It was a very interesting experience, but it was frustrating that I couldn't rebut some of the charges made against me," he said.

"As a result of that trip and some other activities I was involved in, I was later asked to become an agent for the CIA."

During his years as an agent, under the code name "Mr. Page" ("I chose that name because I had been a page in the Senate and thought it would be easy to remember,"), he was at liberty to tell only his wife of his activities.

"There were a couple of agents before me who had just disappeared," he said.

Johnson says he still has faith in the persuasive and example type of diplomacy, the former the kind he said is practiced by the CIA.

AID Guise Still Used By CIA, Official Says

Central Intelligence Agency agents still operate in Laos under the guise of American foreign aid officials, according to the head of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) in Laos.

But he said no AID funds are going for military purposes.

Charles A. Mann, AID mission director in Laos since 1968, left for Vientiane yesterday after spending a week here in consultations. He said that AID supports the CIA in Laos "in a cost-sharing arrangement."

He made the remarks in an interview with UPI and Hearst newspaper reporters to be broadcast next Wednesday by

WAMU-FM, the American University station here.

Mann noted that AID administrator John A. Hannah testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee two years ago that since 1962, AID had subsidized CIA activities in Laos and provided a cover for CIA agents there.

After Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), chairman of the Senate's Refugees Subcommittee, protested that AID funds were being misspent, Hannah informed him in a May, 1971, letter that "at the beginning of fiscal year 1972, all of the AID financing with which you have been concerned will be terminated."

CIA Reference Aids Released

In March 1972, the Library of Congress began public dissemination of selected Central Intelligence Agency reference aids through its Document Expediting Project (DOCEX).

DOCEX provides subscribers (university, college, State, and public libraries) with U.S. Government publications not available for purchase either at the Government Printing Office or at the issuing agency. The subscriber selects the publications desired at an annual fee ranging from \$175 to \$525. No back issues are available.

CIA reference aids planned under this service will include:

- Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments
- Directory of Soviet Officials, Vol. I - National Organizations
- Directory of Soviet Officials, Vol. II - RSFSR (Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic)
- Directory of Headquarters Personnel, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Appearances of Soviet Leaders
- Directory of People's Republic of China Officials
- Appearances and Activities of Leading Personalities of the People's Republic of China
- Directory of Albanian Officials
- Directory of Bulgarian Officials
- Directory of Czechoslovak Officials
- Directory of Hungarian Officials
- Directory of Polish Officials
- Directory of Romanian Officials
- Directory of Yugoslav Officials
- Directory of East German Officials
- Directory of Cuban Officials
- Leadership Wall Charts
- Directory of Ukrainian Officials

Inquiries concerning these publications should be addressed to:

Documentation Expediting Project
(DOCEX)
Exchange and Gift Division
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540

ALBANIAN SATIRICAL REVIEW DISCUSSES CIA ACTIVITIES

(Article; Tirana, H osteni, Albanian, 12 April 1972, p 12)

In 1947 Truman created the Central Intelligence Agency to organize modern coups d'etat everywhere in the world, while financing wars and supporting politicians ready to be bought with dollars.

While the FBI follows and shadows US citizens , the CIA goes a little further and makes high international policy, setting ~~up~~ Mobutu up in the Congo, Suharto in Indonesia, and Lon Nol in Cambodia, and sending Green Berets to Vietnam.

Of the 5 billion dollars which the US spends for espionage, the CIA uses one-fifth, a billion dollars a year. The US armed forces have special espionage services and the Atomic Energy Commission is also active in this field. Nevertheless, the CIA, with its 20,000 agents, remains in the forefront. It deserves this honored spot because of the various plots which it continues to execute in Africa, Asia, and South America. The US ambassador to Guatemala, Mr. Peurifoy, who organized the coup d'etat in Guatemala during Eisenhower's presidency, was a trained CIA agent. No clever US ambassador fails to praise the CIA for its special services.

The new CIA building in Virginia, 13 kilometers from Washington, hidden in a park of 304 hectares, was opened in the fall of 1961. The location of the CIA is not a secret but the building is encircled with barbed wire. It cost 46 million dollars and it might have cost even more.

American monopolists are never known to economize when it is a matter of conquering the world.

In the secret archives of the CIA, more than 200,000 newspapers are scanned each month and 5 million words are recorded every day (collected from various radio broadcasts throughout the world). The CIA has many chemical laboratories and an electronic computer, "Walnut", created especially for it.

The CIA was prepared to pay 100,000 dollars to get its hands on a copy of the speech given by Khrushchev at the 20th [CPSU] Congress, but Nikita disseminated it to the world himself, so perhaps the payment was sent to him.

Allen Dulles, the brother of Secretary of State Foster Dulles (sic), headed the CIA from 26 February 1953 to 23 November 1961. Allen often boasted about his ability. (Among other things, he was the inspirer and creator of the famous 300-meter tunnel between West Berlin and East Berlin, for the purpose of listening to secret telephone calls between Moscow and the Karlhorst staff. The tunnel was discovered by chance on 22 April 1956 by a worker).

Kennedy sacrificed Allen Dulles. He replaced him with the Catholic John Cone (sic), an engineer from California, with a large amount of stock in the US merchant marine.

In 1966, Johnson appointed to this important post Helms who once had interviewed Hitler for the newspaper [sic] "United Press". On 5 November 1971, Nixon organized a commission (headed by Kissinger) to oversee all US espionage organs. Helms was appointed to this commission.

The new director of the CIA has not been chosen yet and the CIA is continuing to work normally: it exploits reports from ambassadors, notes from tourists, books, reviews, newspapers, and radio broadcasts. The CIA, also concerned with meteorological studies, predicts how the harvests will be in the world. It carries on biological studies and predicts epidemics (often helping them along by placing microbes in various spots in the world).

In every coup d'etat, (after which the imperialists clap their hands ^{is} in glee), the architect of the most refined plots and intrigues ~~xxx~~ none other than the CIA. No one can deny ~~xx~~ it this distinction. The CIA has been proving that it is worthy of this noble mission for the past 25 years.

The statement that the CIA is the head of the White House is not just idle talk.

BOSTON, MASS.

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CIA Given 'Cover' for Secret Operations

AID Denies Laos Funds Used for War

By JOHN WALLACH

Sunday Advertiser Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials in Laos continue to masquerade as Agency for International Development (AID) employees in prosecuting the "secret war" against the Communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops, Charles Mann, director of the U.S. AID Mission in Laos, disclosed yesterday.

"AID has provided some CIA personnel with cover positions," Mann, director of the U. S., the end of a week of talks here before returning to Vientiane Sunday. "Let me hasten to add, however, that these personnel have absolutely and utterly no policy functions," he said.

"They have no responsibility whatsoever for the direction of AID programs," Mann also denied allegations, included in a report last month by the Senate Refugees subcommittee, that AID funds were still being misused to support training and resettlement of indigenous Meo tribesmen that make up the government armies.

"There are no funds that are appropriated to AID that are being used for military purposes," he said.

★

AID director John Hannah pledged almost exactly a year ago, in a letter to the subcommittee chairman, Sen. Edward Kennedy, that "at the beginning of fiscal year 1972, all of the AID financing with which you have been concerned will be terminated."

A new cost-sharing arrangement was created and the CIA refunded the State Department agency for its medical assistance and other services provided the secret Royal Laotian Army.

Under this arrangement, Kennedy's subcommittee charged, about \$2.5 million, or about half of the \$4.9 congressional appropriation for humanitarian aid in Laos, will be spent this year on financing the war against the Communists.

According to Mann, in addition providing "cover" for CIA agents working out of AID offices, CIA officials are still relying on AID for logistical and medical support.

★

He called the cost-sharing plan a "perfectly logical and sensible arrangement" and said that the charge that AID funds have been used to support CIA activities was "basically wrong."

"We have 200 field dispensaries," Mann explained. "Obviously, if a wounded soldier comes to a dispensary or if a dependent of a soldier or a civilian who might have stepped on a mine or unfortunately just been wounded comes to us, you're not going to ask 'My

dear friend, are you a soldier or are you a dependent of a soldier?' Are you going to tell him that because you stepped on a mine, therefore I cannot treat you and God bless, good luck, go some place else where there is no medical care.

"For the last year, nobody has hidden the presence of the CIA in Laos and the involvement of the irregular troops fighting there," Mann said.

As far back as 1970, Hannah conceded to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that since 1962 his agency had subsidized CIA activities in Laos and provided a front for secret agents, Mann explained.

But the issue, as framed by Kennedy, was the impossibility

of distinguishing between humanitarian and military aid in Laos when both agencies are involved in complementary roles and where soldier tribesmen are almost always accompanied by their families.

Mann also denied that Long Tieng, the base of CIA operations in Laos, had ever been overrun by the North Vietnamese, as reports indicated earlier this year.

Mann said that there had been hard fighting at this southernmost position but "the headquarters of Military Region Two was never abandoned." The AID director praised the government army and said that the holding of Long Tieng was proof of capable performance.



Fulbright probes CIA propaganda arms

By ERIK BERT

Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, asked the Library of Congress last June to furnish the committee with an analysis of the operations of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

The Library of Congress researchers completed their work seven months later, in January. The committee staff informed the researchers about some alleged deficiencies. Nevertheless, the final LC reports were "substantially as the original drafts," Senator Fulbright said.

Following receipt of the reports by the committee, rumors were circulated in Washington charging that Fulbright was suppressing the information or altering its presentation. In response, Fulbright had the reports published in the Congressional Record of March 6, 1972, except for, he said, several hundred additional pages of appendices, which he said are available to the public in the Foreign Relations Committee office, where the original draft reports can also be consulted. As it is, the text of the reports covers more than 80 of the Congress-

sional Record's triple-column pages.

In presenting the documents to the Senate, Fulbright pointed out that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty "still refuse to acknowledge publicly any ties to the U.S. intelligence community." The two enterprises are known to be vehicles for the Central Intelligence Agency.

The issue on which the RFE-RL problem arose was how to switch them from under-the-table financing by the CIA to aboveboard funding by the Congress. The CIA and the Nixon Administration have resisted congressional funding because that could open the doors to congressional inquiry as to how the money was being used, and the CIA wanted none of that.

Fulbright offered a compromise, possibly a tongue-in-cheek resolution of the problem. He told the Senate he was "persuaded that the Radios should be liquidated, unless perhaps our European allies are willing to pick up their fair share of the financial burden." However, in a letter to Sen. Charles Percy, which he inserted in the Congressional Record with the reports, Fulbright noted the "lack of any apparent interest on the part of our Western European allies to help share the financial burden imposed by the Radios."

Fulbright recalled to the Senate that in 1970 the Foreign Rela-

tions Committee had obtained from the Department of State a "brief description of the arrangements and mechanisms used by the executive branch to maintain policy control and direction of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty."

However, the Department of State "insisted" that its information be available only "on a classified basis." Senators who wanted to read it, Fulbright said, would have to betake themselves to the Foreign Relations Committee Capitol office, S-116.

The Library of Congress report on Radio Free Europe was prepared by James R. Price, the LC's analyst in national defense, foreign relations division, and the report on Radio Liberty by Joseph G. Whalen, a 20-year LC employee.

Whalen came to the Library of Congress from the CIA, according to the bibliography accompanying his reports.

"In 1951, he was briefly employed by the Central Intelligence Agency." That's the formal side. It is an open question whether he ever departed from the CIA.

The RFE and RL reports, although formally prepared by the Library of Congress for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, are in fact a CIA presentation. Despite this fact they are quite enlightening.

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Excerpts from Kissinger memo

Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — Following are excerpts from National Security Study Memorandum 1 (NSSM-1), the secret 1969 Vietnam War document prepared at the request of presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger. The excerpts are drawn from the responses of several agencies to questions drafted by Kissinger.

(1) Question (No.12): To what extent could RVNAF (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, South Vietnam) — as it is now — handle the VC (Viet Cong) . . . without U.S. combat support . . . if all NVA (North Vietnamese Army) units were withdrawn?

The JCS (American Joint Chiefs of Staff), CINCPAC (Commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific) and COMUSMACV (U.S. Commander in Vietnam) estimate that it is highly probable that Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), as it exists today, adequately supported by U.S. artillery, engineer, tactical air, helicopter, and naval assets, is capable of handling the Viet Cong.

Without U.S. combat support and when opposing Viet Cong main and local force units, the RVNAF would have to reduce the number of offensive operations and adopt more of a defensive posture. This would result in loss of control by the Government of Vietnam (GVN) over substantial rural areas.

Preconditioned answer

The above response is predicated upon two assumptions: first, there exists an internal environment characterized by a workable economy, a relatively secure civilian populace and a functioning government. Secondly, the North Vietnamese army forces have withdrawn to North Vietnam and terminated external support to Viet Cong forces. Otherwise, if external support from the north were to continue, it is visualized that filler personnel would infiltrate in ever increasing numbers to counter any substantial RVNAF success.

This could result in a prolongation of the conflict unless substantial Free World Military Assistance Force presence were either continued or re-established.

It is highly probable that the RVNAF, as it exists today, adequately supported by U.S. artillery engineer, tactical air, helicopter and naval assets is capable of (1) making substantial progress in the elimination of Viet Cong main and local force units, including those with northern fillers; (2) making sustained progress in a reduction of the Viet Cong threat although elimination would require a prolonged period of time (3) achieving favorable results in a shorter time frame, if northern fillers are withdrawn.

Reduced offense

It is estimated that without U.S. combat support and opposing Viet Cong . . .

of offensive operations and adopt a more defensive posture; (2) consolidate some forces and redeploy them within major populated areas (3) lose control over substantial rural areas (4) retain . . . control over major populated areas.

However, OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) considers that if all northerners withdraw, the Viet Cong effort in the South may collapse, thus such a complete withdrawal may be unlikely. . . .

RVNAF's capability against VC forces with NVA fillers is closely associated with time. . . .

The impact of . . . expansion and modernization is just now being felt. The second phase of the modernization . . . is to develop a balanced force capable of coping with the internal VC threat, but despite acceleration, goals will not be met before the end of FY 72 (July, 1972). . . .

To what extent could the RVNAF — as it is now — also handle a sizable level of NVA forces?

Could not cope

Today's RVNAF, without full support of U.S. combat forces could not cope with a sizable level of NVA forces.

Should the present RVNAF be reinforced with U.S. air and artillery support, their capability of defense would be improved, but not to the extent of being able to cope with the type and complexity of combat imposed by major NVA involvement.

The posture of the present RVNAF would be further strengthened if . . . backed up by major U.S. ground force elements.

The RVNAF, with their present structure and degree of combat readiness, are inadequate to handle a sizable level of North Vietnamese army forces. The RVNAF are simply not capable of attaining the level of self-sufficiency and overwhelming force superiority that would be required to counter combined Viet Cong insurgency and North Vietnamese army main force offensives. Some of the RVNAF would necessarily have to be redeployed to concentrate defenses in and around critical population centers and installations, thus abdicating a greater extent of rural areas to Viet Cong-NVA control.

Gradual improvement

(Top Secret) Although the question does not consider gradual U.S. troop reduction, the most likely and feasible scenario would be RVNAF gradually improving its capabilities and effectiveness. Associated would be a phased reduction of U.S. forces.

continued

(MACV) considers removing one division from South Vietnam during mid-summer 1969. He and U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker discussed this with President Thieu and were met with a favorable response.

In addition, reduction of other U.S. forces should be possible in the near future. The numbers and timing depend upon progress of RVNAF modernization . . . improvements in effectiveness of RVNAF and a drastic reduction in the RVNAF desertion rate.

The JCS, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV consider that by 1972 the planned Phase II RVNAF will be adequate to handle the Viet-Cong insurgency if the Viet Cong are not re-inforced and supported by the North Vietnamese Army. . . .

Reforms needed

Without major reforms within the RVNAF command and selection system however, it is unlikely that the RVNAF as presently organized and led will ever constitute an effective political or military counter to the Viet Cong. Moreover, as the GVN's major presence in the countryside, the RVNAF as presently constituted will only continue to widen the gap . . . between the government and the rural population.

Thus, any program of priority changes must have as its primary purpose the provision of an interval during which maximum pressure can be exerted on the GVN to make the necessary organizational and political changes commensurate with the assumption of a larger role in the political struggle and the war.

(2) Question No. 10a: What differences of opinion exist (between agencies) on RVNAF readiness?

The State Department's reply read:

A recent CIA memorandum concluded that it would be at least two years, and perhaps longer, before the ARVN (Army of South Vietnam) would become an effective fighting force. The estimate of two years depended on achievement of favorable psychological conditions during that time, an achievement considered unlikely.

Not confident

We believe that the CIA estimate is not overly pessimistic. ARVN effectiveness has certainly improved as a result of better training, greater firepower and inspiration provided by the presence of U. S. forces . . . (but) we believe that the more crucial problems — leadership, morale, discipline and training — are long-term and highly complex and we are not confident that significant improvement in all these fields will be accomplished during the next year or so.

(3) Question No. 11: To what extent could RVNAF handle the VC . . . with or without U.S. combat support . . . if all NVA units were withdrawn? The State Department replied:

Assuming all U.S. and NVA forces were withdrawn from South Vietnam, the RVNAF alone should be able to cope with the remaining VC. If NVA personnel remained in VC units as fillers, the relevant balance would be more difficult to assess. Under these circumstances, it would probably be necessary to provide the RVNAF with sufficient U.S. combat support to make up for its deficiencies until the entire modernization and self-sufficiency program was completed.

Dim prospects

(4) The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research added the following remarks to the above answer:

. . . We do not believe that RVNAF will be able to eradicate VC political-military apparatus or to reduce significantly the level of the insurgency. Indeed, these objectives, as well as the resolution of complex and deeply rooted RVNAF deficiencies are realistically possible only in the long-term context.

The presence of substantial numbers of NVA fillers in VC units, in the absence of U.S. support, tend to negate even favorable short-term, not to mention long-term, prospects for the RVNAF.

(5) Following are excerpts from Kissinger's summary of the agencies' responses to his questions:

Vietnam impact on Southeast Asia

THERE CONTINUES to be a sharp debate between and within agencies about the effect of the outcome in Vietnam on other nations. The most recent NIE on this subject (NIE 50-68) tended to downgrade the so-called "domino theory." It states that a settlement which would permit the Communists to take control of the government in South Vietnam, not immediately but within a year or two, would be likely to bring Cambodia and Laos into Hanoi's orbit at a fairly early state, but that that development would not necessarily unhinge the rest of Asia.

The NIE dissenters believe that an unfavorable settlement would stimulate the Communists to become more active elsewhere and that it will be difficult to resist making some accommodation to the pressure than generated. They believe, in contrast to the estimate, these adjustments would be relatively small and insensitive to subsequent U.S. policy.

Both the majority and the dissenters reject the view that an unfavorable settlement in Vietnam will inevitably be followed by Communist takeovers outside Indochina.

Moscow and Peking influence

There is general governmental agreement on this question. Peking opposes negotiations while Moscow prefers an early negotiated settlement on terms as favorable as possible to Hanoi. Neither Peking nor Moscow have exerted heavy pressure on Hanoi and for various reasons they are unlikely to do so, although their military and economic assistance give them important leverage. CIA notes that "in competing for influence Peking and Moscow tend to cancel out each other."

The enemy

(Questions 5-10)

Under current rules of engagement, the enemy's manpower pool and infiltration capabilities can outlast allied attrition efforts indefinitely.

The major issues

If the 1967-1968 pacification rate is sustained, the first interpretation implies that it will take 8.3 years to pacify the 4.15 million contested and VC population of December, 1968; the second view implies pacification success in 13.4 years.

The present situation

No agency clearly forecasts a "victory" over the Communists, and all acknowledge the manifold problems facing the DVN as we withdraw. However, MACV-JCS stress the need for continued U.S. support. OSD and State believe that only a compromise settlement is possible and emphasize GVN self-reliance. CIA states that progress in SVN has been sufficiently slow and fragile that substantial U.S. disengagement in the next few years could jeopardize all recent gains.

Alternative campaign

All agencies agree that Chinese and Soviet aid has provided almost all the war material used by Hanoi. However, OSD-CIA and MACV-JCS disagree over whether the flow of aid could be reduced enough to make a difference in South Vietnam. If all imports by sea were denied and land routes through Laos and Cambodia attacked vigorously, the MACV-JCS find that NVN could not obtain enough war supplies to continue. In total disagreement, OSD and CIA believe that the overland routes from China alone could provide NVN enough material to carry on, even with an unlimited bombing campaign.

M - 536,108
S - 709,123

APR 28 1972

'69 memo told U.S.

By Morton Kondracke
and Thomas B. Ross

Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — President Nixon was warned in a secret 1969 memo that a major withdrawal of U.S. troops would leave the Saigon government vulnerable to political collapse in the countryside in the event of an enemy offensive like the one now being conducted.

The State Department, Central Intelligence Agency and Joint Chiefs of Staff joined in sounding alarms about a too-large or too-sudden pullout of U.S. troops.

The civilian leadership of the Defense Department, on the other hand, called for "de-Americanization of the war" and Saigon's "takeover of its responsibilities."

Mr. Nixon obviously sided with the Pentagon civilians and launched his Vietnamization and withdrawal program. Including the 20,000-man cut he announced Wednesday night, the U.S. troop level will be down to 49,000 by July 1, 500,000 less than when he took office three years ago.

The debate over the relationship between the U.S. military presence and Saigon's political control is contained in National Security

Study Memorandum 1 (NSSM-1), a secret document on the war prepared by national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger in February, 1969.

'Await reciprocal cuts'

Copies of the study have been obtained by The Sun-Times, New York Times, Washington Post and Jack Anderson, the syndicated columnist.

Kissinger asked the various agencies to comment on how the U.S. military effort related to prospects for "either 'victory' or a strong non-Communist political role."

The State Department replied: "Any reduction in the level of our own military effort without a corresponding reduction in presence and activity of North Vietnamese forces may reduce the likelihood that the GVN (the government of South Vietnam) would work toward political mobilization. . . .

"On balance, we conclude that a policy of maintaining the current level of military effort while preparing for possible reciprocal reduction of that level affords the best pros-

pullout risks

pects for increased political mobilization."

The CIA replied: "South Vietnam has shown (political) progress whether measured against 1961 or 1964, but it has been slow, fragile and evolutionary. It is difficult to see how the U.S. can largely disengage over the next few years without jeopardizing this."

The joint chiefs replied: "It is inconceivable that the essential (political) conditions could be realized as a result of an early unilateral reduction of U.S. military effort."

Avoiding perpetual dependence

The civilian office of the secretary of defense replied: "If the GVN does not improve as an effective non-Communist political system, even its military effort is bound to suffer as it has in the past.

"Americanization of the war in Vietnam was made necessary because of near-collapse of the GVN in February, 1965. The U.S. military effort has provided the shield behind which the reconstruction of the GVN has taken place.

"De-Americanization of the war has to go hand-in-hand with the GVN takeover of its responsibilities if it is to survive in its own right and not be perpetually dependent on the United States military presence."

M - 237,967

S - 566,377

APR 26 1972

Secret Viet study for Nixon stirs furor

By S. J. Micciche
Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—President Nixon's war policy in Vietnam might be construed as "malfeasance in office" for ignoring National Security Council (NSC) advice given to him three years ago, Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) declared yesterday.

Thwarted in his effort to make public all of a 500-page NSC memorandum in his possession since last December, Gravel said that from his study of the documents he believes the United States is pursuing an Indochina policy of a "pitiful giant acting petulantly . . . committing murder and genocide."

Gravel's memorandum is a copy of a study made for President Nixon a month after his inauguration in 1969, and contains high-level government opinions on the situation in Indochina at that time and prospects for the future.

Gravel said in effect that the memorandum showed the Nixon policy of Vietnamization would not work without the continued presence of American forces in Vietnam. The document itself contained estimates of the time required for completion of Vietnamization as from 8.3 to 14.4 years, dating from 1969.

Published excerpts regarding the memorandum requested by Mr. Nixon on the day after his inaugural are "very accurate . . . but the only way for objective analysis is to read it all," said Gravel.

The NSC report contains the responses of the State and Defense departments and the Central Intelligence Agency to 28 questions pre-

pared by Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger on the effect of bombing in Vietnam and the overall Indochina policy.

The advice reflected sharp differences between the military and civilian bureaucracy, dividing optimists from pessimists in assessing what

happened in Vietnam up to early 1969 (when the survey was completed).

While some of these differences have become public knowledge—especially with the publication last year of the Pentagon Papers, which carried the war history up to 1968—the newly revealed study reveals how these diverging viewpoints were extended from the Johnson into the Nixon Administration.

Two broad schools of assessments emerged among the policy planners. In the first group, more optimistic and "hawkish," were the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US military command in Vietnam, the commander in chief of Pacific forces and the American Embassy in Vietnam, headed by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker.

Often conflicting with the judgment of those advisers was a second group, composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The first group, the summary of the study says, generally took "a hopeful view of current and future prospects in Vietnam," with State, Defense and the CIA "decidedly more skeptical about the present and pessimistic about the future."

These are some of the major disclosures in the summary:

—"Sound analysis" of the effectiveness of American B52 bomber strikes against enemy forces was rated "impossible" to achieve; but, "the consensus is that some strikes are very effective, some clearly wasted, and a majority with indeterminate outcome." B52s had been used against targets in South Vietnam during the Johnson Administration; they are currently being conducted for the first time against the heartland of North Vietnam, and under a different strategic rationale.

—In early 1969, the optimists concluded that on the basis of programs then in existence, it would take "8.3 years" more to pacify the remaining contested and Viet Cong-controlled population of South Vietnam. The pessimists estimated it would take "13.4 years" more to

achieve that goal.

—In sharp debate over the validity of the "domino theory"—the consequences of a communist takeover in Vietnam—military strategists generally accepted that principle, but most civilian experts concluded that while Cambodia and Laos might be endangered fairly quickly, the loss of Vietnam "would not necessarily unhinge the rest of Asia."

—On Soviet and Chinese military aid to North Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs and the US military command in Saigon said that "if all imports by sea were denied and land routes through Laos and Cambodia attacked vigorously," North Vietnam "could not obtain enough war supplies to continue." But the CIA and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, "in total disagreement," concluded that "overland routes from China alone" could supply North Vietnam with sustaining war material, "even with an unlimited bombing campaign."

President Nixon's subsequent actions in Vietnam have been more in accord with the assessments reached by the pessimists in this study, although his public explanations of his actions have reflected more of what the optimists were claiming in 1969.

In the process, the President has cut US forces in South Vietnam from over a half million at the time he took office to about 80,000 today.

While the National Security Council memorandum discloses sharp disagreements three years ago on the effectiveness of US bombing of North Vietnam, the current battlefield situation in Vietnam is much different from the situation in early 1969 and US airpower is being applied in different ways.

In contrast to the guerrilla attacks or hit-and-run actions by larger units which have dominated the enemy's strategy in the past, the current communist offensive is much more like a conventional battle, with tanks, artillery and massed troops concentrations standing and fighting.

Thus, it is reasoned officially, bombing now is more important.

and potentially more effective — because big, conventional weapons require large quantities of fuel and ammunition to be sustained for more than a few weeks.

However, Gravel stated yesterday that the lengthy document "conclusively demonstrates . . . the President was advised in 1969 that the policy we now employ had not worked in the past and was unlikely to succeed in the future."

By comparing the Kissinger memorandum with Mr. Nixon's policy decisions over the past three years, Gravel said: "We realize that at no time after taking office did Richard Nixon seriously consider getting out of Vietnam or negotiating with the North Vietnamese for an end to the war."

On the basis of his appraisal of the classified "secret" memorandum, Gravel said he "can only conclude that Richard Nixon is today pursuing a reckless, futile and immoral policy which he knows will not work, but which is intended solely to enable him to save face."

Gravel had intended yesterday to insert into the congressional record that portion of some 50 pages of the memorandum dealing with the effectiveness of American bombing in Southeast Asia.

He was blocked by the objection of Sen. Robert P. Griffin (Mich.), Senate Republican whip. Unanimous consent is required for such insertions, without their being read.

"I don't know what the documents involve," said Griffin, "but I think it is unfortunate that the senator from Alaska would take it upon himself to declassify documents."

Gravel considered reading the entire 500 pages into the record, but Griffin advised him that he would immediately call the Senate into executive session to blunt that maneuver.

The Alaska senator said he was stifled "for very partisan reasons" by Griffin.

"I think they (the Senate Republican leadership) have been told by the White House that this is probably the most damaging piece of evidence, information, and facts against Richard Nixon since his taking office. And it shows in my mind — and I think it will be the judgment of the American people to make but I won't use the word — but I think some could construe this as malfeasance in office," Gravel asserted.

Gravel was allowed to place in the Congressional Record a prepared statement which contained excerpts from the memorandum. He intends

to make another effort today to introduce the entire memorandum, and by this avenue, make it fully open to the public.

He declined to divulge how he received the memorandum, other than to say he obtained it several months ago. A staff aide to Gravel reported the senator received it last December and has been studying it.

Gravel's desire to disclose the contents of the NSC study at this time is believed to be rooted to its pertinence to the current escalation of the war and the feeling it would have public impact now.

To a surprising extent, the document portrays the Pentagon's civilian hierarchy within the office of the Secretary of Defense as more cautious and skeptical, in all of the major assessments affecting the future course of the fighting, than the US military command in Saigon or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The document also seems to make clear that it was from Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird's office that the suggestion came, early in 1969, to cut US forces while modernizing those of South Vietnam — a plan which was eventually to be called "Vietnamization" and which provides the backbone of the President's current policy.

On the military situation, the document makes these points: —

—The Pentagon believed that there was "fat" in US force levels that could safely be cut back without affecting combat capabilities. The (MACV) both denied this.

—MACV and the JCS "assign very much greater effectiveness to our past and current Laos and North Vietnam bombing campaigns than do OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) and CIA. The summary also adds the State Department to this list of doubters.

—The same MACV/JCS coalition "believe that a vigorous bombing campaign could choke off enough supplies to Hanoi to make her stop fighting, while OSD and CIA see North Vietnam continuing the struggle even against unlimited bombing."

—While there was agreement that B52 strikes in South Vietnam were very effective against troop concentrations or in close support, the Joint Chiefs estimated 41,000 enemy troops were killed in 1968 by the planes but the Pentagon estimate was about 9000. The Pentagon took a more skeptical view of the B52's effectiveness against infiltration routes and base camps.

—As to destruction of supplies on the trails leading south, the summary disclosed a Pentagon/CIA be-

lieve that while many enemy supplies and trucks were knocked out, the enemy needs were "so small and his supply of war material so large that

the enemy can replace his losses easily . . ."

This kind of assessment, however might be one that is no longer applicable for the type of major offensive now going on.

President Nixon, said Gravel, was aware from the time of his taking office that "bombing supply trails (in Laos) had not succeeded in crippling the enemy's war effort and he was counseled . . . that it would not succeed in the future."

The Alaska senator quoted from the response of the Defense Department in the NSC memorandum to this effect, citing this passage:

"The external supply requirements of the VC/NVA (Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army) forces in South Vietnam are so small relatively to enemy logistic capacity that it is unlikely any air interdiction campaign can reduce it below the required level . . . the enemy can continue to push sufficient supplies in spite of relatively heavy losses inflicted by air attacks."

The State Department, according to Gravel, agreed with this assessment of the bombing effect with this excerpt:

"Our interdiction efforts in Laos do not appear to have weakened in any major way Communist capabilities to wage an aggressive and protracted campaign in South Vietnam as well as to support military operations against RLG (Royal Laotian Government) forces in Laos itself."

An identical belief was expressed by the Central Intelligence Agency, said Gravel, quoting this section:

" . . . Almost four years of air war in North Vietnam have shown — as did the Korean War — that, although air strikes will destroy transport facilities, equipment and supplies, they cannot successfully interdict the flow of supplies."

The CIA, said Gravel, told President Nixon in 1969 that "three years of daily bombing had totally failed to achieve its objective." The senator recited the following CIA response:

"The major effects of the bombing of North Vietnam were extensive damage to the transport network, widespread economic disruption, greatly increased manpower requirements and the problems of maintaining the morale of the people in the face of personal hardships and deprivation.

"Hanoi was able to ly with each of these strains, so that the air war did not seriously affect the flow of men and supplies to Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. Nor did it significantly erode North Vietnam's military defense capability or Hanoi's determination to persist in the war."

President Nivon, said Gravel, is 'now trying to halt the flow of supplies by bombing Haiphong . . . but he was advised (in 1969) that closing the port of Haiphong would not prevent North Vietnam from continuing the war."

From State Department responses in the NSC memorandum, Gravel said "there are at least 14 other ports that could be used to bring supplies into the country." Moreover, the CIA notes that "all of the war essential imports could be brought into North Vietnam over rail lines or roads from China" even if all the seaports were shut down, said Gravel.

—On problems with Saigon's fighting forces, the memorandum discloses that as the United States was evolving a plan to turn over fighting to the South Vietnamese, Saigon's troops in 1969 were deserting at an annual rate of 34 percent of their strength, equal to about one division a month.

Again, it was the Pentagon civilians who emphasized the need not just for better equipment, but for remedies to weakness in leadership and motivation.

There was agreement in early 1969 on one point disclosed by the Joints Chiefs (JCS) and the US Military Command in Vietnam NSC summary; that the South Vietnamese "could not, either now or even when fully modernized, handle both the Viet Cong and a sizeable level of North Vietnamese forces without US combat support in the form of air, helicopters, artillery, logistics and some ground forces."

—The Central Intelligence agency also "disagrees strongly," the report states, with military estimates of what quantity of Communist supplies were coming through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville.

The President, however, apparently agreed more with the military assessment and sent US troops into Cambodia in May, 1970.

Focusing on the progress of "pacification" and the stability of President Thieu's Saigon regime, the memorandum again shows serious differences among the US agencies in their assessments of the situation. As the summary passages on "pacification" put it, the agencies presented "two well-defined views."

diplomatic and military missions in Saigon were optimistic, and their optimism was shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and the Pacific command headquarters in Honolulu. The Central Intelligence Agency and the State and Defense departments were more pessimistic. As the summary stated:

"The gap in views that does exist is largely one between the policy makers, the analysts and the intelligence community on the one hand, and the civilian and military operators on the other."

Both camps agreed on the nature of the obstacles blocking success. They disagreed, however, over the "magnitude of the problem" and the chances of hurling the obstacles.

Accentuating the positive, the US diplomatic and military missions in Saigon were supported by the Joint Chiefs in the view that "at the present time, the security situation is better than at any time" since 1961.

The US military saw a "dramatic change in the security situation," asserting that the South Vietnamese government then controlled three-fourths of the population. The Joint Chiefs forecast that the Saigon regime would control 90 percent of the population in 1969.

According to the summary, the State and defense departments and the CIA offered "more cautious and pessimistic" responses.

The Defense Department estimated that the alignments of the South Vietnamese rural population had not altered since 1962, described as a "discouraging year," with some 5 million loyal to the Saigon regime and nearly 3 million to the Viet Cong. In addition, the Defense Department calculated, at least half the total rural population "is subject to significant Viet Cong presence and influence."

The State Department Office of Intelligence and Research, and the CIA, went even further, arguing that the Viet Cong had "a significant effect on at least two-thirds of the rural population."

One of the major problems in interpreting the Vietnam situation arose from different approaches to the so-called "hamlet evaluation system," which was contrived to measure the progress of pacification.

Using 1967-68 data, the optimists concluded that only 26.7 percent of the South Vietnamese population remained to be "pacified" as of November, 1968. The pessimists placed their estimate of the population still "unpacified" at 41.3 percent.

If the 1967-68 rate of "pacification" were sustained, the optimists predicted, it would take 8.3 years to bring under Saigon's control the 4.15 million South Vietnamese either loyal to the Viet Cong or living in contested regions. The pessimists figured as of December, 1968, that "pacification" would succeed in 13.4 years.

Capsulizing a disagreement that "could hardly be more divergent," the summary said that one set of US agencies perceived a "high probability" of success for the Saigon regime despite its shortcomings and therefore argued for "mere of the same," which meant "gradual US pressure and wholehearted US support."

The State and Defense Departments and the CIA asserted, in contrast, that the Saigon regime "had failed in the countryside," adding, according to the summary, "we may even be overextended in the rural areas and open to a damaging Viet Cong counter-attack."

These agencies recommended that the United States express "considerable displeasure" at the Saigon regime's rural performance. They also suggested that a "greater effort" be made to promote "rural political accommodation" between Saigon's representatives and the Viet Cong at the district and village level.

None of the agencies queried was able to predict a "victory" over the communists, as US spokesmen were doing in 1966 and 1967. But the American military mission in Saigon and the Joint Chiefs in Washington urged "continued US support," while the State and Defense Departments, voicing the view that "only a compromise settlement is possible," stressed the need for "self-reliance" on the part of the Saigon regime.

As for the CIA, the document states that it held that "progress in South Vietnam has been sufficiently slow and fragile that substantial US disengagement in the next few years could jeopardize all recent gains."

Regarding those latter facets of the memorandum, Gravel said the NSC advisers had concluded in 1969 that the "Thieu regime could not survive without an indefinite American military presence in South Vietnam."

President Nixon, charged Gravel, has developed "a policy of reconstituting the war to maintain this required presence, while at the same time pacifying the American people with his rhetoric of 'winding down' the war."

Gravel said he had distributed copies of the memorandum to the Democratic presidential candidates and to "four or five Senate colleagues" who happened to be on the Senate floor yesterday.

The Alaska senator touched off a Senate furor last year with his disclosure of the portions of the Pentagon Papers during a late night sitting of his obscure subcommittee. The incident, followed by Gravel's desire to publish the Pentagon Papers in book form, touched off Justice Department action against Gravel and the case which focuses on the extent of a senator's immunity is now before the Supreme Court.

2-5 APR 1972

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Kissinger's 1969 National Security Study Memo: The Questions

Following is the text of a draft summary of responses to National Security Study Memorandum 1. It was prepared in early 1969 by various government agencies in answer to questions submitted by presidential adviser Henry Kissinger and his staff (guide to abbreviations at end of text):

VIETNAM QUESTIONS

Environment of Negotiations

1. Why is the DRV in Paris?

What is the evidence?

Among the hypotheses:

- a. Out of weakness, to accept a face-saving formula for defeat.
 - b. To negotiate the withdrawal of U.S. (and NVA) forces, and/or a compromise political settlement, giving a chance for NLF victory in the South.
 - c. To give the U.S. a face-saving way to withdraw.
 - d. To undermine the GVN and U.S./GVN relations, and to relieve U.S. military pressure on both North and South Vietnam.
 - e. Out of desire to end the losses and costs of war on the best terms attainable?
2. What is the nature of evidence, and how adequate is it, underlying competing views (as in the most recent NIE on this subject, with its dissenting footnotes) of the impact of various outcomes in Vietnam within Southeast Asia?
 3. How soundly-based is the common belief that Hanoi is under active pressure with respect to the Paris negotiations from Moscow (for) and Peking (against)? Is it clear that either Moscow or Peking believe they have, or are willing to use, significant leverage on Hanoi's policies? What is the nature of evidence, other than public or private official statements?
 4. How sound is our knowledge of the existence and significance of stable "Moscow" and "Peking" factions within the leadership, as distinct, for

example, from shifting factions, all of whom recognize the need to balance off both allies? How much do we know, in general, of intraparty disputes and personalities within Hanoi?

NVA/VC

5. What is the evidence supporting various hypotheses, and the overall adequacy of evidence, relating to the following questions:

a. Why did NVA units leave South Vietnam last summer and fall?

b. Did the predicted "third-wave offensive" by the NVA/VC actually take place? If so, why did it not achieve success?

c. Why are VC guerrillas and local forces now relatively dormant?

(Among the hypotheses: 1) response to VC/NVA battle losses, forcing withdrawal or passivity; 2) to put diplomatic pressure on U.S. to move to substantive talks in Paris; 3) to prepare for future operations; and/or 4) pressure of U.S. and allied operations.)

6. What rate of NVA/VC attrition would outrun their ability to replenish by infiltration and recruitment, as currently calculated? Do present operations achieve this? If not, what force levels and other conditions would be necessary? Is there any evidence they are concerned about continuing heavy losses?

7. To what relative extent do the U.S./RVNAF and the NVA/VC share in the control and the rate of VC/NVA attrition; i.e., to what extent, in terms of our tactical experience, can heavy losses persistently be imposed on VC/NVA forces, despite their possible intention to limit casualties by avoiding contact?

(Among the hypotheses: a. Contact is predominantly at VC tactical initiative, and we cannot reverse this; VC need suffer high casualties only so long as they are willing to accept them, in seeking contact; or

b. Current VC/NVA loss rates can be maintained by present forces—as in-

creased X% by Y additional forces—whatever the DRV/VC choose to do, short of further major withdrawal.)

8. What controversies persist on the estimate of VC Order of Battle; in particular, on the various categories of guerrilla forces and infrastructure? On VC recruiting, and manpower pool? What is the evidence for different estimates, and what is the overall adequacy of evidence?

9. What are NVA/VC capabilities for launching a large-scale offensive, with "dramatic" results (even if taking high casualties and without holding objectives long), in the next six months? (e.g., an offensive against one or more cities, or against most newly "pacified" hamlets.) How adequate is the evidence?

10. What are the main channels for military supplies for the NVA/VC forces in SVN, (e.g., Cambodia and/or the Laotian panhandle)? What portion of these supplies come in through Sihanoukville?

A. What differences of opinion exist concerning extent of RVNAF improvement and what is evidence underlying different views? (e.g., compare recent CIA memo with MACV views.) For example:

a. Which is the level of effective, mobile, offensive operations? What results are they achieving?

b. What is the actual level of "genuine" small-unit action in ARVN, RF and PF? i.e., actions that would typically be classed as such within the U.S. Army, and in particular, offensive ambushes and patrols? How much has this changed?

c. How much has the officer selection and promotion system, and the quality of leadership, actually changed over the years (as distinct from changes in paper "programs")? How many junior officers hold commissions (in particular, battlefield commissions from NCO rank) despite lack of high school diploma?

d. What known disciplinary action has resulted from ARVN looting of civilians in the past year (for example, the widespread looting that took place last spring)?

e. To what extent have past "anti-desertion" decrees and efforts lessened rate of desertion; why has the rate recently been increasing to new highs?

f. What success are the RF and PF having in providing local security and reducing VC control and influence in rural populations?

11. To what extent could RVNAF—as it is now—handle the VC (Main Force, local forces, guerrillas), with or without U.S. combat support to fill RVNAF deficiencies, if all NVA units were withdrawn:

a. If VC still had Northern fillers.

b. If All Northerners (but not regroupes) were withdrawn.

12. To what extent could RVNAF—as it is now—also handle a sizeable level of NVA forces:

a. With U.S. air and artillery support.

b. With above and also U.S. ground forces in reserve.

c. Without U.S. direct support, but with increased RVNAF artillery and air capacity?

13. What, in various views, are the required changes—in RVNAF command, organization, equipment, training and incentives, in political environment, in logistical support, in U.S. modes of influence—for making RVNAF adequate to the tasks cited in questions 9 and 10 above? How long would this take? What are the practical obstacles to these changes, and what new U.S. moves would be needed to overcome these?

PACIFICATION

14. How much, and where, has the security situation and the balance of influence between the VC and NLF actually changed in the countryside over time, contrasting the present to such benchmarks as end-61, end-63, end-65, and-67? What

continued

are the best indicators of such change, or lack of it? What factors have been mainly responsible for such change as has occurred? Why has there not been more?

15. What are the reasons for expecting more change in the countryside in the next two years than in past intervals? What are the reasons for not expecting more? What changes in RVNAF, GVN, U.S., and VC practices and adaptiveness would be needed to increase favorable change in security and control? How likely are such changes, individually and together; what are the obstacles?

16. What proportion of the rural population must be regarded as "subject to significant VC presence and influence"? (How should hamlets rated as "C" in the Hamlet Evaluation System — the largest category — be regarded in this respect?) In particular, what proportion in the provinces surrounding Saigon? How much has this changed?

17. What number or verified numbers of the Communist political apparatus (i.e. People's Revolutionary Party members, the hard-core "infrastructure") have been arrested or killed in the past year? How many of these were cadre or higher than village level? What proportion do these represent of total PRP membership, and how much — and how long — had the apparatus been disrupted?

18. What are the reasons for believing that current and future efforts at "rooting out" hard-core infrastructure will be — or will not be — more successful than past efforts? For example, for believing that collaboration among the numerous Vietnamese intelligence agencies will be markedly more thorough than in the past? What are the side-effects, e.g., on Vietnamese opinion, of anti-infrastructure campaigns such as the current "accelerated effort," along with their lasting effect on hard-core apparatus?

19. How adequate is our information on the overall scale and incidence of damage to civilians by air and artillery, and looting and misbehavior by RVNAF?

20. To what extent do recent changes in command and administration affecting the countryside represent moves to improve competence, as distance from re-

placement of one clique by another? What is the basis of judgment? What is the impact of the recent removal of minority-group province and district officials (Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Montagnard) in their respective areas.

POLITICS

21. How adequate is our information, and what is it based upon, concerning:

a. Attitudes of Vietnamese elites not now closely aligned with the GVN (e.g., religious leaders, professors, youth leaders, professionals, union leaders, village notables) towards: Participation — if offered — in the GVN; the current legitimacy and acceptability of the GVN; like-wise (given "peace") for the NLF or various "neutralist" coalitions; towards U.S. intent, as they interpret it (e.g., U.S. plans for ending the war, perceived U.S. alignments with particular individuals and forces within Vietnam, U.S. concern for various Vietnamese interests).

b. Patterns of existent political alignments within GVN/RVNAF and outside it — reflecting family ties, corruption, officers' class, secret organizations and parties, religious and regional background — as these bear upon behavior with respect to the war, the NLF, reform and broadening of the GVN, and responses to U.S. influence and intervention.

22. What is the evidence on the prospects — and on what changes in conditions and U.S. policies would increase or decrease them — for changes in the GVN towards: (a) broadening of the government to include participation of all significant non-Communist regional and religious groupings (at province and district levels, as well as cabinet); (b) stronger emphasis, in selections and promotion of officers and officials, on competence and performance (as in the Communist Vietnamese system) as distinct from considerations of family, corruption, and social (e.g., educational) background, and support of the GVN, as evidenced, e.g., by reduced desertion, by willing alignment of religious, provincial and other leaders with the GVN, by wide competition and pro-efficiency

drives.

23. How critical, in various views, is each of the changes in question 22 above to prospects of attaining — at current, reduced or increased levels of U.S. military effort — either "victory," or a strong non-Communist political role after a compromise settlement of hostilities? What are, views of the risks attendant to making these changes, or attempting them; and, to the extent that U.S. influence is required, on U.S. practical ability to move prudently and effectively in this direction? What is the evidence?

U.S. OPERATIONS

24. How do military development and tactics today differ from those of 6-12 months ago? What are reasons for changes, and what has this impact been?

25. In what different ways (including innovations in organization) might U.S. force-levels be reduced to various levels, while minimizing impact on combat capability?

26. What is the evidence on the scale of effect of B-52 attacks in producing VC/NVA casualties? In disrupting VC/NVA operations? How valid are estimates of overall effect?

27. What effect is the Laotian interdiction bombing having:

a. In reducing the capacity of the enemy logistic system?

b. In destroying material in transit?

28. With regard to the bombing of North Vietnam:

a. What evidence was there on the significance of the principal strains imposed on the DRV (e.g., in economic disruption, extra manpower demands, transportation blockages, population morale)?

b. What was the level of logistical through-put through the southern province of NVN just prior to the November bombing halt? To what extent did this level reflect the results of the U.S. bombing campaign?

c. To what extent did Chinese and Soviet aid relieve pressure on Hanoi?

d. What are current views on the proportion of war-essential imports that could come into NVN over the border from China, even if all imports by sea were denied and a

strong effort even made to interdict ground transport? What is the evidence?

e. What action has the DRV taken to reduce the vulnerability and importance of Hanoi as a population and economic center (e.g., through population evacuation and economic dispersal)?

SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO NSSM 1

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

The responses to the questions posed regarding Vietnam show agreement on some matters as well as very substantial differences of opinion within the U.S. government on many aspects of the Vietnam situation. While there are some divergencies on the facts, the sharpest differences arise in the interpretation of those facts, the relative weight to be given them, and the implications to be drawn. In addition, there remain certain areas where our information remains inadequate.

There is general agreement, assuming we follow our current strategy, on the following:

(1) The GVN and allied position in Vietnam has been strengthened recently in many respects.

(2) The GVN has improved its political position, but it is not certain that the GVN and other non-Communist groups will be able to survive a peaceful competition with the NLF for political power in South Vietnam.

(3) The RVNAF alone cannot now, or in the foreseeable future, stand up to the current North Vietnamese-Vietcong forces.

(4) The enemy have suffered some reverses but they have not changed their essential objectives and they have sufficient strength to pursue these objectives. We are not attriting his forces faster than he can recruit or infiltrate.

(5) The enemy is not in Paris primarily out of weakness.

The disagreements within these parameters are reflected in two schools in the government with generally consistent membership. The first school, which we will call Group A, usually includes MACV, CINCPAC, ICS and Embassy Saigon, and takes a hopeful view of current and future prospects in Vietnam within the

parameters mentioned. The second school, Group B, usually includes OSD, CIA and (to a lesser extent) State, and is decidedly more skeptical about the present and pessimistic about the future. There are, of course, disagreements within agencies across the board or on specific issues.

As illustration, these schools line up as follows on some of the broader questions.

- In explaining reduced enemy military presence and activities, Group A gives greater relative weight to allied military pressure, than does Group B.

- The improvements in RVNAF are considered much more significant by Group A than Group B.

- Group A underlines advancements in the pacification program, while Group B is skeptical both of the evaluation system used to measure progress and of the solidity of recent advances.

- In looking at the political scene, Group A accents recent improvements while Group B highlights remaining obstacles and the relative strength of the NLF.

- Group A assigns much greater effectiveness to bombing in Vietnam and Laos than Group B.

Following is a summary of the major conclusions and disagreement about each of six broad areas with regard to Vietnam the negotiating environment, enemy capabilities, RVNAF capabilities, pacification, South Vietnamese politics, and U.S. military operations. Attached (at Tabs A-F) are summaries of the individual questions asked of the various agencies.

1. NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENT

(Questions 1-4)

There is general U.S. government agreement that Hanoi is in Paris for a variety of motives but not primarily out of weakness; that Hanoi is charting a course independent of Moscow, which favors negotiations, and of Peking, which opposes them; and that our knowledge of possible political factions among North Vietnamese leaders is extremely imprecise. There continues wide disagreement about the impact on Southeast Asia of various outcomes in Vietnam.

WHY IS THE DRV IN PARIS?

Various possible motives for negotiating are discussed, and there is agreement that the DRV is in Paris for mixed reasons. No U.S. agency responding to the questions believes that the primary reason the DRV is in Paris is weakness. All consider it unlikely that Hanoi came to Paris either to accept a face-saving formula for defeat or to give the U.S. a face-saving way to withdraw. There is agreement that Hanoi has been subject to heavy military pressure and that a desire to end the losses and costs of war was an element in Hanoi's decision. The consensus is that Hanoi believes that it can persist long enough to obtain a relatively favorable negotiated compromise. The respondents agree that the DRV is in Paris to negotiate withdrawal of U.S. forces, to undermine GVN and USG relations and to provide a better chance for FV victory in the South. State believes that increased doubt about winning the war through continued military and international political pressure also played a major role. Hanoi's ultimate goal of a unified Vietnam under its control has not changed.

VIETNAM IMPACT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

There continues to be a sharp debate between and within agencies about the effect of the outcome in Vietnam on other nations. The most recent NIE on this subject (NIE 50-68) tended to downgrade the so-called "domino theory." It states that a settlement which would permit the Communists to take control of the Government in South Vietnam, not immediately but within a year or two, would be likely to bring Cambodia and Laos into Hanoi's orbit at a fairly early state, but that these developments would not necessarily unhinge the rest of Asia.

The NIE dissenters believe that an unfavorable settlement would stimulate the Communists to become more active elsewhere and that it will be difficult to resist making some accommodation to the pressure than generated. They believe, in contrast to the Estimate, these adjustments would be relatively small and insensitive to subsequent U.S. policy.

Factors entering into the judgments are estimates of behavior after the settlement;

(2) U.S. posture in the regions; (3) Asian leaders' estimates of future U.S. policy; (4) the reactions of the area's non-Communist leaders to the outcome in Vietnam; (5) vulnerabilities of the various governments to insurgency or subversion; and (6) the strengths of opposition groups within each state.

The assessments rest more on judgments and assumptions than on tangible and convincing evidence, and there are major disagreements within the same department. Within the Defense Department, OSD and DIA support the conclusions of the NIE, while Army, Navy and Air Force Intelligence dissent. Within State, the Bureau of Intelligence supports the NIE while the East Asian Bureau dissents.

Both the majority and the dissenters reject the view that an unfavorable settlement in Vietnam will inevitably be followed by Communist takeovers outside Indo China.

Indeed, even the dissenters, by phrasing the adverse results in terms such as "pragmatic adjustments" by the Thais and "some means of accommodation" leave it unclear how injurious the adverse effects would be to U.S. security.

MOSCOW AND PEKING INFLUENCE

There is general governmental agreement on this question. Peking opposes negotiations while Moscow prefers an early negotiated settlement on terms as favorable as possible to Hanoi. Neither Peking nor Moscow have exerted heavy pressure on Hanoi and for various reasons they are unlikely to do so, although their military and economic assistance give them important leverage. CIA notes that "in competing for influence Peking and Moscow tend to cancel out each other." For its own reasons Hanoi's tendency in the last year has been in the Soviet direction. However, the Hanoi leadership is charting its own independent course.

HANOI LEADERSHIP FACTIONS

There is agreement that knowledge of the existence and significance of possible factions within the Hanoi leadership is imprecise. There are differences of opinion within the leadership as to the ultimate objectives but there are not stable "Mos-

cow" and "Peking" factions. Leadership will form different alignments on different issues. The attempts by the agencies to ascertain the position of various North Vietnamese leaders on specific issues shows the imprecision of our information and analysis. For example, different agencies set forth sharply conflicting identifications of the position of individual leaders such as Giap on particular questions.

2. THE ENEMY

(Questions 5-10)

Analyses of various enemy tactics and capabilities reveal both significant agreements and sharp controversies within the Government. Among the major points of consensus:

- A combination of military pressures and political tactics explains recent enemy withdrawals and lower levels of activity.

- Under current rules of engagement, the enemy's manpower pool and infiltration capabilities can outlast allied attrition efforts indefinitely.

- The enemy basically controls both sides' casualty rates.

- The enemy can still launch major offensives, although not at Tet levels, or, probably, with equally dramatic effect.

Major controversies include:

- CIA and State assign much higher figures to the VC Order of Battle than MACV, and they include additional categories of VC/NLF organization.

- MACV/JCS and Saigon consider Cambodia (and specifically Sihanoukville) an important enemy supply channel while CIA disages strongly.

RECENT ENEMY ACTIVITIES

Military pressures and political considerations are viewed as responsible for the withdrawal of some North Vietnamese units into Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries during the summer and fall of 1968. Military factors included heavy enemy losses, effective allied tactics, material shortages, and bad weather. Political factors centered on enemy efforts to make a political virtue out of a military necessity in a talk-fight strategy to influence the Paris negotiations, and the enemy's emphasis on the es-

continued

Committees" through South Vietnamese countryside. The enemy undertook a third-wave offensive during the week of August 17. At a cost of 5,500 enemy KIA, the enemy tripled the number of his attacks to 300 per week and his assaults during the second half of August nearly equalled the level of his "second-wave" offensive in May. Prisoners and captured documents reported the goal of achieving a general uprising and overthrow of the GVN. The lack of greater success was attributed to: the enemy's economy-of-forces tactics; his desire to demonstrate initiative but at reduced risk; effective U.S. spoiling actions and increased intelligence; and the continuing deterioration of enemy Post-Tet capabilities in terms of quality of men and officers and lack of training.

All evaluators except the Department of State and Embassy Saigon state that VC guerrillas and local forces are not relatively dormant and that levels of harassment and terror remain high. However, the Embassy notes "the current low level of guerrilla and local forces activity," and State agrees there has been a "relative decline." Both agree that among the reasons are the heavy casualty rates, manpower problems and loss of cadres. But according to Embassy evaluators the main factor is that "The VC are husbanding their resources to give themselves the option of a 'climaxing' offensive." State notes that to support the VC counter-pacification campaign and their "Liberation Committees," "the Communists may feel that a demonstrably strong blow against the pacification program would have wide repercussions particularly at a time of optimistic Allied claims about pacification successes."

NVN/VC MANPOWER

It is generally agreed that the NVN/VC manpower pool is sufficiently large to meet the enemy's replenishment needs over an extended period of time within the framework of current rules of engagement. According to the JCS, "The North Vietnamese and Vietcong have access to sufficient manpower to meet their replenishment needs—even at the high 1968 loss

least the next several years. Present operations are not outrunning the enemy's ability to replenish by recruitment or infiltration." Enemy losses of 291,000 in 1968 were roughly balanced by infiltration and recruitment of 298,000. North Vietnamese manpower assets include 1.8 million physically fit males aged 15 to 34 of whom 45 per cent are in the regular forces (475,000) and paramilitary (400,000) forces. 120,000 physically fit males reach draft age each year and 200,000 military and labor personnel have been freed by the bombing half from defensive work. The potential manpower pool in SVN is estimated at half a million men and recruitment, while down, is running at approximately 3,500 per month. Enemy maintenance of the current commitment of 300,000 new men per year requires that the Allies inflict losses of 25,000 KIA per month, or 7,000 more than the current rate. MACV considers current Allied force levels adequate to inflict such casualties if the enemy chooses to engage.

The enemy's employment of economy of forces tactics since the fall of 1968 and intelligence evidence reflect the enemy's concern about his 1968 level of losses, which if continued another year would mean nearly 100 per cent yearly attrition of his full-time fighters and nearly total North-Vietnamization of local fighting forces in South Vietnam. He is judged unlikely to undertake the heavy losses of a major offensive unless he believes he could thereby achieve a breakthrough in Allied willpower in Vietnam or Paris. Yet, without a VC/NVA offensive on the scale of Tet 1968, the JCS believe "it will be exceedingly difficult in 1969 for allied forces to attrite the enemy at 1968 levels."

CONTROL OF NVA/VC ATTRITION

There is general agreement with the JCS statement: "The enemy, by the type action he adopts, has the predominant share in determining enemy attrition rates." Three-fourths of the battles are at the enemy's choice of time, place, type and duration. CIA notes that less than 1 per cent of nearly two million allied

ducted in the last two years resulted in contact with the enemy and, when ARVN is surveyed, the percentage drops to one-tenth of 1 per cent. With his safe havens in Laos and Cambodia, and with carefully chosen tactics, the enemy has been able during the last four years to double his combat forces, double the level of infiltration and increase the scale and intensity of the main-force war even while bearing heavy casualties.

VC ORDER OF BATTLE

Considerable disagreement is evidenced concerning the estimates of Vietcong order of battle, the categories of guerrilla forces, recruiting manpower pool and quality of the data. MACV includes only enemy personnel engaged in offensive military actions and estimates enemy strength at 327,000. Moreover, CIA and State consider categories of paramilitary and administrative service to be indispensable to the enemy's military effort and population control and extrapolate a total range of 435,000 to 595,000 men. State, noting that the MACV estimate results from adding up so-called "hard" field intelligence figures for main-force, local and guerrilla forces, believes CIA's extrapolation is developed more realistically from the totality of evidence. OSD presents both MACV and CIA estimates, pointing out that the differences in overall strength presented by the two are not sufficient to cause a change in overall strength presented by the two are not sufficient to cause a change in overall strategy (though, as CIA notes, they could have a bearing on peace terms).

Recruiting figures vary for reasons similar to the divergencies on strength. Monthly VC recruitment is estimated at 8,500 in 1966, 7,500 in 1967, double the 1967 rate during the first quarter of 1968 and dropping sharply after the Tet offensive to approximately 3,500 per month. CIA estimates a smaller drop than MACV. Saigon reports that the last six months reflect a reduced level of recruitment, citing as evidence GVN expansion, reduction in VC standards, VC attempts to improve existing

NVA/VC Capabilities for a Large-Scale Offensive

All agree that (as recent events have borne out) the enemy has a capability for a large scale offensive against cities, bases and/or villages in the accelerated pacification program if he wishes to bear the heavy casualties that would result. Allied countermeasures and preemptive capabilities make it highly unlikely that such an attack would have an impact on the scale of the Tet offensive of 1968. Further, the enemy would have to weigh the effect of such an offensive on the Paris talks and on the risk of touching off a resumption of bombing in North Vietnam.

NVA/VC Supply Channels

There is general agreement that the main channels for military supplies reaching enemy forces in the northern areas of South Vietnam (I, II, and a part of III Corps) are the Laos Panhandle and the DMZ. Considerable disagreement exists as to the channel of supplies for the southern part of South Vietnam (part of III and all of IV Corps. MACV, CINCPAC, JCS and Embassy point to Cambodia MACV believes that no large shipments of ordnance are coming into IV Corps via Laos and that Cambodia has during the last two years become a major source of supplies for this region, with 10,000 tons of arms going through Sihanoukville to the border between October, 1967, and September, 1968. CIA disagrees strongly, especially with regard to the importance of Sihanoukville. It estimates that the external resupply requirement of IV Corps is three tons of combat-related material a day and that this comes across two Cambodian border points and the South China sea coast of South Vietnam. CIA notes numerous factors which it believes cast doubt on the importance of the Sihanoukville channel.

OSD summarizes without comment the national level CIA/DIA estimates for total enemy external daily supply requirements of 80 tons: 34 tons come from Laos, 14 tons across the DMZ, and 32 tons from Cambodia (of which 29 tons involve mainly food and other non combatant goods).

3. THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES

(Questions 10A Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100005-0)

The emphatic differences between U.S. agencies on the RVNAF outweigh the points of agreement. There is consensus that the RVNAF is getting larger, better equipped and somewhat more effective. And all agree that it could not now, or in the foreseeable future, handle both the VC and sizeable NVA forces without U.S. combat support. On other major points there is vivid controversy. The military community gives much greater weight to RVNAF statistical improvements while OSD and CIA highlight remaining obstacles, with OSD being the most pessimistic. Paradoxically, MACV/CINCPAC/JCS see RVNAF as being less capable against the VC alone than does CIA.

RVNAF CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE ENEMY

The Vietnamese Armed Forces (RVNAF) are being increased in size and re-equipped to improve their ground combat capability. The best measure of this improvement is the RVNAF's expected performance against a given enemy threat. However, there is a paradoxical divergence in agency views on the RVNAF ability to handle the internal VC that without U.S. assistance. State (both EA and INR) and CIA — who generally rate RVNAF improvement and effectiveness lowest among the respondents, and who accept the highest estimates of overall VC strength — believe that, "Without any U.S. support ARVN would at least be able to hold its own and make some progress against the VC unsupported by the NVA" (i.e. the VC without NVA fillers, though with regroupes).

In contrast is the view of MACV/CINCPAC/JCS, who rate RVNAF improvement and effectiveness highest who accept the lowest estimates of VC armed strength and who (unlike CIA and State) do not consider VC irregular forces to be part of the VC military threat. But the military community believes that without U.S. combat support in opposing VC main and local forces without any NVA units or fillers, RVNAF "would have to reduce the number of offensive operations and adopt more of a defensive posture," resulting in "loss of

control by the government of Vietnam for substantial gains. Thus, MACV/CINCPAC/JCS believe that RVNAF would not be able to cope with purely indigenous VC forces without U.S. combat support until the completion of the modernization in 1972.

OSD, however, believes that a number of major reforms are required, in addition to the current modernization program, if this goal is to be met. "It is unlikely that the RVNAF, as presently organized and led, will ever constitute an effective political or military counter to the Vietcong."

All agencies agree that RVNAF could not, either now or even when fully modernized, handle both the VC and a sizeable level of NVA forces without U.S. combat support in the form of air, helicopters, artillery, logistics and some ground forces.

RVNAF IMPROVEMENTS

There is consensus that RVNAF forces are now much larger (826,000) than in December, 1967 (743,000), and will be further increased to 876,000, with the greatest increases in manpower given to the popular and regional forces needed for local security. The RVNAF is also better equipped. All regular combat units have M-16 rifles and are beginning to receive increases in their own artillery and helicopter support. Militia (393,000 of the total RVNAF strength in December, 1968) have 100,000 M-16 rifles and are scheduled to receive 150,000 more in 1969. MACV has stepped up its training efforts by forming 353 mobile teams in 1968 to train and advise the militia.

Moreover, all agencies agree that overall RVNAF capabilities, number of operations and effectiveness increased during 1968. Data presents a mixed picture in some areas, but it is clear that the larger number of enemy killed by RVNAF resulted from better effectiveness (more kills per 1,000 troops), along with higher kill ratios, as well as increased force size. In spite of these statistical improvements (which CIA in particular finds unreliable indicators), RVNAF is best thought of as a force which enlarged its contribution in 1968 within a total allied effort which also expanded. The modernization program, high impact on the field,

promises that results will continue to increase so long as the RVNAF is the bone in the form of a U.S. ground combat presence.

RVNAF PROBLEMS

RVNAF faces severe motivation, leadership and desertion problems. The officer problem is mixed in politics and little has been done to correct it. Poor leadership and motivation contributes to regular ground combat forces deserting (net) at an annual rate of 34 per cent of their strength (gross rate one-third of the divisions is more than 50 per cent). Total RVNAF desertions (net) are equivalent to losing one ARVN division per month.

Thus, OSD does not believe that current expansion and re-equipment programs are sufficient to make RVNAF into an effective fighting force because major political and military actions are required that are not now emphasized. OSD considers essential action to recognize and reward combat leadership and development of a favorable attitude by the military towards their own people which will result in acceptance and support of the government by its citizens.

JCS, CINCPAC, MACV and State feel that, without such changes, RVNAF is making reasonable progress toward development as a self-sufficient force able to hold its own against an internal VC threat. OSD and CIA feel that RVNAF is making limited progress and many of RVNAF's weaknesses are uncorrected.

OSD suggests the possibility of cutting costs and U.S. losses by reducing U.S. forces as RVNAF reaches milestones in the modernization program. This plan is contingent on the enemy force stabilizing at a reduced level of threat. A plan to withdraw one U.S. division during mid-1969 has been discussed with President Thieu, who responded favorably. Allied troop reductions are dependent on progress in RVNAF improvement, changes in enemy forces and a manageable battlefield and pacification situation in South Vietnam.

4. PACIFICATION

(Questions 14-20)

Two well-defined and divergent views emerged from the agencies on the pacification situation in South Vietnam. One view is held by MACV/CINCPAC/JCS and endorsed by CINCPAC,

and JCS. The other view is that of OSD, CIA and State. The two views are profoundly different in terms of factual interpretation and policy implications. Both views agree on the nature of the problem, that is, the obstacles to improvement and complete success. What distinguishes one view from the other is each's assessment of the magnitude of the problem, and the likelihood that obstacles will be overcome.

The Two Views

The first group, consisting of MACV/JCS/Saigon, maintains that "at the present time, the security situation is better than any time during period in question," i.e., 1961 to 1968. MACV cites a "dramatic change in the security situation," and finds that the GVN controls three-fourths of the population. JCS suggests that the GVN will control 90 per cent of the population in 1969. The second group, OSD/CIA/State, on the other hand, is more cautious and pessimistic; their view is not inconsistent with another Tet offensive-like shock in the countryside, for example, wiping out the much-touted gains of the 1968 accelerated pacification program, or with more gradual erosion. Representing the latter view, OSD arrives at the following conclusions:

- (1) "The portions of the SVN rural population aligned with the VC and aligned with the GVN are apparently the same today as in 1962 (a discouraging year): 5,000,000 GVN aligned and nearly 3,000,000 VC aligned.
- (2) "At the present, it appears that at least 50 per cent of the total rural population is subject to significant VC presence and influence." today as in 1962 (a discouraging year) goes even further, "Our best estimate is that the VC have a significant effect on at least two-thirds of the rural population."

THE MAJOR ISSUES

After removing population control changes attributable to urban migration (which has brought more people under GVN control than pacification), the two views differ by the magnitude of up to about one-sixth of the South Vietnamese people, i.e., 2-3 million. The second group places a contested category, yet to be secured

by the GVN, while the first group maintains that these 2-3 million people are already under GVN control.

The substance of the argument is evident on the next page. Using HES data for 1967-68, the chart [not reproduced] shows that the optimistic interpretation leaves only 26.7 per cent of SVN's population to be pacified as of November, 1968. The conservatives think 41.3 per cent of the population has yet to be pacified. More importantly, the second view shows little pacification progress over the period except for the gains of the accelerated pacification campaign (APC) program, and they dispute these gains. State, OSD, and CIA maintain that the October-December APC acquisition of 9.4 per cent of the population is an exaggerated claim because these gains were achieved by cutting minimal force levels to one-third of previously accepted levels. These agencies, therefore, argue that the APC gains have stood only because the NLF has not challenged them, and they believe it is "quite likely" the gains will be contested in the coming months.

If the APC gains are removed, the substance of the long-term debate emerges clearly. The chart then shows that according to the second view, pacification programs have registered no progress over 1967-68 and before. The first view records only slight progress over the 1966-68 period. It is further seen that the second view places the chart's pacification line much lower. For example, in August, 1968, the first group says 65.8 per cent of the population was under GVN control; the second group places only 49.9 per cent in the GVN category. The source of this difference is a dispute over the value of the HES composite indicator which is really an average of 18 indicators, few of which have anything to do with security. (There is a strong case for abolishing an over-

all composite indicator from HES and either utilizing the subindicators on a category basis, e.g., security, political, and economic development, or using the category data within a newly devised system. Despite all its shortcomings, HES has provided useful data and the small amount of analysis, although is very helpful, although

ground remain to be covered.)

The second group arrives at their estimate by allocating the contested population on the basis of security criteria alone. According to their view, in the fall of 1968 at least one-half of South Vietnam's population was subject to a significant NLF presence; for the first group, this figure was one-third.

By neither view can pacification be said to have progressed much in the last three years (at least, prior to the last few months). Nor does either view promise anything close to complete success within several years. If the 1967-1968 pacification rate (including the debated APC gains) is sustained, the first interpretation implies that it will take 8.3 years to pacify the 4.15 million contested and VC population of December, 1968; the second view implies pacification success in 13.4 years.

It is noteworthy that the gap in views that does exist is largely one between the policy makers, the analysts, and the intelligence community on the one hand, and the civilian and military operators on the other.

The policy implications of the disagreement could hardly be more divergent. One view sees a high probability of GVN success and generally applauds the GVN's performance. It finds that the GVN has been ineffective at times, but that it has not been negligent, and overall progress has been most satisfactory. The policy implications of this view are more of the same, gradual U.S. pressure and wholehearted U.S. support.

The other view leads to a radically different policy. The GVN has failed in the countryside. The rural population situation has not changed significantly and certainly not at a rate which will free us of noticeable burdens within 2 to 5 years. We may even be overextended in the rural areas and open to a damaging VC counterattack. The implied policy recommendations would call for voicing considerable displeasure at the GVN's rural performance; establishing realistic rural goals for the GVN; penalizing the GVN if these goals are not achieved, and devoting a greater effort to promoting a GVN/VC rural political accommodation, or,

large basis.

LESSER ISSUES

In 1968, 15,776 members of the Vietcong infrastructure (VCI) were neutralized, 87.1 per cent of whom were low-level functionaries. Anti-VCI operations showed major improvements but did not seriously harm the VCI.

All agencies agreed that the Phoenix program was long overdue and potentially very valuable. The respondents agreed that it is too early for a thorough assessment of the Phoenix program, and they predict it is unlikely to cause the NLF major problems in 1969. Embassy, Saigon noted that Phoenix bears close watching with respect to the attitudes of rural population, attitudes toward the American sponsors and a potentially deleterious effect on the possibilities for a rural accommodation.

Every agency except MACV/JCS agrees that the available data on war damage to the civilian population is inadequate. Using limited data which showed that 7 per cent of the reporting hamlets were affected by friendly caused war damages, CIA concluded "the rural hamlets take a tremendous beating." The responses received suggest that this is a very serious problem in need of further U.S. government attention and analysis.

Recent GVN personnel changes were found by all agencies to have brought a significant upgrading in the average quality of GVN officials. Nonetheless, corruption, favoritism and neglect of the populace's problems were still seen as major GVN shortcomings. There was no conclusive evidence that the 1968 personnel changes harmed the GVN's relations with minority groups.

5. THE POLITICAL SCENE (Questions 21-23)

This section on the political situation can be boiled down to three fundamental questions: (1) How strong is the GVN today? (2) What is being done to strengthen it for the coming political struggle with the NLF? (3) What are the prospects for continued noncommunist government in South Vietnam?

The essence of the replies from U.S. agencies is as follows: (1) Stronger recently

very weak in certain areas and among various elites. (2) Some steps are being taken but these are inadequate. (3) Impossible to predict but chancy at best.

Within these broad thrusts of the responses there are decided differences of emphasis among the agencies. Thus MACV/JCS and Saigon, while acknowledging the problems, accent more the increasing stability of the Thieu regime and the overall political system; the significance of the moves being made by the GVN to bolster its strength, and the possibility of continued noncommunist rule in South Vietnam given sufficient U.S. support. CIA and OSD on the other hand, while acknowledging certain progress, are decidedly more skeptical and pessimistic. They note recent political improvements and GVN measures but they tend to deflate their relative impact and highlight the remaining obstacles. State's position, while not so consistent or clear-cut, generally steers closer to the bearishness of OSD and CIA.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

We have a great quantity of information on Vietnamese politics but the quality is suspect. It varies greatly by elite and level and is usually sounder for broad groups than factions or individuals. In addition, we are dealing with a nascent constitutional system and public opinion is often manipulated.

Noncommunist elements rally in times of common danger from the communist threat, but otherwise generally engage in a perpetual struggle for power. Most elites may be willing to participate in the GVN but their motives are often more self-serving than nationalistic. In their view toward the military struggle, Northerners are most insistent on military victory, central Vietnamese the most wary, Southerners the most ambiguous. Firm support for GVN comes from most military elements, Catholics and the bureaucratic and merchant classes. The major problem for the GVN remains in the rural villages where the VC are strongest. Opposition also comes from uncertain Buddhist, youth, union and army elements,

continued

Various ethnic and religious minorities, while often anti-communist, are not strongly tied to the GCN.

In reading the Vietnamese political scene, one must keep in mind that pragmatism, expediency, war weariness, a desire to remain unaligned and end up on the winning side are all common features. So are family loyalty, corruption, social immobility and clandestine activities.

OSD points out (and a recent Saigon cable corroborates this view) that there has been a noticeable shift recently by many noncommunists towards acceptance of the NFL in some capacity as part of an eventual political settlement. Most elites would want to minimize the communist influence in the government.

South Vietnamese attitudes toward the U.S. are varied and ambivalent. Our presence is seen as a necessary evil to forestall a communist takeover. Our involvement is viewed with a mixture of gratitude, shame and suspicion. In any event, recent events, especially the Paris talks, have made it clear to the Vietnamese that the U.S. commitment is not open-minded and that some withdrawals will probably come soon.

GVN Political Actions

All agencies agree that there has been substantial progress in broadening the government; all except OSD see significant movement against corruption; and all agree that political mobilization is both the (material missing) advancement based on merit, and there are many other political steps needed. In general, all these factors will be increasingly important as the U.S. reduces its military effort. Such a reduction might stimulate political progress but it will also entail risks. As noted earlier, there is some ambiguity as well as differences of view about the proper U.S. role in SVN politics. State and Saigon caution against undue U.S. involvement and pressure, while MAC/JCS place greater emphasis on the use of our leverage in effecting needed reforms.

No agency clearly forecasts a "victory" over the communists, and all acknowledge the manifold problems facing the DRV as we withdraw. However,

MACV/JCS stress the need for continued U.S. support. OSD and State believe that only a compromise settlement is possible and emphasize GVN self-reliance. CIA states that progress in SVN has been sufficiently slow and fragile that substantial U.S. disengagement in the next few years could jeopardize all recent gains.

JCS and OSD each list their essential conditions for cessation of hostilities. While they agree on certain elements, the JCS look toward continued U.S. support to assure the sovereignty of the GVN while OSD requires only that the South Vietnamese be free to choose their political future without external influence.

6. U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS

(Questions 24-28)

The only major points of agreement with the U.S. government on these subjects are:

- The description of recent U.S. deployments and tactics.
- The difficulties of assessing the results of B-52 strikes, but their known effectiveness against known troop concentrations and in close support operations.
- The fact that the Soviets and Chinese supply almost all war material to Hanoi and have enabled the North Vietnamese to carry on despite all our operations.

Otherwise there are fundamental disagreements running throughout this section, including the following:

- OSD believes, and MACV/JCS deny, that there is a certain amount of "fat" in our current force levels that could be cut back without significant reduction in combat capability.
- MACV/JCS and, somewhat more cautiously, CIA ascribe much higher casualty estimates to our B-52 strikes.
- MACV/JCS assign very much greater effectiveness to our past and current Laos and North Vietnam bombing campaigns than do OSD and CIA.
- MACV/JCS believe that a vigorous bombing campaign could choke off enough supplies to Hanoi to make her stop fighting, while OSD and CIA see North Vietnam continuing the struggle over against unlimited bombing.

U.S. DEPLOYMENTS AND TACTICS

In early 1968, MACV moved the equivalent of two divisions from II and III Corps to northern I Corps. This deployment was a defensive reaction to the threat of a major NVA siege of Khesanh and the coastal lowlands. With the further enemy offensives in February and May, U.S. forces throughout the country (except for I Corps) were pulled back into screening positions around SVN's major cities and used to push the VC forces out. Since then, the two U.S. divisions redeployed to I Corps have been returned to III and IV Corps. MACV now gives top priority to the control of Saigon, the approaches to it, in III and northern IV Corps, and the heavily populated upper Delta.

Until late 1968, allied (particularly U.S.) efforts were directed largely against enemy main forces through large (1,000 men or more) unit operations. With the recent withdrawal of NVA main force units from SVN, U.S. units have been able to operate in smaller units and with more emphasis on the enemy's infrastructure and support apparatus. Though no U.S. units are currently in direct support of pacification, the deployment of U.S. units in SVN's populated areas and the change in tactics has, MACV asserts, helped improve pacification progress.

U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS

MACV/JCS and OSD agree that there is no way of reducing U.S. force levels in Vietnam without some reduction in combat capability. However, OSD argues that withdrawing some U.S. logistics headquarters, construction or tactical air personnel may not have any significant effect on U.S. combat capability or effectiveness. For instance, OSD concludes that because of the halt in bombing North Vietnam, the U.S. needs neither as many interdiction aircraft as we now have nor our full force of three Navy carriers off North Vietnam. OSD also believes certain tactical innovations might make some troop cutbacks possible. MACV/JCS feel that while some of the proposed reductions might be made to minimize loss of combat

capability, in general, significant reductions in our force levels will proportionately reduce our combat capability.

OSD also thinks that U.S. forces could be reduced as the RVNAF improves and expands. By their estimates, the ongoing RVNAF improvement plan might free up to about 15 U.S. battalions and their support units by mid-1969 without a decrease in total allied force capability. This projection assumes that RVNAF combat effectiveness increases along with their combat capability. In their responses, MACV/JCS do not consider this question.

B-52 EFFECTIVENESS

All agencies acknowledge that sound analysis of the effectiveness of B-52 strikes is currently impossible for several reasons. The consensus is that some strikes are very effective, some clearly wasted and a majority with indeterminate outcome.

There is agreement that B-52 strikes are very effective when directed against known enemy troop concentrations or in close support of tactical operations, and have served to disrupt VC/NVA operations.

There are sharp differences on casualty estimates. While the JCS estimate that about 41,000 enemy were killed in 1968 by the B-52s, OSD believes that perhaps as few as 9,000 were. The difference is that OSD, unlike MACV/JCS, find that B-52 strikes against suspected enemy infiltration routes or base camps (50 per cent of 1968's sorties) are much less effective than close-support strikes. CIA cites a variety of casualty estimates and considers it impossible to select one, but believes it is apparent that B-52 strikes have become a significant factor in the attrition of enemy forces.

THE LAOS AND NORTH VIETNAM INTERDICTION CAMPAIGN

The MACV/JCS and State/CIA/OSD fundamentally disagree over whether our bombing campaign either prior to or after November has reduced the enemy's throughput of supplies so that the enemy in South Vietnam receives less than he needs there. The MACV/OSD think it has succeeded; State/CIA/OSD think it has

Since early November, MACV has attempted to reduce the logistic capacity of the enemy by blocking the two key roads near the passes from NVN into Laos. MACV finds it has effectively blocked these roads 80 per cent of the time and therefore caused less traffic to get through. OSD/CIA/State agree that enemy traffic on the roads attacked has been disrupted. However, they point out that the enemy uses less than 15 per cent of the available road capacity, is constantly expanding that capacity through new roads and bypasses, and our air strikes do not block but only delay traffic.

Besides blocking the roads, our bombing destroys material in transit on them. JCS/MACV and OSD/CIA agree that we destroy 12 per cent to 14 per cent of the trucks observed moving through Laos and 20 per cent to 35 per cent of the total flow of supplies in Laos. To MACV/JCS, the material destroyed cannot be replaced so that our air effort denies it to the VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam. In complete disagreement, OSD and CIA find that the enemy needs in SVN (10 to 15 trucks of supplies per day) are so small and his supply of war material so large that the enemy can replace his losses easily, increase his traffic flows slightly, and get through as much supplies to SVN as he wants to in spite of the bombing.

PRE-NOVEMBER CAMPAIGN

Prior to November, 1968, we bombed in southern North Vietnam as well as Laos. The MACV/JCS find that this campaign reduced the flow of supplies into Laos greatly and that this flow increased greatly after the bombing halt. The OSD/CIA agree that traffic followed this pattern, but argue that it was caused by normal seasonal weather changes, not our bombing policy. Comparing 1967 traffic to 1968 traffic, they find that prior to the bombing halt, 1968's supply throughout was higher than 1967's and that, after the halt, it followed its normal seasonal patterns.

CAMPAIGN

All agencies agree that Chinese and Soviet aid has provided almost all the war material used by Hanoi. However, OSD/CIA and MACV/JCS disagree over whether the flow of aid could be reduced enough to make a difference in South Vietnam. If all imports by sea were denied and land routes through Laos and Cambodia attacked vigorously, the MACV/JCS find that NVN could not obtain enough war supplies to continue. In total disagreement, OSD and CIA believe that the overland routes from China alone could provide NVN enough material to carry on, even with an unlimited bombing campaign.

A guide to the abbreviations and terms in the text follows, in their order of appearance:

DRV--Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).

NVA--North Vietnamese Army.

GVN--Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

VC--Vietcong.

RVNAP--Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (South Vietnamese forces).

SVN--South Vietnam.

MACV--Military Assistance Command Vietnam (U.S. headquarters).

RF and PF--Regional Forces and Popular Forces (South Vietnamese local defense militia).

NLF--National Liberation Front (The Vietcong political organization).

Hamlet rating C--Moderately secure.

Hoa Hao--South Vietnamese religious sect.

Cao Dai--Another religious sect.

CINCPAC--Commander-in-Chief Pacific.

JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff.

OSD--Office of the Secretary of Defense.

USG--U.S. government.

NIE--National Intelligence Estimate.

DIA--Defense Intelligence Agency.

KIA--Killed in action.

ARVN--Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnamese army).

DMZ--Demilitarized zone.

EA--East Asia (desk of State Department).

INR--Intelligence and Research (division of State Department).

HES--Hamlet Evaluation Survey (classification program).

NVN--North Vietnam.

BARRE, VT.
TIMES-ARGUS

E - 12,353

APR 25 1972

Can't Justify Bombing

If reports published in Newsweek are true, then the Nixon administration is even more guilty of misleading the American public than at first believed.

Those reports say the Nixon administration in 1969 ordered a secret appraisal on the effectiveness of bombing of North Vietnam.

The result of that appraisal — stamped secret — was the State Department wrote the bombing had plainly not “paralyzed” Hanoi; the Defense Department pointed out the bombing only seemed to have rallied the people behind Hanoi; the Central Intelligence Agency concluded “the air war did not seriously affect the flow of men and supplies to Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. Nor did it significantly erode North Vietnam’s military defense capability or Hanoi’s determination to persist in the war.”

On the basis of those conclusions, how in heaven’s name can the Nixon administration possibly justify bombing North Vietnam in April of 1972.

We are bombing towns and villages in South Vietnam off the face of the map now to “save” them.

Are we going to do the same with all of North Vietnam to “win” the war?—KLR

APR 25 1972

E - 427,270

Nixon Got Conflicting Advice on War

L.A. Times/Wash. Post News Service

Washington—President Nixon received "profoundly different" judgments from key government agencies at the start of his administration concerning the state of the war in Vietnam.

This is disclosed in the summary of a survey ordered by the President on Jan. 21, 1969, the day after his inauguration. The study was National Security Study Memorandum No. 1, assembled by the National Security Council staff, headed by presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger. Several reporters and publications have obtained copies.

Some of the findings shed light on war action now unfolding, but one of the most striking disclosures is the evidence the study contains of great splits inside the federal bureaucracy and how those divergent viewpoints were extended from the Johnson into the Nixon administration.

In one group, more optimistic and hawkish, were the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. command in Saigon, the commander in chief of Pacific forces and the U.S. Embassy in Vietnam, headed by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. That group was often in conflict with a second group composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Nixon's subsequent actions in Vietnam have been more in accord with the pessimists' assessments in the study, although his public explanations have reflected more of what the optimists were saying in 1969.

Although the summary discloses sharp disagreements three years ago on the effectiveness of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, the current situation in Vietnam is much different and U.S. airpower is being applied in different ways. It is officially reasoned that bombing is potentially more effective now because the big, conventional battles being fought need large quantities of fuel and ammunition to be sustained for more than a few weeks.

The summary outlines sharp disagreements over the fighting capabilities of Saigon's forces and the effectiveness of U.S. bombing. The document also seems to make clear that it was from Defense Secretary Laird's office that the suggestion came, early in 1969, to cut U.S. forces while modernizing those of South Vietnam.

On the military situation, the document makes these points:

- The Pentagon believed that there was "fat" in U.S. force levels that could be cut back safely without affecting combat capabilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. command disputed that.

- The Command and the Joint Chiefs "believe

that a vigorous bombing campaign could choke off enough supplies to Hanoi to make her stop fighting, while OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and CIA see North Vietnam continuing the struggle even against unlimited bombing."

- The Joint Chiefs estimated 41,000 enemy troops were killed in 1968 by B-52s, but the Pentagon estimate was about 9,000. The Pentagon took a more skeptical view of the B-52s effectiveness against infiltration routes and base camps.

- Concerning destruction of supplies on the trails leading south, the summary disclosed a Pentagon/CIA belief that, although many enemy supplies and trucks were knocked out, the enemy needs were "so small and his supply of war material so large that the enemy can replace his losses easily . . ."

- As the U.S. was evolving a plan to turn over fighting to the South Vietnamese, Saigon's troops were deserting at an annual rate of 34 per cent of their strength, equal to about one division a month.

- There was agreement in early 1969 on one point: The South Vietnamese "could not, either now or even when fully modernized, handle both the Viet Cong and a sizeable level of North Vietnamese forces without U.S. combat support in the form of air, heli-

copters, artillery, logistics and some ground forces."

- The U.S. diplomatic and military missions in Saigon were supported by the Joint Chiefs in the view that "at the present time, the security situation is better than at any time" since 1961. The missions saw a "dramatic change in the security situation," asserting that Saigon controlled three-fourths of the population. The Defense Department felt that the alignment of the rural population had not altered since 1962, with some 5,000,000 loyal to Saigon and nearly 3,000,000 to the Viet Cong.

The summary said that one set of agencies perceived a "high probability" of success for the Saigon regime despite its shortcomings and therefore argued for "more of the same," which meant "gradual U.S. pressure and wholehearted U.S. support." The State and Defense Departments and the CIA asserted, in contrast, that Saigon "had failed in the countryside," adding, according to the summary, "We may even be overextended in the rural areas and open to a damaging Viet Cong counter-attack."

Kissinger apparently posed 28 questions about the war and the bombing. They sought to determine the ability of the enemy forces to continue fighting and to keep up their flow of materiel to the battle areas.

LANCASTER, PA.

NEW ERA

E - 56,523

NEWS APR 22 1972

S - 110,874

Pressure on U.S. Productivity

The ability of the United States to meet the increasing competition of foreign production, in the battle for world markets, is under more and more pressure all the time.

In recent years, productivity has taken a negative trend. The emphasis has been on more leisure, more pay for fewer hours, and less production on the part of each employee in exchange for the amount he receives for each hour worked.

Quality of the output has come under severe question also. Dependability of the products is only part of it; while we formerly could claim we were first with the best, companies in other nations have made superior products they never would have tried before—and have undersold us.

In a recent Gallup pole, most adults participating said they believed U.S. workers are not producing as much as they could, each day they work.

And a majority of skilled and unskilled manual workers agreed.

To sum it up, our workers could produce more and better manufactured goods, but they are not doing it.

The drop in productivity is tied directly to the erosion of the belief in validity of the work ethic. Too many persons now ridicule the value of work in formation and maintaining of national character.

President Richard M. Nixon told industrial leaders in February that they were going to have to make some difficult decisions,

and that the nation must "learn once again to compete in the world." The only way to compete, he said, "is on the basis of our own productivity."

The Nixon administration is endeavoring through many kinds of measures to restore our competitive standing. It will be a long pull, and not an easy one.

Where will the motivation be found? Newsweek magazine, in an article on productivity drop, quotes two men high in government.

Richard Helms, CIA director, when asked whether he worries more about possible slippage in the U.S. diplomatic or military positions, answered:

"I worry more about our economic position. If we can't hack it economically, we're not going to hack it any way."

Secretary of Commerce Peter C. Peterson, on the same subject, commented:

"It is hard for any country without economic strength to have any political influence."

Thus our trade standing goes hand in hand with our total standing in the world. And if we lose economically, we lose diplomatically and in all other ways.

What many citizens fail to realize also is that our position in world markets is tied inextricably to our domestic economy. It bears directly on the number of jobs available in the U.S.; the amount of pay — and yes, the amount of time free from the job for leisure.

The challenge is clear. It can be met—but only by will translated into action.

The missing MIRV

By Herbert Scoville Jr.

The Soviet MIRV threat is a classic example of the misuse of intelligence to promote vast expenditures for new weapons. (MIRVs are multiple missile warheads which can be aimed at separate targets.) Three years after the first cries of alarm over an imminent Soviet MIRV capability, defense officials are now only saying that the Russians have the necessary technological base to develop MIRVs.

In 1969, the danger of a first strike against our Minuteman ICBMs from the large Soviet SS-9 missiles armed with MIRVs was used to justify going ahead with the Safeguard ABM. Then, President Nixon referred to Russian tests since 1963 of triplet reentry vehicles (MRVs) with a "footprint" or impact pattern which could be made to match the layout of three Minuteman silos. This same song was repeated for two years whenever the Red menace was needed to pry loose from reluctant congressmen money for new weapons.

In 1971, however, a leak to the press at last gave the public an inside view of the validity of DOD "interpretations." Analysis of the Soviet MRV tests did not substantiate the theory that the impact patterns of the triplet warheads could be varied, i.e., the "footprint" could not be changed to step accurately on more than one pattern of Minuteman silos. This less fearsome interpretation was held, it seems, by most intelligence analysts from the beginning. Our previous policies had been based on an improbable "worst case analysis." In his February, 1972, report to Congress, Secretary of Defense Laird conceded that the Russians have probably not yet tested a MIRV system and that there had been no new tests of even an MRV system for the SS-9 since the fall of 1970.

One might have thought that this was the end of the MRV and its "footprint." After all, the U.S. has had MRVs on its Polaris missiles since 1962, and they are not first-strike weapons. But no, on March 6, speaking to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Secretary Laird reported that the Russians were deploying about 100 missiles with MRVs (no mention of this was made three weeks earlier to the more savvy congressional committees). When queried by the press, he played down the difference between MRVs and MIRVs, implied that this was unimportant semantics, and again gave the impression that the Russians could vary the

"footprint" of their MRVs. Thus, the fears of the public, unfamiliar with details of the past history, were once again aroused by the MRV threat.

However, two weeks later, on March 21, Dr. Foster, the top Pentagon weapons scientist, reporting to the Senate Armed Services Committee, reversed the field once again. The lack of even MRV tests since 1970 now suggests to Dr. Foster that the Russians may have canceled or curtailed the SS-9 triplet program, possibly in favor of a new missile which has not even yet been tested for the first time. If this is true, a Soviet first-strike threat against Minuteman is delayed (Dr. Foster mentioned early 1980's or beyond) — or postponed indefinitely since it was recently reported that the Soviets had not initiated any construction of new silos for more than six months.

So goes the MIRV threat — first you see it in all its fearsome trappings, then as you dig deeper it fades into the future. Now it recedes to the '80's. Certainly, as President Nixon says, the Russians have the technological base to develop MIRVs if they choose to move in that direction and if they are not prevented by an arms limitation agreement. (Strangely, the administration has never made a serious effort to control MIRVs at SALT). But today there is no concrete evidence that the Russians are far down the MIRV road. Although they could start testing tomorrow, it would be several years before they had a fully developed MIRV and many more before they could deploy a system that could threaten our Minuteman deterrent.

Meanwhile the public has been the victim of a hoax, fed by a blatant misuse of intelligence designed to scare it into approval of large new weapons programs. Not only does this result in a waste of billions of dollars, but it frequently leads to a decrease in security because we buy weapons designed against the wrong threat. We are seeing today a repetition of the same tactics in the request for nearly one billion dollars for a new missile submarine—ULMS, when even the nature of the danger to the present Polaris-Poseidon system is unknown. The time has come for honesty in our national security programs as well as in our national political structure.

Mr. Scoville is former deputy director of the CIA and assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Bargaining Gains Hinted

Nixon Halves Rate of Troop Withdrawal From Vietnam, Sets July 1 Ceiling of 49,000; Bombing Will Continue

By ROBERT KEATLEY

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—President Nixon slowed the rate of U.S. troop withdrawals from South Vietnam and promised that America "will not be defeated" in the long war there.

He also vowed that "we will never surrender" the Saigon government to its Communist foes, who, he said, seek "a victory they cannot be allowed to win."

Mr. Nixon's nationally televised talk was tough, full of scorn for Hanoi's breaking of alleged agreements with the U.S. in mounting its present invasion. But the impact was softened considerably by senior White House advisor Henry Kissinger in a press briefing just before the President spoke. He hinted broadly that major negotiating gains may come soon in Paris, and suggested, without quite saying, that his secret Moscow visit last weekend is mainly responsible for his cautious optimism.

President Nixon announced that 20,000 more American soldiers will be withdrawn from South Vietnam by July 1, bringing down the new troop ceiling to 49,000 men. This is about half the withdrawal rate of the past six months. He didn't say when or whether he will announce another troop withdrawal, however.

The President also said negotiators of both sides will return to the Paris peace talks today; Hanoi Politburo member Le Due Tho, in fact, is reported en route to Paris for the negotiations. This senior official generally is present whenever North Vietnam has major proposals to announce.

But Mr. Nixon said he has ordered American air and naval attacks against North Vietnam to continue until the offensive is stopped.

Kissinger's Comments Cited

Only one paragraph of Mr. Nixon's otherwise tough speech dealt with his hopes for the peace talks, but this left open the possibility that important progress may come soon. "We are resuming the Paris talks with the firm expectation that productive talks leading to rapid progress will follow through all available channels," he said. He listed getting the Communist invasion halted and negotiating a return of U.S. war prisoners as the first two items of business.

This lone upbeat reference was strengthened by Mr. Kissinger's comments. He said the

U.S. "will see fairly rapidly" whether or not Hanoi will respond positively to some "very precise propositions" the American team will outline today. The first American demand, he said, is that the three North Vietnamese divisions that crossed the so-called Demilitarized Zone dividing the two Vietnams go home again. However, he didn't say that other Hanoi troops also would have to be withdrawn in order to advance peace prospects and get a halt to U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

The senior White House aide was cagey about just what he and Soviet Communist Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev discussed over the weekend. But he left the clear impression that Vietnam was a major topic, and that Russian leaders assured him Hanoi has some serious proposals to make in Paris. Mr. Kissinger did say flatly that he didn't have any direct meetings with North Vietnamese negotiators in Moscow, or elsewhere, in recent days.

The presidential adviser also sounded hopeful about the wide variety of other subjects currently being negotiated by U.S. and Russian officials. These include talks about arms control, trade, lend-lease repayments, European security, shipping and other matters.

"All negotiations are on course," Mr. Kissinger said, stressing that all "received additional impetus" as a result of his Moscow visit. He singled out the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, called SALT, for special mention. However, he didn't give any specific information about expected terms of the agreement. He did say a treaty is expected during, or before, Mr. Nixon's visit to Moscow starting May 22.

But the Nixon rhetoric dealt more with threat than promise, in sharp contrast to the statements of his closest adviser on national security matters.

The President called the current offensive "naked and unprovoked aggression" by North Vietnam that will be thwarted by allied forces. He promised that U.S. ground forces won't be returned to the battlefield but also vowed that "essential" American air strikes will continue indefinitely. "They won't stop until that invasion stops," Mr. Nixon stated flatly.

He also was critical of Communist tactics. The President said they have failed to win popular support among the South Vietnamese people. He also cited the senior U.S. military man in South Vietnam, Gen. Abrams, as stating

Hanoi cannot win militarily against Saigon's improving army. Although the general predicted Saigon will lose some battles during the coming weeks of hard fighting, he claimed the South Vietnam army is fighting "courageously."

Thus, Mr. Nixon concluded, the Communists' "one remaining hope is to win in the Congress of the United States, and among the people of the United States, the victory they cannot win among the people of South Vietnam, or on the battlefield of South Vietnam." But if Democratic doves and other war opponents here force the U.S. to end support of Saigon, he warned, "it would be an invitation for the mighty to prey on the weak all around the world."

Both Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger argued that U.S. credibility is involved in Vietnam and that honoring past American pledges there is directly related to the prospects for broader world peace.

Argument Is Opposed

This argument isn't accepted by many war foes, including some Democratic candidates for the presidential nomination. Because the troop withdrawal rate has been slowed, and bombing North Vietnam will continue, it seems certain they will be sharply critical of this latest presidential speech on the war.

Yet Mr. Nixon may be able to claim some politically helpful progress toward peace soon if the hints about Paris negotiations are correct. Mr. Kissinger said he expects to know soon whether Hanoi has serious proposals to offer; he declined to give a schedule but said Communist intentions should be known before Mr. Nixon begins his Moscow visit.

Mr. Kissinger wouldn't say anything about possible future troop withdrawals. Earlier, Mr. Nixon had indicated that a so-called residual force of some 25,000 to 35,000 men would be left in South Vietnam until Hanoi releases U.S. prisoners. His aide refused to say last night if that is, in fact, the eventual goal.

CHICAGO, ILL.
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S - 1,016,275

APR 26 1972

Gravel Tells New Secrets

BY PHILIP WARDEN

[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

WASHINGTON, April 25 — Sen. Mike Gravel [D., Alaska] today accused President Nixon of possible "malfeasance in office" for not conducting the Viet Nam war the way some advisers recommended.

Gravel defied federal classified document laws and Senate rules to divulge, partly on the Senate floor and partly at a press conference, some of the contents of a 1969 National Security Council study memorandum on Viet Nam.

There were no tears in Gravel's eyes today. On the night last summer when he read portions of the secret Pentagon papers on Viet Nam, Gravel cried.

Senate OK Denied

Gravel first attempted today to induce the Senate to allow him to publish the near-500-page memorandum in the Congressional Record. He asked the unanimous consent of the four senators in the chamber. Sen. Robert P. Griffin [R. Mich.], the acting minority leader, objected.

Gravel then asked unanimous consent to make a speech quoting portions of the secret memorandum. Again Griffin objected. Gravel proceeded to read his speech, including quotations direct from the memorandum. Griffin listened but did not voice new objections.

Gravel told newsmen he obtained the secret document in December. He said it was "classified secret."

Fear of Damage

Asked why he thought Griffin objected to his reading it into the Congressional Record, Gravel replied:

"I think he blocked for very partisan reasons. I think they know—and they've been told by the White House—that this is probably the most damaging piece of evidence and information and facts against Richard Nixon since he's taken office.

"And it shows in my mind—and I think that will be the judgment of the American people to make, but I won't use the word—but I think some could construe this as malfeasance in office."

Gravel charged that the President refused to accept the opinion of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Department that daily bombing of North Vietnamese targets would fail to achieve its objective.

A Strategic Error

The new bombing of the North ordered by the President to stop the current Communist drive into South Viet Nam and breaking off of peace negotiations in Paris, Gravel said, "has forced the offensive now taking place."

"The President had only one concern," Gravel told the Senate. "The one, foremost concern of all was to save face."

Gravel said hundreds of thousands of men have died as a result of the President's desire to save face.

"It is reminiscent of some of the dictators and monarchs of the past," he said.

Gravel has reserved 15 minutes of time in the Senate for Thursday in a new attempt to print the complete text of the 1969 memorandum in the Congressional Record.

Gravel asked Sen. William Fulbright [D., Ark.], chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, to call a meeting of his committee so Gravel could get the committee to print the document and thereby circumvent Griffin. Fulbright reportedly rejected Gravel's proposal.

Gravel said he would not call his subcommittee on public buildings and grounds into extraordinary session, as he did when he wanted congressional

immunity so he could declassify the Pentagon papers and make them public last summer.

Only Course Open

"I have legal problems," he explained, saying these were mostly his case before the United States Supreme Court connected with the release of the Pentagon papers and his claim to immunity.

Gravel told the press conference that once the President renewed the bombing of North Viet Nam and terminated the Paris peace talks, North Viet Nam had to start a new offensive.

"They could only undertake the offensive because they had nothing to lose," Gravel said. "It would take a fool not to come to the same conclusion."

Altho there was talk of possible censure of Gravel for violating both the classified documents laws and Senate rules, Sen. William B. Saxbe [R., Ohio], an advocate of censure, said he doubted whether such a move would be attempted. He speculated that a censure move would be defeated on a straight party-line vote.

"Gravel is not the most important thing, even tho he might disagree," Saxbe said in an interview. "The most important thing is to get the Senate to police its membership."

At the State Department today, a spokesman said Gravel's criticism of the renewed bombing in North Viet Nam was not valid because the present military situation differs substantially from the situation three years ago when the National Security Council memorandum was prepared.

"What the North Vietnamese Army has faced us with is something quite different from what was essentially small-

scale, guerrilla warfare," Charles W. Bray, a State Department press officer said.

Bray also noted that judgments regarding the effectiveness of air bombing in the past have been "mixed and not categorical."

By using more conventional combat devices, including tanks, heavy artillery and ground-to-air anti-aircraft

rockets, the North Vietnamese are now presenting "individual targets which were rarely available in earlier years," Bray said.

The North Vietnamese, he commented, are much more heavily dependent on logistic and re-supply operations, "which by their very nature are accessible to retaliation from the air."

Memo shows Nixon had no peace plan

By TIM WHEELER

WASHINGTON, April 25—Senator Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) defied President Nixon today and read on the U.S. Senate floor portions of a secret White House memo which explodes as a hoax Nixon's so-called "peace plan" that won him election in 1968.

However, Senate minority whip, Robert Griffin (R-Mich) frantically maneuvered to gag Gravel from inserting the full text of the memo in the Congressional Record.

The memo, written by Nixon's adviser, Henry Kissinger, and titled "Responses to National Security Study Memorandum 1" (NSSM-1) was completed in February, 1969.

The memo told Nixon that it would take 8.5 to 13.4 years to complete "pacification" of South Vietnam and that liberation forces were capable of outlasting U.S. aggression indefinitely.

No U.S. victory seen

The report said, in no uncertain terms, that the U.S. could not win a military victory, nor could it win a political victory.

It said that South Vietnamese armed forces "could not either now or even when fully modernized handle both the VC and a sizeable level of NVA (North Vietnamese Army) forces without U.S. combat support in the form of air, helicopters, artillery logistics and some ground forces."

The South Vietnamese faced "severe motivation, leadership and desertion problems" and had an annual desertion rate of 54 percent of their strength, the memo declared.

Press shown memo

Gravel displayed the book length memo to reporters at a Senate press conference but he refrained from releasing the full document, explaining that Nixon supporters are threatening to censure him for his bold action.

He vowed, nevertheless, to release "every stitch of paper I have" so that the American people can judge the facts for themselves.

The memo says that the CIA and Defense Department had told Nixon in 1969 that his Vietnamization policy would never work, that U.S. saturation bombings of civilian populations was futile, that the South Vietnamese population would never be pacified, short of total annihilation carried out over more than a decade, and that the South Vietnamese puppet government is "chancy at best."

The Washington Post devoted two full pages and two columns on its front page to reprinting vast portions of the memo, in defiance of an executive order which establishes the system of government classification of documents.

The Senate floor was all but deserted but the galleries were jammed with citizens, including reporters, as Sen. Griffin, his voice cold with fury, threatened to call the Senate into closed session to keep the American people from learning the contents of the memo.

But Gravel read portions of the document anyway. The people, he charged, "now know that he, President Nixon, never had a plan to end the war. Instead he adopted a policy that would indefinitely maintain the American military presence in Vietnam...and the result is now clear for all to see, with the war raging at a level as intense and as destructive as any time before."

Gravel accused Nixon of "committing genocide in Vietnam."

"The consequences of his policy will be the killing and maiming of hundreds of thousands of human beings," he told reporters.

Nixon intention exposed

Gravel said that a study of the Kissinger memo proves "that at

no time after taking office did Richard Nixon consider seriously getting out of Vietnam or of negotiating with the North Vietnamese for an end to the war."

Instead of accepting the "pessimistic" conclusions of the CIA reported in the memo, Nixon, he said, "ignored NSSM-1's evaluation and persisted in the fundamental policies of his predecessor—propping up our client regime in Saigon."

"In spite of the heaviest bombing campaign in history conducted upon Laos and the Ho Chi Minh trail, the Communist side has been able to mount a massive new offensive..."

Bombing held vain

Gravel quoted a section of the memo in which civilian experts in the Pentagon informed Nixon that "the external supply requirements VC/NVA (Vietcong/North Vietnam Army) forces in South Vietnam are so small... that it is unlikely any air interdiction campaign can reduce it below the required levels...the enemy can continue to push sufficient supplies through."

The State Department intelligence wing is recorded as stating, "Our interdiction efforts in Laos do not appear to have weakened in any major way Communist capabilities to wage an aggressive and protracted campaign in South Vietnam..."

And the CIA added glumly, "Almost four years of air war in North Vietnam have shown—as did the Korean war—that although air strikes will destroy... they cannot successfully interdict the flow of supplies."

The portions of the memo reprinted by the Washington Post reveal that Nixon was told by the CIA and the Office of the

Secretary of Defense that it would take at least "33.4 years of U.S. pacification" to crush the liberation forces in South Vietnam.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are described as "the optimists" of Nixon's inner circle, said it would take only 8.3 years to "pacify" the 4.15 million Vietnamese living in liberated zones.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense conceded optimistically that 50 percent of the population "is subject to significant VC presence and influence."

The INR—Intelligence and Research Division of the State Department—declared, "Our best estimate is that the VC have a significant effect on at least two thirds of the rural population."

Yet despite this proof of overwhelming support for the liberation movement among the South Vietnamese masses, the memo concludes, "The policy implications of this view are more of the same, gradual U.S. pressure and wholehearted U.S. support" for the continuation of the war.

Kissinger also hailed the Phoenix Program as "long overdue and potentially very valuable."

He added, "In 1968, 15,776 members of the Vietcong infrastructure were neutralized, 87.1 percent of whom were low level functionaries. Anti-VCI (Vietcong Infrastructure) operations showed major improvements but did not seriously harm the VCI."

ST. LOUIS, MO.
GLOBE-DEMOCRAT

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APR 23 1972

Edward W. O'Brien

Soviet spying unmasked

WASHINGTON — It's not fashionable any longer to apply the term "Cold War" to the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Semantics aside, the two super-powers are in fact in a great struggle for what each considers to be stakes of the highest value. Tangled though the Vietnam war issues are, one issue surely is the future role of Washington and Moscow in the future of South-east Asia.

In other parts of the world, the struggle takes varied forms, one of them being the collection of information — or, bluntly, espionage. It is for this purpose that American taxpayers appropriate hundreds of millions of dollars annually to the Central Intelligence Agency and possibly larger amounts to military intelligence organizations.

A few years ago, the CIA was a high-priority target in this country of many Leftists, who said the United States should not soil its hands on dirty tricks against the Kremlin.

RECENTLY, DOMESTIC ATTACKS on the CIA have subsided, partly because of its discreet and effective director, Richard Helms, who has succeeded in disarming most congressional critics of CIA by informing them honestly and fully about his agency's findings and conclusions.

How about the other side?

As often happens in such matters, little has been said publicly in the United States about Russian espionage operations except for an occasional brief headline when the FBI catches a Soviet agent in the act.

Now the Senate Internal Security subcommittee has published a priceless tool for any American with a serious interest in Soviet intelligence and security operations.



O'Brien

THE SUBCOMMITTEE BOOK is a 289-page list and summary of published materials about achievements of Soviet intelligence agencies. The notable aspect of all this is that most of the materials were published in and by the Soviet itself, in books, magazines, and newspapers.

Until eight years ago, the Russians maintained their traditional policy of silence about their espionage activities. Premier Nikita Khrushchev, for example, declared in 1962 that the Soviet was not engaging in espionage because it did not intend to attack anyone and therefore did not need such information.

But on Sept. 4, 1964, the Senate study states, "the Soviet Union did a dramatic reversal, and since then there has been a spate of articles and books extolling the Soviet intelligence and security services and creating a new pantheon of heroes—the staunch protectors of the fledgling Communist regime of the 1918-1921 period and the intrepid intelligence operatives spying abroad during the inter-war period at great personal sacrifice and danger for the Soviet fatherland."

THE FIRST OF THE NEW heroes was Richard Sorge, who spied brilliantly for the Soviet in Tokyo just before and during World War II. He was discovered, tortured, and executed by the Japanese in 1944.

Once the publicity barrier was down, many other spies were deified. Rudolf Abel, who was convicted in New York in 1957 and later sent back to Moscow in a prisoner exchange, was glorified as another Sorge by the KGB, the Soviet security service.

"The admission to the Soviet people that the KGB — long portrayed to them as an internal, defensive arm of the state — does in fact engage in peacetime spying abroad was even more dramatic than the revelations of the activities of military intelligence," The Senate study said.

Some of the Soviet books and articles are available in English translation from the Commerce Department's Joint Publications Research Service here. Even the brief descriptions in the Senate compilation provide a rare glimpse into an obscure side of the all too real world.

THE TALK OF THE TOWN

Studies

ON a recent Tuesday evening, we spent an hour in the Grand Ballroom of the Waldorf-Astoria listening to graduate students, lecturers, professors, and an assortment of scholars and specialists unwind from a day's work. It was the end of the second day of the twenty-fourth annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies—with headquarters in Ann Arbor—and more than half of the two thousand conferees were relaxing at a reception after spending the day in such seminars as "The Emperor's New Clothes: Symposium on Interpreting the Meiji Restoration," "Continuity and Change in Princely India," "Lu Hsun: The Man, the Artist, and His Ambiguities," "Judicial Conscience in Modern Japan," "Wang Yang-Ming (1472-1529): In Commemoration of the 500th Anniversary of His Birth," and "Yogācāra Buddhism."

When we got there, at about five-thirty, the ballroom was teeming with white Americans (who were easily in the majority), a handful of black Americans, and a liberal sprinkling of Chinese, Filipinos, Koreans, Japanese, Indians, Burmese, and other Asians. At the center of the large stage that is a fixture of the ballroom was an elfin young Japanese lady—Fusako Yoshida, we learned—plucking classical Japanese music from a long stringed instrument, whose ends were resting on wooden horses covered with red cloth. There was nothing on the stage but Miss Yoshida and her instrument. She had on a sea-green kimono with a broad gold-colored obi; her hair was piled high in what looked like a spiral of buns; and her feet were shod in a pair of wooden clogs. Miss Yoshida was treated as a pleasant background to the evening, her music competing with the babble of chatter, though in her demureness, the delicacy of the sounds she brought from the instrument, and the economy of her physical stature she quite dominated the stage.

So as not to look too much a stranger in all this Fordham Forest where, we went over to a bar, bought a

bourbon-and-water, and, glass in hand, walked around, either listening to what people were saying or talking to them ourself. The first man we went up to was a short, middle-aged American who was sitting at a table in the vicinity of the stage, seemingly engrossed in the music. He was a Bostonian, he told us, who had studied at the University of Wisconsin and was now a professor in East-West relations at Cheyney State College, in Pennsylvania.

"What instrument is that?" we asked.

"A koto," he replied. "It belongs to a large family of traditional Japanese stringed instruments, one of which is the samisen—considerably smaller."

"Good music," we observed.

"Exquisite," he replied. "You know, I adore Orientals, feel very much at home in their company, and am just as fond of their culture. I even took up karate. Not to use it, mind you—or, at least, I hope I'll never have to—but to keep in touch with the Oriental spirit and sensibility."

We told the professor that the meeting seemed remarkably well attended and asked him what had brought so many people out.

"All sorts of things," he said. "There are some people here looking for jobs, some looking to change jobs, some looking for intellectual rejuvenation, some just looking for old friends, and some, like me, hoping to meet scholars whose work we've admired. You might even find people from the federal government here. Take the C.I.A.—they have an interest in what goes on here."

"Scholarly?" we asked.

"Sure, scholarly—why not? Some of my best friends are in the C.I.A."

At this point, seeking to broaden our acquaintance, we turned to a man standing nearby, who may or may not have overheard the conversation. We hadn't broadened things very much, it turned out, for there on the man's lapel badge, along with his name, was the designation "C.I.A." A tall, white-haired man in his early fifties,

he was wearing a black suit and a narrow, red-and-gray striped tie, and under tortoiseshell glasses was the gentlest pair of eyes we had seen that day. We asked him what he did for the C.I.A., and he said he was a China-studies specialist, doing research and analysis in the Agency's geography department. He had been there since

the end of the Second World War, after he came back from New Guinea, the Philippines, and Japan, where he had served in the armed forces.

"What is the C.I.A.'s interest in this meeting?" we asked.

"This is where you find the best minds in Asian studies," he replied. "They are my brethren. From time to time, we have to get in touch with them to find out what the new frontiers in research are. In our business, accuracy is the name of the game. We can't afford not to keep up with what's going on."

We said "Fair enough," thanked him, and moved on.

Sauntering in the direction of Miss Yoshida, who, we had noticed, was taking a breather at a table near the stage, we passed two happy-go-lucky-looking young men in crumpled sports jackets, battered old suede boots, and collars open at the neck—a uniform identifying them as graduate students. "Why are all the attractive girls in South Asian studies?" one of the young men said. The other laughed before he answered, and we didn't wait to hear what he said.

Next, we overheard a fragment of another conversation, among a foursome consisting of a Japanese, an Indian, and two white Americans. One of the Americans was saying, "Did you see all those professors running around with their bright graduate students in tow? I hear the job pickings are slim this year. In fact, they seem to be getting slimmer every year. A few years ago, there was a great demand for Asian scholars, but apparently that was in anticipation of the postwar baby boom, and the boom has trailed off now, leaving smaller classes and a surplus of teachers."

Miss Yoshida smiled modestly at us when we arrived at her table and introduced herself. She seemed to be in her early thirties, and her mouth and eyes were lovely and expressive. She told us she was not in Asian Studies but was appearing at the reception under the auspices of the Japan Society. We asked what she had been playing, and she said, "A number of modern and traditional Japanese pieces." She handed us the program of a recital she had given at Carnegie Hall last November, along with Sumiko Murashima, a young Japanese soprano. Most of the pieces she was playing at the reception were on the program, she said.

We chatted next with a tall, bespectacled, clerical-looking man, who, indeed, turned out to be a Presbyterian minister, and also the Southeast Asia specialist at Illinois College, in Jacksonville. He had returned a while ago from Chiang Mai, Thailand, where, he said, he had done community-development work for more than twenty years. We asked him what had brought him back to the States after a lifetime in the East.

"Success," he said. "I worked myself out of a job."

"Is that success?" we asked.

"For me it is," he replied. "As a foreigner in community-development work, you are not doing very well if the local people can't get along without you after a reasonable time. You are expected to train them to the point where they will literally take over your job."

We headed for an exit, slowing down to follow a conversation between a couple walking alongside us—a smiling, open-faced Chinese girl and a short white American with a toothbrush mustache and a pair of granny glasses.

"I've about had it," the man said to the girl. "The first day was great, but around about now I just want to go home. I'm tired of running around talking to people."

"Ah," the girl said, smiling. "You miss your wife, perhaps?"

"No, I don't miss my wife," he replied. "As a matter of fact, my books are what I miss. I'm dying to get back to them."

CIA Latitude Flabbergasting

Fiscal conservatives and no-nonsense leaders such as the late Sen. Robert A. Taft would be utterly flabbergasted to learn that a free-wheeling agency within the United States government is permitted to spend untold millions in tax funds with only minimal accountability to Congress.

But that is precisely the case. The Central Intelligence Agency, which is waging its own war against undefined enemies in Laos, has a secret budget and a high disdain for the legislative branch of government.

Early in the year it was disclosed that funds voted the Agency for International Development have been diverted to the CIA for use in its Laotian war. The disclosure had the side effect of discrediting much of the fine work of AID in extending technical assistance to the people of other lands. Because of the apparent tie to the CIA, AID now operates in the same suspicious light that falls upon government-sponsored radio stations that are nothing more than CIA espionage tools.

There may be some relief from the excesses of America's best publicized secret agency. Sen. John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky., has offered a bill which would oblige the CIA to provide congressional committees dealing with foreign policy the same information and assessments it now releases only to the White House.

The CIA presently briefs Congress, but only when it has White House authorization to do so. It is an understandable suspicion, under the circumstances, that the CIA's machinations, usually involving the military and political affairs of other nations, are undertaken in giddy and irresponsible fashion. Most of us, given millions of dollars to play with, would be giddy and irresponsible.

Curiously, the CIA has never played a decisive role in any American diplomatic achievement. On the other hand, it has figured prominently in several embarrassments to the nation. It ought to be abolished. If congressional timidity prevents abolition, it should be restricted to certain well-defined work, with full accountability to Congress.

The people are rapidly losing their taste for the cloak-and-dagger skullduggery of Cold War diplomacy, and the Cooper bill might be a good means of getting this information to the CIA.

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10 YEARS FOR EMBASSY MAN 'IN SOVIET TRAP'

By JAMES ALLAN and PETER THORNTON

A £4,000-A-YEAR British Embassy cypher clerk, who was said to have turned Russian spy for fear of blackmail over his innocent relationship with a married woman, was sentenced at the Old Bailey yesterday to 10 years' imprisonment.

The clerk, LEONARD MICHAEL HINCHLIFFE, 39, who had been stationed at Khartoum and Algiers, pleaded guilty to four charges under the Official Secrets Act of communicating documents.

Passing sentence, Lord WIDGERY, the Lord Chief Justice, said to him: "There is no doubt that there is no motive other than plain greed. You sold your country's secrets at a time when you were in a position of trust."

He added: "I shall make a substantial reduction in the sentence you would otherwise have got on account of the fact that you have confessed voluntarily and at a time when, had you not confessed, you might well have been free for a long time, if not for ever."

"I also take note of the fact that you were not politically motivated. You did not, therefore, give your contact the best material available to you, but material of a lower grade."

Bus driver's son

The platonic friendship between tall, bearded Leonard Hinchliffe, son of a Liverpool bus driver, and another British Embassy official's wife became a talking point in the tightly-knit diplomatic circle in Khartoum, the Sudanese capital.

The friendship had begun soon after his arrival in Khartoum in 1968 as he struggled to overcome the mental torment of the death of his 10-month-old son, Nicholas. The boy had died in his arms on the voyage out and was buried at sea.

According to Sir ELWYN JONES, Q.C., defending, "this dreadful experience had a totally disturbing affect on him." He and his wife, Patricia Anne, now 37, decided that the best way for Leonard to have another child.

Because there was a risk of pregnancy complications, Mrs Hinchliffe returned home for the birth of the child, which arrived in March, 1969.

Mental distress

While Hinchliffe was suffering much mental distress and confusion of mind his woman friend comforted him. They were frequently together, but there was no infidelity.

When his wife returned, still suffering from post-natal depression, he told her about the friendship and said the woman had been responsible for helping him back to normal. Hinchliffe suggested his wife should be grateful for that, but instead it made her feel "a bitter sense of her own inadequacy."

Though it took some time for the Hinchliffes to re-establish a close relationship they did so. Mrs Hinchliffe said it was the happiest time of their lives.

One day in July, 1970, five months after he had last seen the woman, a Soviet agent telephoned to ask him: "Does your wife know about your mistress?"

Hinchliffe replied that she did. But the KGB agent said: "We can always suggest there was more to it."

Afraid that the Russians would carry out their threat to approach his wife and destroy their happiness, he agreed to meet the agent, who was called André, next day at the Blue Nile cinema.

More meetings

Sir Peter Rawlinson, Q.C., Attorney-General, prosecuting, said Hinchliffe was asked to identify

British Embassy staff from photographs. He agreed to supply papers. Future meetings were arranged.

Hinchliffe's position as head of the registry, or archivist, made him an ideal recruit for the Russians.

He had access to and control over secret documents passing through the embassy and supervision of cypher machines. He was responsible for making up and opening the diplomatic bag and had custody of cypher keys and codes.

Hinchliffe told André the name of the cypher machine. He provided a section of the cypher key used to decode a telegram from the Foreign Office to the embassy, plus a section

of plain text and part of the coded text.

Sir Peter said: "It is difficult to accept that he could not have appreciated what he had done and the value of the information he had supplied."

"But whether he did or not, by studying the material he had given the Russians, they could not only learn the content of the telegram, but they would also be able to determine the type of cypher used, how to identify it in other cypher telegrams and how the cypher system works."

"He had given the Russians valuable material which must cause serious injury to the interests of the State."

Other documents, though of a less serious nature, were handed over.

In July, 1970, he returned to Britain on leave. He went to Northwick Park station, near Harrow, with a copy of *Punch* under his arm. A Russian agent approached him and asked: "Can you direct me to Alexandra Park?" Hinchliffe replied: "I don't know. I have just come back from the Sudan." This was a password and the Russian handed over £1,000 in £5 notes.

Hinchliffe returned to the Sudan two months later and carried on as a Russian agent.

Paid £3,000

In a period of nine months Hinchliffe was paid nearly £3,000 by the Russians. When he was posted to Algiers last June he was to have continued spying.

But, according to a statement he made to the police, he decided to break with the Russians. Hinchliffe confessed to the British ambassador in Algiers, Mr Ronald Burroughs, and flew to London to be arrested by Scotland Yard Special Branch officers.

He made a full confession, identified the documents he had given to the Russians and

named the agents he had been in contact with. The Attorney-General said this would go a long way to preventing further damage to State security.

Gregarious man

Throughout the period of his espionage activities he went unsuspected by colleagues at the embassy or by other members of the British community. To them he was a well-liked and gregarious man who took a prominent part in social life.

He was the leading man in the Khartoum theatrical company, translated plays for it from French, wrote a Christmas pantomime and appeared on local television.

He was a member of the old Sudan Club where he frequently dropped in for a John Collins cocktail.

At weekends he would borrow the embassy Land Rover and drive off with his wife and children for a camping trip. Known to his friends as Mike, he was regarded as a smart dresser who led a normal family life.

"Very friendly"

The Very Rev. Patrick Blair, formerly honorary chaplain to the British Embassy in Khartoum, said: "I thought he was a very friendly person."

"His main interest appeared to be in acting and writing. I think he was writing a novel. But he never discussed his work at the embassy."

When he first arrived his distinguished appearance led many people to mistake him for a senior embassy official.

As a member of the Sudan Club, commented: "When he first came in I thought he must be a new first secretary at least. Then they told me he was a grade 10 clerk and I couldn't believe it."

Hinchliffe's wife was in court throughout the hearing. She said afterwards: "Naturally I will stand by my husband and wait for him. I am glad the nightmare, is over."

The Hinchliffes have three children, a boy aged 12 and two daughters, 11 and 2.

Lao Spies Help War On Opium

Heroin Makers' Supplies Reduced

By ARNOLD ABRAMS

Miami Herald-Newsday Wire

VIENTIANE, Laos —

American-directed teams of native spies are being staked along the mountain trails of northern Laos as part of a \$1 million campaign to stop the opium traffic from the opium fields of Laos, Thailand and Burma.

The anti-drug campaign is being waged by a task force that includes a narcotics attache from the American Embassy here and at least 10 U.S. Customs officers who act as advisers to local authorities at border crossings and airport facilities. Embassy officials say they harbor no illusion about stopping the flow of narcotics from the jungle area known as the "golden triangle."

"ONLY A FOOL would say we'll be able to do that," one American said. "But if we can reduce the traffic and cause some opium dealers some trouble, we'll be doing something."

Some experts believe that Vientiane and Bangkok, the capital of Thailand, now rank as the world's largest producers of heroin, an opium derivative, and provide most of the heroin used by American servicemen in Vietnam.

Little of the traffic from the golden triangle gets to the United States, federal officials say, but that could change. "As we cut off other sources (such as Turkey), the triangle is a ready-made source of opium," said Robert Nickoloff, action regional director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. "It's just a matter of developing the trade routes."

As part of the campaign, spy teams of Lao tribesmen trained by the Central Intelligence Agency are providing authorities here with information about drug-smuggling routes and the location of narcotics refineries. That information has led to a series of ambushes against drug-hauling convoys and raids on two large refineries.

IN BAN Houei Sai, a narcotics traffic center about 225 miles north west of Vientiane, a refinery was destroyed by a mysterious fire last year, and last month a raid by Lao police netted large amounts of chemicals and semirefined heroin. American involvement in both actions was said to be significant.

The teams have conducted more traditional spy work, infiltrating South China's Yunnan province to spy on Chinese political and military activities. The Nixon Administration ordered those operations stopped last summer. "They (the spies) are well trained for reconnaissance work," one high-ranking source said. "It makes no difference whether they are gathering intelligence on drug traffic within Laos or military traffic outside it."

Despite the successes of the spy teams, here remain huge obstacles to the success of the American anti-drug campaign. One is the involvement of high-ranking Lao military and government officials in drug traffic. Laos' "Mr. Big" allegedly is Ouan Rathikoun, a former army chief of staff, but many prominent figures still in office also have a hand in the action.

THE VICE president of the National Assembly, for example, recently was stopped by airport police in Paris with a suitcase full of heroin. For political reasons, French authorities released the Lao-tian official, who claimed he had been framed. Knowledgeable observers here were certain, however, that it was less a matter of framing than a bribe backfiring.

Another obstacle is the fact that opium is the stuff of life for the fiercely independent mountain folk of eastern Burma and northern Thailand, who grow most of the opium that passes through Laos. It is their principal cash crop and is used in trade for household and farm utensils, salt, kerosene and silver for ornamentation. Opium profits buy modern weapons — automatic rifles, grenade launchers, machine guns

Radio stations deceived Americans

Robert White's article on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty was interesting, and his advocacy of continued funding for the stations on the basis of good programming and large audiences is understandable, but there are questions more profound that need to be asked.

Integrity of government in dealing with its citizens is also at stake, as well as the more practical diplomatic problem posed by American installations in friendly foreign nations promoting anti-Soviet propaganda.

The prime grievance we all should have against RFE and RL stems from their long deception of the American people. For more than 20 years the operations were billed as voluntary enterprises supported by the contributions of Americans. Advertising, particularly by RFE, was always urgently directed toward Americans to help bring "truth" to the prisoners of communism.

Both organizations were set up as corporations with big-name Americans on their letterheads as a blind to hide their true source of support. And while the deception was an open secret among well-informed people, the conspiracy of political silence was total until Sen. Case disclosed their CIA funding.

Another part of the deception has been the use of prominent American travelers and scholars behind the Iron Curtain as informants for RFE and RL. Many such trips, supposedly innocent of espionage, were sponsored by and paid for from CIA funds, using RFE and RL as fronts for people doing "research."

A good deal of the scholarship and research generated in support of RFE and

RL has always been CIA-funded. I suppose that many of the people who performed the tasks were not fully aware of the identity of their sponsors.

It is these peripheral activities of RFE and RL I believe to be the most corrupting, because they strike at the very root of intellectual integrity.

It may be true, as White says, that RFE and RL have large followings behind the Iron Curtain, but they are not the only foreign broadcasters to the Communist world, nor are they necessarily the best. BBC certainly was, and I hope still is, extremely effective.

Another difficulty with the two stations, now that their cover has been "blown," is that they are official foreign installations disturbing to the political sovereignty of the host nations. When the pretense could be maintained that RFE and RL were private and not related to the U.S. government, host nations could ignore Soviet protests. This they now will find difficult.

RFE and RL are headquartered in Munich, but some of their transmitters are located in places other than West Germany. How can such countries openly accommodate those broadcast facilities, which are so unremittingly hostile to Soviet interests?

How would we feel if the Soviets had a series of powerful transmitters in Mexico, spilling Soviet propaganda into the United

States? Can West Germany now continue to permit those troublesome installations to remain within its borders when the West German government is trying to heal some of the wounds of World War II? Surely Soviet negotiators have a good argument in dealing with German officials.

I hold no brief for the Soviet paranoia about free circulation of news, but I think that justification of the expense of maintaining RFE and RL is pretty shaky, both in the light of past ineffectiveness in altering Soviet policy and in the light of present availability of a great many programs from the radio stations of other nations, including our own Voice of America—Ervin J. Gaines, director, Minneapolis Public Library.

Editor's note: Dr. Gaines was on the administrative staff of Radio Liberty from 1952 to 1954.

Doctor Holds Right Wing Group, CIA Killed Kennedy

By KATHY LILLY

The pain of President John F. Kennedy's assassination has been dulled for most Americans, but not for Dr. Cyril Wecht, who believes a well-financed right wing group and the CIA were involved in a death plot.

Dr. Wecht, Allegheny County (Pittsburgh) coroner and a well-known forensic pathologist (a doctor who applies medicine to the law) with a long list of credentials, says scientific evidence clearly shows Lee Harvey Oswald did not act alone in killing Kennedy.

"Based on scientific study, I know Lee Harvey Oswald was not a sole assassin," Dr. Wecht told the Beacon Journal in an interview.

"My own theory — not based on science — is that I think there are two possibilities not necessarily exclusive of each other . . . Some ultra right wing group fearful of the President's actions, philosophies and motives — and I believe the CIA was involved."

DR. WECHT was in Akron Saturday to address 130 members of the Ohio Osteopathic Medical Assistants Association, meeting at Hilton Inn West for an annual convention. (Dr. Wecht is a medical doctor).

"I am not consumed with my investigation, I don't have the time. And I'm not planning to write a book. But I intend to keep on pursuing this because I'm deeply disturbed that organized bodies (like the American Academy of Forensic Science of which he is immediate past president) have been ignored.

"I'm disturbed that the American public has been deceived and that we're treated like children.

"I want to try to get to the heart of these inconsistencies (in the Warren Commission report and other documents) and see if we can come up with a truthful report."

So far, he says, the government won't let him.

ALL THE autopsy reports, photographs and other scientific documents were given to Kennedy's widow, who gave them as a private gift to the National Archives with the stipulation that after five years (which expired last Fall) experts in the field with historical or scientific interests could examine the material.

Dr. Wecht asked the administrator, Burke Marshall, Dean of Yale University Law School, for permission several months ago and still hasn't gotten an answer.

"The only one who has received permission is a urologist — a kidney specialist. He (the specialist) previously wrote three articles agreeing with the Warren Commission report. I had written about it and criticized it.

"Marshall's reasons are because the government is fearful. They know there are parts of the investigation that are contradictory, incomplete and inadequate. I have somewhat of a reputation in this field. I couldn't make something that isn't there," said Dr. Wecht.

DR. WECHT grows more intense as he becomes involved in explaining the contradictions. His brow wrinkled, his arms gesturing, his voice takes on a note of anger and incredulity.

"Lee Harvey Oswald was above, behind and to the right

of the President. The Zapruder film clearly shows when the President is struck he slumps backward to the left. He goes immediately backward.

"Anyone who knows anything about this sort of thing would know this just could not happen. A high velocity rifle like Oswald used would have a tremendous impact.

"The grassy knoll in front to the right of the President would account for this physical move," he said.

The film, made by Abraham Zapruder, an amateur, was the most accurate filming of the shooting. Zapruder sold it to Life magazine which used Dr. Wecht as a consultant on it.

DR. WECHT said the film disputes the single bullet theory of the Warren Commission.

"The single bullet theory — I call it the 'magic bullet theory' — is that the shot struck the President in the back, re-entered (Texas) Gov. John Connally's back, went through the front of his chest, through the right wrist and lodged in his left thigh.

"The bullet alleged to have done all this was not found until several hours later. A janitor in the basement of the hospital claims he found the bullet on a stretcher. They deduced it was from Connally and had fallen from his thigh," said Dr. Wecht.

"That type of bullet, in its pristine state, weighs from 161 to 161.51 grains. The bullet found weighed 159 grains. It had only lost a total of 2.5 grains.

"X-rays showed it left particles in four different locations — Kennedy's and Connally's chest, and Connally's wrist and thigh. It shattered a rib in Connally's chest and

then extensively fractured a large bone in the wrist.

"It (the bullet) also shows practically no deformity or mutilation at all. A bullet simply would not do that without deformity, mutilation and some loss of substance," said Dr. Wecht.

DR. WECHT said he testified about his findings at a hearing in a Washington, D.C. federal court in 1969, when New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison was asking to see the National Archives evidence.

The judge agreed to his request but government appeals kept the material from being seen before the Clay Shaw trial began.

"I have been consulting with Garrison, but didn't testify because I couldn't review the material and because the trial was coming on more like a circus than a real courtroom action," he said.

He said the government doesn't want the material seen by an expert like himself qualified to testify in court (a forensic pathologist) because "if you don't buy the single bullet theory you can't buy that Lee Harvey Oswald was a sole assassin."

He said the Zapruder film, reviewed by the FBI and Kodak Laboratories, showed Oswald would have had time to fire only the one bullet.

DR. WECHT also said the left side of the President's brain was never examined to determine if there was another bullet or fragment.

"There's no question in my mind any testimony in even a routine murder case based on that sort of partial examination would be stricken," he said.

Dr. Wecht said Dallas Patrolman J. D. Tippett, who was killed by Oswald, was not in his assigned area when he was killed and had not been ordered to the scene where he found Oswald, nor had he called in to report he was leaving his assigned area.

"When J. D. Tippett pulled up, Oswald knew something was amiss. He shot first because he was about to be gunned down.

"Oswald was not a sole assassin. There's no question that's why he was shot. Jack Ruby finished the job that J. D. Tippett was assigned," Dr. Wecht said.

HE SAID Oswald was a double agent and probably a triple agent who had defected to Russia, deserting the Marines, and had married a Russian whose uncle was a high ranking officer in the Russian secret police.

"Yet Oswald got permission to return to the U. S. in a matter of days — with that

kind of record — when even an ordinary tourist who lost his passport would have to go through endless red tape.

"And he was on the CIA payroll at some time," said Dr. Wecht. "Yet, with this sort of record no one bothered to check him out before

the President's visit — a routine measure."

Dr. Wecht also is president of the American College of Legal Medicine, is on the faculty of the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine and is on the Duquesne University Research Law staff.

APR 16 1972

M - 127,079

S - 174,257

Diem Assassination Was a 'Monstrous Blunder'

By S. L. A. Marshall,
Brig. Gen (ret.)

Times/Post News Service

IN HIS WELL-POLISHED MEMOIR, "Swords and Plowshares," Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor sees the murder of former South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Nhu and his brother, Ngo Dinh Diem, as a monstrous blunder in the Vietnam War, bringing about political confusion that vastly prolonged the struggle.

Though one might answer such a theory in the words of the French diplomat who said that it is an idle exercise in history to speculate on what might have happened had that which happened not happened, the Taylor opinion stays no less weighty in the aftermath of the military coup and the killings. Taylor became ambassador to Saigon and had to cope with the consequent chaos.

As he correctly puts it, the inexcusable mistake of all who conspired to overthrow Diem was that they had planned nothing better to replace him.

The passions and attitudes of that summer nine years ago almost inevitably generated a violent climax. Diem was under heavy fire. He was being viciously assailed by the American press in Saigon, who waged their vendetta because Diem scorned them and they were being starved of news.

Public opinion in the United States, seeing Diem as a lesser evil, vented its rage against Nhu because of his oppression of the Buddhists led by Tri Quang, who was just another Vietnamese racketeer in a saffron robe. The self-immolation of several Buddhist monks in protest against Nhu's measures also served to fire American emotion. Though Taylor indicates that Tri Quang had contrived these sacrifices to topple Diem, Madame Nhu, already an object of particular loathing to the American press, intensified the get-Diem movement by

referring to them as "barbecues." Thus, in the summer of 1963, several official statements came out of Washington that seemed clearly to signal that the U.S. government would welcome the ruination of Diem.

Gen. Taylor's freshly minted memoir lifts the lid on that subject more than a little. On Aug. 24, when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there came to his desk a U.S. State Department action paper already cleared and cabled to the embassy in Saigon. What he read alarmed Taylor as it did other defense principals.

The authors of the already cabled instruction were Undersecretary of State W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman and a White House staffer, Michael Forrestal. They had cleared their paper with Undersecretary of State George Ball while he was playing golf and with the late President Kennedy via telephone, which signifies mainly that the clearers gave only passing attention to a major and convulsive change in American policy.

Significantly, the paper had not been cleared with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who was not anti-Diem, or the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense.

The sense of the paper sent to the new ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, was that the United States would no longer tolerate the presence of brother Nhu in the Saigon government. Diem, however, must be given a chance to get rid of Nhu. At the same time, Lodge was to inform key South Vietnamese generals about this change in the U.S. position. Not only that, but if at any point the generals decided to get rid of President Diem, they were told the United States would directly support their action.

So what was in essence this instruction to the ambassador? Only a twisted mind would see it other than as a license for the South Vietnamese military

to form a cabal to gun down Diem and Nhu with the approval of the United States.

Inside official U.S. circles there was no protest against the course so definitely set forth. Some of those directly concerned such as Taylor might in their own minds question the wisdom of the instruction or policy shift. But none said clearly: "What we propose to do is immoral. It is beneath the dignity of the United States that we as a government would conspire to political assassination. My conscience won't take it. So I will turn in my suit." One by one the principals fell in line with what had become, if by default, White House policy. In the end, the deed was done.

Be it said in favor of the Vietnamese military brass that they were more loath to become the executioners of Diem and Nhu than were U.S. generals and diplomats.

Taylor, however, in noting the incident, writes: "I know of no evidence of direct American participation in the coup and certainly of none in the assassination."

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APR. 14 1977

Percy on ABM and SST

WASHINGTON—A TRIBUNE editorial [April 7] entitled "Secrets of the CIA," unintentionally misrepresented my position on two issues, the supersonic transport and the antiballistic missile system. The editorial stated that: "He [Percy] confessed to voting wrong on the supersonic transport and the antiballistic defense system, both of which he opposed, stating that he had been misled by 'fallacious' information."

At no time have I ever said that I regretted my opposition to the SST or the ABM. I opposed the Sentinel [ABM] system proposed by the Johnson administration for reasons later substantiated by the Nixon administration. I have consistently opposed expansion of the Safeguard [ABM] system so long as any reasonable chance existed of achieving an enforceable nuclear arms reduction agreement with the Soviet Union.

At the hearing to which your editorial referred, I complimented the CIA, whose intelligence briefings had given me valuable information vital to my votes on the ABM, all of which I stand behind.

I also said at the CIA hearings that the SST offered another example of the necessity of senators having adequate backup information prior to votes. Without such information, I originally supported the SST. After additional intensive study, however, I concluded it was not a viable project economically and reflected distorted priorities. Consequently, I helped lead the fight against continued federal funding of the SST in 1970 and 1971.

My office has received several inquiries on this editorial. I hope this letter will clarify any questions that may have been raised in your readers' minds.

Charles H. Percy
United States Senator

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
CHRONICLE

M - 480,233

APR 13 1972

CIA Spy Teams Are Hitting the Opium Trail in Laos

By Arnold Abrams
Chronicle Foreign Service

Vientiane, Laos

American-directed spy teams, which used to conduct reconnaissance missions in southern China, have turned their attention to a new target: opium traffic in northern Laos.

The teams, trained and supported by the Central Intelligence Agency, are providing authorities here with information about drug-smuggling routes and the location of narcotics refineries.

The results of such efforts, according to well-informed sources, have included a series of ambushes against drug-hauling convoys, and raids on two large refineries.

Although still reluctant to provide detailed information, American officials are more willing to discuss the teams' new missions than their old ones, which involved infiltrating south China's Yunnan province to spy on Chinese military and political activities.

The Nixon Administration ordered those operations stopped last summer.

The teams, consisting of native hill tribesmen, operate from CIA outposts in northern Laos. "They are well-trained for reconnaissance work," says one high-ranking source. "It makes no difference whether they are gathering intelligence on drug traffic within Laos or military traffic outside it."

In addition to being a major source of opium grown by hill tribesmen, this landlocked mountain kingdom

provides transport routes for opium harvested in the "golden triangle" — a heavily jungled area where the borders of Burma, Laos and Thailand converge.

Spy teams and CIA-trained guerrilla units now are being staked along rugged mountain trails traditionally used by mule and coolie convoys to haul poppy produce down through Laos. A major target area is Ban Houei Sai, a narcotics traffic center about 225 miles northwest of Vientiane.

One refinery there was destroyed by a mysterious fire last year; more recently, a March raid by Lao police netted large amounts of chemicals and semi-refined heroin. American involvement in both moves reportedly was significant.

Such missions are part of an anti-drug campaign in Laos by a task force from several U.S. government agencies.

Key force members include a narcotics attache in the American embassy and at least ten U.S. customs officers acting as advisers to local authorities at border crossings and airport facilities.

The American campaign, in which Lao officials were pressured last fall to pass their country's first anti-drug laws, will cost close to \$1 million. Nevertheless, embassy officials say they harbor no illusions about stopping narcotics traffic here.

"Only a fool would say we'll be able to do that,"

says one American. "But if we can reduce the traffic, and cause opium dealers some trouble, we'll be doing something."

A major obstacle remains the involvement of high-ranking Lao military and government officials in drug traffic. This country's "Mr. Big" allegedly is Ouan Rathikoun, former army chief of staff, but many prominent figures still in their posts also have a hand in the action.

The vice president of Laos' National Assembly, for example, recently was caught by airport police in Paris with a suitcase full of heroin.

Bring The CIA To Heel

Although Congress in the foreign aid authorization bill signed earlier this year imposed some controls over the Central Intelligence Agency, the free wheeling CIA still operates without much accountability to the legislative branch of government. Its budget remains secret. And only last month a study by the General Accounting revealed that Agency for International Development funds intended for public health use in Laos were being diverted to the CIA for use in the guerrilla war in that country.

The record of CIA disdain for the will of Congress underscores the importance of Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on a bill proposed by Senator John Sherman Cooper which would oblige the agency to provide congressional committees dealing with armed services and foreign policy "fully and currently" with both intelligence information and evaluations affecting foreign relations and national security. Two former CIA officials, Dr. Herbert Scoville and Chester L. Cooper, testifying for the bill, said the agency should provide Congress with the same analyses it now regularly provides the White House.

At present CIA briefings of Congress are provided only as sanctioned by the White House. Since Congress also has authority in foreign relations and military affairs, there is justification for giving the legislators access to CIA data. Indeed, its machinations in the military and political affairs of other countries suggest that it has arrogated to itself so many improper policy-making initiatives that the agency should be either be abolished or restricted by law to intelligence gathering alone.

Congress Seeks Facts On CIA

By WILLIAM K. WYANT JR.

A Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, April 11
CONGRESS CAN be gimlet-eyed when looking at welfare projects, but thus far has played the doting, indulgent parent if cloak-and-dagger work is afoot. It is bad form for a legislator to inquire as to how many billions the intelligence agencies are getting, or ask for a peek at what they find out.

That is changing. Senator John Sherman Cooper (Rep.), Kentucky, appears to be making good progress with his proposal that the Central Intelligence Agency make available to Congress what it knows about matters relating to foreign countries and the national security.

Proponents of the Cooper bill say it will prevail because the existing situation does not make sense. Congress needs light to make its decisions. Why should Congress be ignorant of facts and analyses assembled by the United States at great cost?

Congress now operates in the dark. As Cooper noted when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee opened hearings March 28, the foreign intelligence information developed by the CIA and other agencies is available only to President Richard M. Nixon and the Executive Branch, as a matter of law.

"I contend that the Congress, which must make decisions upon foreign policy and national security—which is called upon to commit the material and human resources of the nation—should have access to all available information and intelligence to discharge properly and morally its responsibility to our government and its people," Cooper said.

SENATOR COOPER'S proposal would amend the National Security Act of 1947, under which the CIA was established. There is a precedent for what he wants to do, in that Congress required in 1946 that its joint Committee on Atomic Energy be kept fully informed of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, a federal agency.

It was remarked at the hearings by Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, a member of the Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committees, that he had been unable to obtain nuclear information as a member of those committees. He became a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy last spring.

"I learned more about the true strength of the United States in six days in Europe about this time last year than I did in my previous 18 years as a member of the Armed Services Committee," Symington said.

Testimony on the Cooper proposal gave Senators an opportunity to complain

about the Defense Department's habit of reporting a new Russian "threat" at the time the Pentagon's money bill is going through Congress. Congress, some Senators complained, is asked to take these so-called threats on faith.

"We all know," said Senator George D. Aiken (Rep.), Vermont, "that when the appropriations bill is pending, the Russians in particular become extremely powerful..."

THE COOPER BILL gave the public insight into the curious procedure under which, for security reasons members of the Senate and House are asked to vote on multi-billion-dollar defense issues—including the funds to be spent on intelligence—without being able to know what they are doing.

For example, the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and others are said to cost up to six billion dollars a year, but nobody in the Senate except five senior members of the Appropriations Committee is privy to the amount of money spent. Mammoth sums are hidden in the federal budget.

Senator Symington tried unsuccessfully late last November to put a four billion dollar annual ceiling on outlays of the CIA, NSA, DIA and military intelligence activities. He was defeated 31 to 56. Symington told the Senate he had tried to get information about intelligence outlays from the Appropriations Committee staff, but it was denied him.

This was called by Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, "a shocking and unprecedented situation."

Senator Cooper's bill would not throw light on intelligence-gathering costs but would di-

rect the CIA to make available "facts and analyses" to Senate and House committees dealing with foreign relations and the armed services. The CIA reports would include material produced by all agencies.

WHAT COOPER and his associates want, as a practical matter, is the same basic intelligence that is disseminated to the White House, the Pentagon and other branches of Government. They do not want to be fed tidbits carefully selected by persons who may have an ax to grind.

Vast sums have been voted by Congress to buy weapons systems that insiders maintained were essential to counter perils that turned out to be illusory. Critics of such spending want to be able to question the CIA, which has the reputation of putting out sound and honest reports.

Among witnesses who have testified favorably on the Cooper bill are Adam Yarmolinsky of Harvard Law School, a former assistant secretary of defense, and Herbert Scoville Jr., former director of science and technology for the CIA.

"IT SEEMS TO ME," Yarmolinsky said March 30, "it is rather inappropriate for the Congress of the United States to be in the position of the schoolboy who is lectured by his instructors rather than in the position of the graduate student who is able to go into the library and look up the sources."

Scoville noted that the CIA frequently briefed congressional committees but said this was not so satisfactory, in his opinion, as the situation would be if the CIA had a legal duty to keep Congress informed. He pointed out that measures must be taken to safeguard the information.

"I believe the regularized provision of national intelligence to the Congress by the CIA would improve security," he said, "not compromise it."

In the House, a companion bill to Cooper's has been introduced by Representative Paul Findley (Rep.), Illinois.